Quasi Delict 4b1u5r

Quasi-delicts Example A broke the window of B's house while playing softball. The accident would not have happened had A played a little farther from the house of B. In this case, A has the obligation to pay the damage caused to B by his act although there is no pre-existing. Background image of ===---=== Quasi Delict is a French legal term used in some civil law jurisdictions. It refers to a negligent act or omission which causes harm or damage to the person or property of another, and thus exposes a person to civil liability as if the act or omission was intentional. It is a residuary category of private wrongs, characterized by either vicarious or strict liability. In quasi delicts the law creates a liability though the defendant may not in fact be to blame. A quasi-delict is a wrong which occurs unintentionally, as a result of something like negligence, where as a true delict requires intentional action. Thus, someone who commits murder has committed a delict, while manslaughter would be an example of a quasi-delict.

QUASI-DELICT Q – What are the requisites of quasi-delict? Answer: The requisites of quasi-delict are the following: (a) there must be an act or omission; (b) such act or omission causes damage to another; (c) such act or omission is caused by fault or negligence; and (d) there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. (Chan, Jr. v. Iglesia Ni Cristo, Inc., G.R. No. 160283, October 14, 2005).

Res Ipsa Loquitur; Medical Negligence Cases Once again, the SC in Dr. Milagros Cantre v. Sps. Go, G.R. No. 160889, April 27, 2007, had the occasion to say that the Hippocratic Oath mandates physicians to give primordial consideration to the well-being of their patients. If a doctor fails to live up to this precept, he is able for his acts. This notwithstanding, courts face a unique restraint in adjudicating medical negligence cases because physicians are not guarantors of case and, they never set out to intentionally cause injury to their patients. However, intent is immaterial in negligence cases because where negligence exists and is proven, it automatically gives the injured a right to reparation for the damage caused. (Ramos v. CA, G.R. No. 124354, December 29, 1999, 321 SCRA 584). In cases involving medical negligence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur allows the mere existence of an injury to justify a presumption of negligence on the part of the person who controls the instrument causing the injury, provided that the following requisites concur: 1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; 2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and 3. the possibility of contributing conduct would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated. In this case, a woman gave birth. Due to the operation, there was profuse bleeding inside her womb, hence, the doctors performed various medical procedures. Her blood pressure was monitored with the use of a sphygmomamometer. It was observed later on that there was a fresh gaping wound in the inner portion of her left arm. The NBI-Medico Legal found out that it appeared to be a burn resulting in the placing of a droplight near her skin. Despite surgical operation, there was an unsightly mark in her left arm and the pain remained and her movements were restricted. A complaint was filed praying for damages where the RTC rendered judgment holding the doctor liable. The CA affirmed, but modified the judgment. On appeal to the

SC it was contended that the wound was not caused by the droplight but by the constant taking of her blood pressure. The SC said that, that is immaterial. The medical practice is to deflate the blood pressure cuff immediately after each use. Otherwise, the inflated band can cause injury to the patient similar to what could have happened in this case. Thus, if the wound was caused by the blood pressure cuff, then the taking of the blood pressure must have been done so negligently as to have inflicted a gaping wound on her arm, for which the defendant cannot escape liability under the “captain of the ship” doctrine. The argument that the failed plastic surgery was not intended as a cosmetic procedure, but rather as a measure to prevent complication does not help her case. It does not negate negligence on her part. Based on the foregoing, the presumption that defendant was negligent in the exercise of her profession stands unrebutted. In this connection, the Civil Code provides: ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done… ART. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission. Clearly, under the law, the defendant is obliged to pay plaintiff for moral damages suffered by the latter as a proximate result of her negligence. On the presumption of negligence under the principle of res ipsa loquitur, the SC in applying the requirements of the rule said: As to the first requirement, the gaping wound the plaintiff’s certainly not an ordinary occurrence in the act of delivering a baby, far removed as the arm is from the organs involved in the process of giving birth. Such injury could not have happened unless negligence had set in somewhere.

Second, whether the injury was caused by the droplight or by the blood pressure cuff is of no moment. Both instruments are deemed within the exclusive control of the physician in charge under the “captain of the ship” doctrine. This doctrine holds the surgeon in charge of an operation liable for the negligence of his assistants during the time when those assistants are under the surgeon’s control. (Black Law Dictionary, 192 (5th ed., 1979). In this particular case, it can be logically inferred that defendant, the senior consultant in charge during the delivery of the baby, exercised control over the assistants assigned to both the use of the droplight and the taking of the plaintiff’s blood pressure. Hence, the use of the droplight and the blood pressure cuff is also within her exclusive control. Third, the gaping wound on the plaintiff’s left arm, by its very nature and considering her condition, could only be caused by something external to her and outside her control as she was unconscious while in hypovolemic shock. Hence, plaintiff could not, by any stretch of the imagination, have contributed to her own injury. The defense that the wound was caused not by the droplight but by the constant taking of her blood pressure, even if the latter was necessary given her condition, does not absolve her from liability.

Malicious Prosecution and Damages When someone may be liable for malicious prosecution. In Antonio Diaz v. Davao Light & Power Corp., et al., G.R. No. 160959, April 4, 2007 (Callejo, J), petitioner unilaterally installed a meter to replace another one. There was a notice of disconnection and eventually, the connection was cut. There was a petition for mandatory injunction to restore connection. It was however settled by way of a compromise agreement where the parties agreed to reduce the respondent’s claim and to waive the counterclaim and to install the electric service. There was no agreement to bar the institution of other action. Thereafter, respondent filed criminal cases for theft against the petitioner, hence, a complaint for damages for abuse of right under Article 19, NCC was filed.

Petitioner insisted that the compromise agreement as well as the decision based on it already settled the controversies between them; yet, DLPC instituted the theft case against petitioner, and worse, instituted another action for violation of P.D. 401, as amended by B.P. 876. Thus, the only conclusion that can be inferred from the acts of DLPC is that they were designed to harass, embarrass, prejudice, and ruin him. He further averred that the compromise agreement in civil case completely erased litigious matters that could necessarily arise out of either Electric Meter No. 84737 or 86673509. Moreover, he asserted that the evidence he presented is sufficient to prove the damages he suffered by reason of the malicious institution of the criminal cases. In brushing aside his contentions, the SC Held: Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a compromise as a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced. The purpose of compromise is to settle the claims of the parties and bar all future disputes and controversies. However, criminal liability is not affected by compromise for it is a public offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the Government on its own motion, though complete reparation should have been made of the damages suffered by the offended party. A criminal case is committed against the People, and the offended party may not waive or extinguish the criminal liability that the law imposes for the commission of the offense. Moreover, a compromise is not one of the grounds prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the extinction of criminal liability. Petitioner is not entitled to damages under Articles 19, 20 and 21, and Article 2217 and 2219(8) of the New Civil Code. The elements of abuse of rights are the following: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercise in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. (Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp., Limited v. Catalan, G.R. No. 159591, October 18, 2004, 440 SCRA 498, 511-512; Saber v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132981, August 31, 2004, 437 SCRA 259). Thus, malice or bad faith is at the core of the above provisions. Good faith refers to the state of the mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. In consists of the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. Good faith is presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove

the same. Bad faith, on the other hand, does not simply connote bad judgment to simple negligence, dishonest purpose or some moral obloquy and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty due to some motives or interest or ill-will that partakes of the nature of fraud. Malice connotes ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad motive. There was no malice or bad faith. Petitioner himself alleged in his complaint that he unilaterally installed a meter after it was removed by DLPC. No less than the Court, onished petitioner and reminded him that connections of electrical service and installations of electric meters should always be upon mutual contract of the parties, and that payments for electrical consumption should also be made promptly whenever due. Based on these established facts, petitioner has not shown that the acts of respondent were done with the sole intent of prejudicing and injuring him. Petitioner may have suffered damages as a result of the filing of the complaints. However, there is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone; the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria. (Far East Bank and Trust Company v. Pacilan, Jr., G.R. No. 157314, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 372, 384-385). Whatever damages petitioner may have suffered would have to be borne by him alone since it was his acts which led to the filing of the complaints against him. Concept of malicious prosecution. On the other hand, malicious prosecution has been defined as an action for damages brought by or against who a criminal prosecution, civil suit or other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable

cause, after the termination of such prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of the defendant therein. (Yasonña v. De Ramos, 440 SCRA 154 (2004). It is an established rule that in order for malicious prosecution to prosper, the following requisites must be proven by petitioner: (1) the fact of prosecution and the further fact that the defendant (respondent) was himself the prosecutor, and that the action finally terminated with an acquittal; (2) that in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and (3) that the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice, that is, by improper or sinister motive. The foregoing are necessary to preserve a person’s right to litigate which may be emasculated by the undue filing of malicious prosecution cases. From the foregoing requirements, it can be inferred that malice and want of probable cause must both be clearly established to justify an award of damages based on malicious prosecution. (Id. At 158-159; Villanueva v. UB, G.R. No. 138291, March 7, 2000, 327 SCRA 391, 400; Ponce v. Legaspi, G.R. No. 79184, May 6, 1992, 208 SCRA 377, 388). A claim for damages based on malicious prosecution will prosper only if the three elements aforecited are shown to exist. In this case, the cases were dismissed by the prosecutor before they could be filed in court, hence, they did not end in acquittal. It cannot be likewise concluded that respondent DLPC acted without probable cause when it instituted the actions. The events which led to the filing of the complaints are undisputed, and respondent DLPC cannot be faulted for filing them. In the early case of Buchanan v. Esteban, 32 Phil. 363 (1915) it was stressed that “one cannot be held liable in damages for maliciously instituting a prosecution where he acted with probable cause.” As Justice Moreland explained in that case: Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. The general rule is well settled that one cannot be held liable in damages for maliciously instituting a prosecution where he acted with probable cause. In other words, a suit will lie only in cases where a legal prosecution has been carried on without probable cause. And the reason for the rule as stated by Blackstone, is that it would be a very great discouragement to public justice is prosecutors, who had a

tolerable ground of suspicion, were liable to be sued at law when their indictments miscarried. Thus, the element of malice and the absence of probable cause must be proved. (China Banking Corp. v. CA, G.R. No. 94182, March 28, 1994, 231 SCRA 472, 478; Albenson Enterprise Corp. v. CA, G.R. No. 88694, January 11, 1993, 217 SCRA 16, 29). There must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately knowing that the charge was false and baseless to entitle the victims to damages. The two elements must simultaneously exist; otherwise, the presence of probable cause signifies, as a legal consequence, the absence of malice. (Lucas v. Royo, G.R. No. 136185, October 30, 2000; 344 SCRA 481). In the instant case, it is evidence that respondent DLPC was not motivated by malicious intent or by a sinister design to unduly harass petitioner, but only by a well-founded anxiety to protect its rights. Respondent DLPC cannot therefore be faulted in availing of the remedies provided for by the law. In a free society, controversies are heard and settled under the rule of law in the forum of the courts of justice. It is one of the virtues of our system of government that a person who feels aggrieved does not have to take the law into his or her hands or resort to the use of force for the vindication of injury. The courts are there to hear and act on the complaint. The right to litigate is an escape valve to relieve the pressures of personal disagreements that might otherwise explode in physical confrontation. It is necessary not only for upholding one’s claims when they are unjustly denied but also for the maintenance of peace, if not goodwill, among incipient antagonists. Without the right to litigate, conflicting claims cannot be examined and resolved in accordance with one of the primary purposes of government, which is to provide for a just and orderly society. Hence, the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not render a person liable for malicious prosecution should he or she be unsuccessful, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. (Rivera v. Roman, G.R. No. 142402, September 20, 2005, 470 SCRA 276; Saber v, CA, supra., at 290; China Banking Corp. v. CA, supra.). Moral damages.

The award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees was likewise upheld: “The award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual status quo ante. (Roque v. Tomas, G.R. No. 157632, December 6, 2006). Moral damages are designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly caused a person. Although incapable of pecuniary computation, they must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. (PNR v. Brunty, G.R. No. 169891, November 2, 2006). The amount of the award bears no relation whatsoever with the wealth or means of the offender. Evidence of moral damages. Stephen Huang the victim and his parents Richard and Carmen Huang testified to the intense suffering they continue to experience as a result of the accident. Stephen recounted the nightmares and traumas he suffers almost every night when he relives the accident. He also gets depression when he thinks of his bleak future. He feels frustration and embarrassment in needing to be helped with almost everything and in his inability to do simple things he used to do. Similarly, respondent spouses and the rest of the family undergo their own private suffering. They live with the day-to-day uncertainty of respondent Stephen Huang’s condition. They know that the chance of full recovery is nil. Moreover, respondent Stephen Huang’s paralysis has made him prone to many other illnesses. His family, especially respondent spouses, have to make themselves available for Stephen twenty-four hours a day. They have patterned their daily life around taking care of him, ministering to his daily needs, altering the lifestyle to which they had been accustomed. Exemplary damages. On the matter of exemplary damages, Art. 2231 of the Civil Code provides

that in cases of quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence. At the time of the accident, the employee was driving without a license because he was previously ticketed for reckless driving. The evidence also showed that he failed to step on his brakes immediately after the impact. Had he done so, the injuries which the victim sustained could have been greatly reduced. Wanton acts such as that committed by the employer need be suppressed; and employers like Mercury Drug should be more circumspect in the observance of due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. The award of exemplary damages is therefore justified. Attorney’s fees. With the award of exemplary damages, the award of attorney’s fees was upheld. (Art. 2208(1), NCC). In addition, attorney’s fees may be granted when a party is compelled to litigate or incur expenses to protect his interest by reason of an unjustified act of the other party. (Art. 2208(4), NCC).