Political Law Case Digests 504g16

POLITICAL LAW JURISPRUDENCE ATTY. GOROSPE

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS A.M. No. 93-7-696-0 February 21, 1995 In Re JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO, Ex Rel. Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. HELD: Joaquin Borromeo was declared guilty of constructive contempt of court for repetitiously disrespecting the decisions and resolutions issued by the courts, and even by issuing a circular containing libelous and offending accusations (like whimsical, capricious, and tyrannical) against the Supreme Court justices and its employees. He even delivered a letter accusing lawyers of defamatory comments and insults. This is due to his series of dismissed complaints and appeals against 3 banks namely Traders Royal Bank, United Coconut Planters Bank, and Security Bank and Trust Co. from which he obtained loans with unfulfilled mortgages. In relation to this, he filed cases against the lawyers of these banks and even against the clerks of court who signed the minute resolutions of these cases. The actions reached the alarming number of 50 cases varying from civil, criminal, to istrative cases. In response, the court answered all his false alleged accusations through a resolution along with declaring him guilty of contempt of court.

A.M. MTJ-98-1147 July 2, 1998 JESUS S. CONDUCTO vs. JUDGE ILUMINADO C. MONZON FACTS: A complaint was filed by petitioner Conducto with the Sangguniang Panlungsod of San Pablo City against Benjamin Maghirang, the barangay chairman of Barangay III-E of San Pablo City, for abuse of authority, serious irregularity and violation of law in that, among other things for appointing his sister-in-law to the position of barangay secretary which

violates the law. A case was filed against Maghirang for violating Art 244 (Unlawful Appointment) under the RPC. Petitioner seeks that Maghirang be suspended from his office but it was denied by the respondent judge holding that the requirement for such action is a simultaneous existence of istrative and criminal cases as against the accused, which according to him is not present in this case, and that the reelection of the Barangay Chairman is a condonation of his mistakes during his prior term. Hence, petitioner filed a case against the respondent judge for ignorance of the law. ISSUE: WON respondent judge is guilty of ignorance of the law. HELD: YES. The claim of respondent Judge that a local official who is criminally charged can be preventively suspended only if there is an istrative case filed against him is without basis. It is well settled that Section 13 of RA 3019 makes it mandatory for the Sandiganbayan (or the Court) to suspend any public officer against whom a valid information charging violation of this law, Book II, Title 7 of the RPC, or any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property is filed in court. Barangay Chairman Benjamin Maghirang was charged with Unlawful Appointment, punishable under Article 244, Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, it was mandatory on Judge Monzon’s part, considering the Motion filed, to order the suspension of Maghirang. Also, In Ingco v. Sanchez,[17] this Court explicitly ruled that the re-election of a public official extinguishes only the istrative, but not the criminal, liability incurred by him during his previous term of office. Be that as it may, it would also do well to note that good faith and lack of malicious intent cannot completely free respondent from liability.

Digested and compiled by Monica S. Cajucom, UST Law “It’s not how good you are, it’s how good you want to be.” –Paul Arden


A.M. No. 133-J May 31, 1982 BERNARDITA R. MACARIOLA vs. HONORABLE ELIAS B. ASUNCION, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte FACTS: This is a complaint of petitioner against respondent judge of “acts unbecoming of a judge” regarding an act following the unfavorable decision rendered by the respondent judge against the former concerning disputed properties of her deceased father which were being claimed by the latter’s children from a subsequent marriage. It turned out that respondent judge purchased one of the lots in the case decided by him and transferred it to the fishing corporation where he is a stockholder and a ranking officer. Along with this, other misdeeds were also exposed such as that his involvement in the mentioned business corporation while he is sitting as a judge is in violation of the law, his alleged coddling of and close relations with an impostor, Dominador Tan, who misrepresents himself as a practicing attorney, and other disregard for ethics. ISSUE: WON respondent judge should be held guilty of “acts unbecoming of a judge.” HELD: NO. Respondent Judge cannot be held liable for involving himself in a business because there is no showing that respondent participated or intervened in his official capacity in the business or transactions of the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. In the case at bar, the business of the corporation in which respondent participated has obviously no relation or connection with his judicial office. It does not appear also from the records that the aforesaid corporation gained any undue advantage in its business operations by reason of respondent's financial involvement in it, or that the corporation benefited in one way or another in any case filed by or against it in court. No provision in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions of the Philippines, nor is there an

existing law expressly prohibiting of the Judiciary from engaging or having interest in any lawful business Likewise, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce which prohibits judges from engaging in commerce is, as heretofore stated, deemed abrogated automatically upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to America, because it is political in nature. virtual law libraryMoreover, the prohibition in paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code against the purchase by judges of a property in litigation before the court within whose jurisdiction they perform their duties, cannot apply to respondent Judge because the sale of the lot in question to him took place after the finality of his decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as his two orders approving the project of partition; hence, the property was no longer subject of litigation. virtual l WE are not, however, unmindful of the fact that respondent Judge and his wife had withdrawn on January 31, 1967 from the aforesaid corporation and sold their respective shares to third parties. Such disposal or sale by respondent and his wife of their shares in the corporation only 22 days after the incorporation of the corporation, indicates that respondent realized that early that their interest in the corporation contravenes the aforesaid Canon 25. With respect to the third and fourth causes of action, complainant alleged that respondent was guilty of coddling an impostor and acted in disregard of judicial decorum, and that there was culpable defiance of the law and utter disregard for ethics. That fact even if true did not render respondent guilty of violating any canon of judicial ethics as long as his friendly relations with Dominador A. Tan and family did not influence his official actuations as a judge where said persons were concerned. There is no tangible convincing proof that herein respondent gave any undue privileges in his court to Dominador Arigpa Tan or that the latter benefitted in his practice of law from his personal relations with respondent, or that he used his influence, if he had any, on the Judges of the other branches of the Court to favor said Dominador Tan.



G.R. No. 152154 July 15, 2003 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION), Ferdinand E. Marcos (represented by his estate/heirs: Imelda R. Marcos, Maria Imelda [Imee] Marcos-Manotoc, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. and Irene MarcosAraneta) and Imelda Romualdez Marcos FACTS: Petitioner Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner sought the declaration of the aggregate amount of US$356 million (now estimated to be more than US$658 million inclusive of interest) deposited in escrow in the PNB, as illgotten wealth. The funds were previously held by the following five groups, using various foreign foundations in certain Swiss banks. In addition, the petition sought the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million in treasury notes which exceeded the Marcos couple’s salaries, other lawful income as well as income from legitimately acquired property. The treasury notes are frozen at the Central Bank of the Philippines by virtue of the freeze order issued by the PCGG. Before the case was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement and the Supplemental Agreement dated December 28, 1993 were executed by the Marcos children and then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for a global settlement of the assets of the Marcos family to identify, collate, cause the inventory of and distribute all assets presumed to be owned by the Marcos family under the conditions contained therein.

HELD: NO. RA 1379 raises the prima facie presumption that a property is unlawfully acquired, hence subject to forfeiture, if its amount or value is manifestly disproportionate to the official salary and other lawful income of the public officer who owns it. The following facts must be established in order that forfeiture or seizure of the Swiss deposits may be effected: (1) ownership by the public officer of money or property acquired during his incumbency, whether it be in his name or otherwise, and (2) the extent to which the amount of that money or property exceeds, i. e., is grossly disproportionate to, the legitimate income of the public officer. Herein, the spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos were public officials during the time material to the present case was never in dispute. The spouses accumulated salary of $304,372.43 should be held as the only known lawful income of the Marcoses since they did not file any Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SAL), as required by law, from which their net worth could be determined. Besides, under the 1935 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could not receive "any other emolument from the Government or any of its subdivisions and instrumentalities". Likewise, under the 1973 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could "not receive during his tenure any other emolument from the Government or any other source." Their only known lawful income of $304,372.43 can therefore legally and fairly serve as basis for determining the existence of a prima facie case of forfeiture of the Swiss funds. The Republic did not fail to establish a prima facie case for the forfeiture of the Swiss deposits. The Swiss deposits which were transferred to and are deposited in escrow at the Philippine National Bank in the estimated aggregate amount of US$658,175,373.60 as of 31 January 2002, plus interest, were forfeited in favor of the Republic.

ISSUE: WON the Swiss funds can be forfeited in favor of the Republic, on the basis of the Marcoses’ lawful income.



THE STATE G.R. No. L-26379 December 27, 1969 WILLIAM C. REAGAN, ET. AL vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no means follows that such areas become impressed with an alien character. They retain their status as native soil. They are still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does not disappear. So it is with the bases under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the military bases agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be foreign territory.

G.R. No. 175888 SUZETTE NICOLAS vs. ROMULO FACTS:

FACTS: Petitioner Reagan, a civilian employee of an American corporation providing technical assistance to the US Air Force in the Philippines, questioned the payment of the income tax assessed on him by respondent CIR on an amount realized by him on a sale of his automobile to a member of the US Marine Corps, the transaction having taken place at the Clark Field Air Base at Pampanga. It is his contention, that in legal contemplation the sale was made outside Philippine territory and therefore beyond our jurisdictional power to tax. He seeks that an amount of P2,979.00 as the income tax paid by him be refunded. ISSUE: WON the Clark Field Air Base is a foreign property therefore excluded from the power of Philippine taxation. HELD: NO. By the [Military Bases] Agreement, it should be noted, the Philippine Government merely consents that the United States exercise jurisdiction in certain cases. The consent was given purely as a matter of comity, courtesy, or expediency over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. This provision is not and can not on principle or authority be construed as a limitation upon the rights of the Philippine Government. The State is not precluded from allowing another power to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional right over certain

Respondent Lance Corporal (L/L) Daniel Smith is a member of the US Armed Forces. He was charged with the crime of rape committed against a Filipina, petitioner herein, sometime on November 1, 2005. Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the US entered into, the US, at its request, was granted custody of Smith. The RTC of Makati rendered a decision finding defendant Smith guilty due to sufficient evidence. Defendant Smith was taken out of the Makati jail by a contingent of Philippine law enforcement agents, purportedly acting under orders of the DILG and brought to a facility for detention under the control of the US government under the new agreements between the Philippines and the US, referred to as the Romulo-Kenney Agreement. Petitioners contend that the Philippines should have custody of defendant L/L Smith because, first of all, the VFA is void and unconstitutional. ISSUE: WON the unconstitutional.

VFA

is

void

HELD: NO. Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 states: Sec. 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the


and

POLITICAL LAW JURISPRUDENCE ATTY. GOROSPE Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State. The provision of Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 of the Constitution, is complied with by virtue of the fact that the presence of the US Armed Forces through the VFA is a presence “allowed under” the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. Since the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty itself has been ratified and concurred in by both the Philippine Senate and the US Senate, there is no violation of the Constitutional provision resulting from such presence. The VFA being a valid and binding agreement, the parties are required as a matter of international law to abide by its and provisions. Applying, however, the provisions of VFA, the Court finds that there is a different treatment when it comes to detention as against custody. “Art. V, Sec. 10. The confinement or detention by Philippine authorities of United States personnel shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by appropriate Philippines and US authorities.” Therefore, the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006, which are agreements on the detention of the accused in the United States Embassy, are not in accord with the VFA itself because such detention is not “by Philippine authorities.” Respondents should therefore comply with the VFA and negotiate with representatives of the United States towards an agreement on detention facilities under Philippine authorities as mandated by Art. V, Sec. 10 of the VFA.

G.R. No. L-9657. November 29, 1956 LEOPOLDO T. BACANI and MATEO A. MATOTO vs. NATIONAL COCONUT CORPORATION, ET AL., NATIONAL COCONUT

CORPORATION and BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS FACTS: Plaintiffs herein are court stenographers assigned in Branch VI of the Court of First Instance of Manila. During the pendency of Civil Case No. 2293 of said court, entitled Francisco Sycip vs. National Coconut Corporation, Assistant Corporate Counsel Federico Alikpala, counsel for Defendant, requested said stenographers for copies of the transcript of the stenographic notes taken by them during the hearing. Plaintiffs complied with the request by delivering to Counsel Alikpala the needed transcript containing 714 pages and thereafter submitted to him their bills for the payment of their fees. The National Coconut Corporation paid the amount of P564 to Leopoldo T. Bacani and P150 to Mateo A. Matoto for said transcript at the rate of P1 per page. However, the Auditor General disallowed the payment of these fees and ordered that it shall be reimbursed for the reason that NACOCO, being a public corporation, is exempted from the fees. For reimbursement to take place, it was further ordered that the amount of P25 per payday be deducted from the salary of Bacani and P10 from the salary of Matoto. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: WON NACOCO is exempt from legal fees being an alleged government corporation. HELD: NO. There are functions which our government is required to exercise to promote its objectives as expressed in our Constitution and which are exercised by it as an attribute of sovereignty (constitute), and those which it may exercise to promote merely the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people (ministrant). To this latter class belongs the organization of those corporations owned or controlled by the government to promote certain aspects of the economic life of our people such as the National Coconut Corporation. These are what we call government-owned or controlled corporations which may take on the form of a private enterprise or one organized with powers and


POLITICAL LAW JURISPRUDENCE ATTY. GOROSPE formal characteristics of a private corporations under the Corporation Law. They do not acquire the status of a government entity for the simple reason that they do not come under the classification of municipal or public corporation. NACOCO is a GOCC. Thus, not part of the government.

G.R. No. L-21484 November 29, 1969 THE AGRICULTURAL CREDIT AND COOPERATIVE FINANCING ISTRATION (ACCFA) vs. CONFEDERATION OF UNIONS IN GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS AND OFFICES (CUGCO), et. al. FACTS: The Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing istration (ACCFA) was a government agency created under Republic Act No. 821, as amended. Its istrative machinery was reorganized and its name changed to Agricultural Credit istration (ACA) under the Land Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844). On September 4, 1961 a collective bargaining agreement, which was to be effective for a period of one (1) year was entered into by and between the Unions and the ACCFA. A few months thereafter, the Unions started protesting against alleged violations and non-implementation of said agreement. Thereafter Unions declared a strike, which was ended when the strikers voluntarily returned to work. The Unions, together with its mother union, the Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and Offices (CUGCO), filed a complaint with the Court of Industrial Relations against the ACCFA for having allegedly committed acts of unfair labor practice. ISSUE: WON the Unions and CUGCO had the right to commence a CBA with ACA, formerly ACCFA.

HELD: NO. We hold that the respondent Unions are not entitled to the certification election sought in the Court below. Such certification is ittedly for purposes of bargaining in behalf of the employees with respect to and conditions of employment, including the right to strike as a coercive economic weapon, as in fact the said unions did strike in 1962 against the ACCFA. This is contrary to Section 11 of Republic Act No. 875, which provides for the prohibition against to strike in the government. With the reorganization of the ACCFA and its conversion into the ACA under the Land Reform Code and in view of our ruling as to the governmental character of the functions of the ACA, the decision of the respondent Court dated March 25, 1963, and the resolution en banc affirming it, in the unfair labor practice case filed by the ACCFA, which decision is the subject of the present review in G. R. No. L21484, has become moot and academic, particularly insofar as the order to bargain collectively with the respondent Unions is concerned. The respondent Unions have no right to the certification election sought by them nor, consequently, to bargain collectively with the petitioner, no further fringe benefits may be demanded on the basis of any collective bargaining agreement.

G.R. No. 143377. February 20, 2001 SHIPSIDE INCORPORATED vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 26 (San Fernando City, La Union) & The REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: October 29, 1958, Original Certificate of Title was issued in favor of Rafael Galvez, over four parcels of land. Lots No. 1 and 4 were conveyed by Rafael Galvez in favor of Filipina Mamaril, Cleopatra Llana, Regina Bustos, and Erlinda Balatbat in a deed of sale.


POLITICAL LAW JURISPRUDENCE ATTY. GOROSPE Then Mamaril et al. sold Lots No. 1 and 4 to Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company. Unknown to the latest owner, the CIR of La Union issued an Order in Land Registration Case No. N-361 declaring the deed of sale between Galvez and Mamaril, et. al. (OCT No. 0-381) null and void, and ordered the cancellation thereof. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company sold to herein petitioner Shipside Inc. Lots No. 1 and 4. Twenty-four years after, the lots have never been executed. Consequently, a complaint for revival of judgment and cancellation of titles was filed by the OSG. ISSUE: WON Republic of the Philippines can maintain the action for revival of judgment herein despite the issue of prescription. HELD: NO. While it is true that prescription does not run against the State, the same may not be invoked by the government in this case since it is no longer interested in the subject matter. Moreover, to recognize the Government as a proper party to sue in this case would set a bad precedent as it would allow the Republic to prosecute, on behalf of government-owned or controlled corporations, causes of action which have already prescribed, on the pretext that the Government is the real party in interest against whom prescription does not run, said corporations having been created merely as agents for the realization of government programs. Parenthetically, petitioner was not a party to the original suit for cancellation of title commenced by the Republic twenty-seven years for which it is now being made to answer, nay, being made to suffer financial losses. It should also be noted that petitioner is unquestionably a buyer in good faith and for value, having acquired the property in 1963, or 5 years after the issuance of the original certificate of title, as a third transferee. If only not to do violence and to give some measure of respect to the Torrens System, petitioner must be afforded some measure of protection.

STATE IMMUNITY ACT NO. 3083 AN ACT DEFINING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS MAY BE SUED Section 1. Complaint against Government. — Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Government of the Philippine Islands hereby consents and submits to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, expressed or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties. Sec. 2. A person desiring to avail himself of the privilege herein conferred must show that he has presented his claim to the Insular Auditor 1 and that the latter did not decide the same within two months from the date of its presentation. Sec. 3. Venue. — Original actions brought pursuant to the authority conferred in this Act shall be instituted in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the province were the claimant resides, at the option of the latter, upon which court exclusive original jurisdiction is hereby conferred to hear and determine such actions. Sec. 4. Actions instituted as aforesaid shall be governed by the same rules of procedure, both original and appellate, as if the litigants were


POLITICAL LAW JURISPRUDENCE ATTY. GOROSPE private parties. Sec. 5. When the Government of the Philippine Island is plaintiff in an action instituted in any court of original jurisdiction, the defendant shall have the right to assert therein, by way of set-off or counterclaim in a similar action between private parties. Sec. 6. Process in actions brought against the Government of the Philippine Islands pursuant to the authority granted in this Act shall be served upon the Attorney-General 2 whose duty it shall be to appear and make defense, either himself or through delegates. Sec. 7. Execution. — No execution shall issue upon any judgment rendered by any court against the Government of the Philippine Islands under the provisions of this Act; but a copy thereof duly certified by the clerk of the Court in which judgment is rendered shall be transmitted by such clerk to the GovernorGeneral, 3 within five days after the same becomes final. Sec. 8. Transmittal of Decision. — The Governor-General, 4 at the commencement of each regular session of the Legislature, 5 shall transmit to that body for appropriate action all decisions so received by him, and if said body determine that payment should be made, it shall appropriate the sum which the Government has been sentenced to pay, including the same in the appropriations for the ensuing year. Sec. 9. This Act shall take effect on its approval. Approved: March 16, 1923.

COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 327 AN ACT FIXING THE TIME WITHIN WHICH THE AUDITOR GENERAL SHALL RENDER HIS DECISIONS AND PRESCRIBING THE MANNER OF APPEAL THEREFROM

Section 1. In all cases involving the settlement of s or claims, other than those of able officers, the Auditor General shall act and decide the same within sixty days, exclusive of Sundays and holidays, after their presentation. If said s or claims need reference to other persons, office or offices, or to a party interested, the period aforesaid shall be counted from the time the last comment necessary to a proper decision is received by him. With respect to the s of able officers, the Auditor General shall act on the same within one hundred days after their submission, Sundays and holidays excepted. In case of s or claims already submitted to but still pending decision by the Auditor General on or before the approval of this Act, the periods provided in this section shall commence from the date of such approval. Section 2. The party aggrieved by the final decision of the Auditor General in the settlement of an for claim may, within thirty days from receipt of the decision, take an appeal in writing: (a) To the President of the United States, pending the final and complete withdrawal of her sovereignty over the Philippines, or (b) To the President of the Philippines, or (c) To the Supreme Court of the Philippines if the appellant is a private person or entity. If there are more than one appellant, all appeals shall be taken to the same authority resorted to by the first appellant. From a decision adversely affecting the interests of the Government, the appeal may be taken by the proper head of the department or in case of local governments by the head of the office or branch of the Government immediately concerned. The appeal shall specifically set forth the particular action of the Auditor General to


POLITICAL LAW JURISPRUDENCE ATTY. GOROSPE which exception is taken with the reasons and authorities relied on for reversing such decision. Section 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. Approved: June 18. 1938.

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1807 PRESCRIBING THE PROCEDURE WHEREBY THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES MAY WAIVE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FROM SUIT AND OTHER LEGAL PROCEEDING WITH RESPECT TO ITSELF OR ITS PROPERTY IN CONNECTION WITH FOREIGN OBLIGATIONS CONTRACTED BY IT PURSUANT TO LAW WHEREAS, in the pursuit of economic growth and development, it has become imperative for the Republic of the Philippines to enter into contracts or transactions with international banking, financial and other foreign enterprises; WHEREAS, recognizing this need, existing legislation expressly authorize the Republic of the Philippines to contract foreign obligations, including borrowings in foreign currency, and to guarantee foreign obligations of corporations and other entities owned or controlled by the Government of the Philippines; WHEREAS, circumstances in the international market may require that sovereign states entering into contracts or transactions make express waivers of sovereign immunity in connection with such contracts or transactions; WHEREAS, it is in the national interest that a procedure be prescribed with respect to the waiver of sovereign immunity of the Republic of the Philippines in respect of international contracts or transactions entered into by it;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order and decree: Section 1. Procedure for, and Conditions of, Waiver of Sovereign Immunity. In instances where the law expressly authorizes the Republic of the Philippines to contract or incur a foreign obligation, it may consent to be sued in connection therewith. The President of the Philippines or his duly designated representative may, in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, contractually agree to waive any claim to sovereign immunity from suit or legal proceedings and from set-off, attachment or executive with respect to its property, and to be sued in any appropriate jurisdiction in regard to such foreign obligation. For purposes of this decree, a foreign obligation means any direct, indirect, or contingent obligation or liability capable of pecuniary estimation and payable in a currency other than Philippine currency. Section 2. Validity of existing Waivers. Nothing in this Decree shall be construed to revoke or repeal any waiver of sovereign immunity from suit or legal proceedings or from set-off, attachment or execution granted under or pursuant to other provisions of law. Section 3. Effectivity. This Decree shall take effect immediately.

ARTICLE 2180 (NCC) xxx The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable. xxx

G.R. No. L-11154 March 21, 1916 E. MERRITT vs. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS FACTS:


POLITICAL LAW JURISPRUDENCE ATTY. GOROSPE Counsel for the plaintiff insists that the trial court erred (1) "in limiting the general damages which the plaintiff suffered to P5,000, instead of P25,000 as claimed in the complaint," and (2) "in limiting the time when plaintiff was entirely disabled to two months and twenty-one days and fixing the damage accordingly in the sum of P2,666, instead of P6,000 as claimed by plaintiff in his complaint." The Attorney-General on behalf of the defendant urges that the trial court erred: (a) in finding that the collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital was due to the negligence of the chauffeur, who is an alleged agent or employee of the Government; (b) in holding that the Government of the Philippine Islands is liable for the damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the collision, even if it be true that the collision was due to the negligence of the chauffeur; and (c) in rendering judgment against the defendant for the sum of P14,741. Consequently, the Government issued an act allowing the plaintiff to commence a lawsuit against it.

Civil Code reads: The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable. The responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim. The chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent.

ISSUE:

FACTS:

1) WON the Government conceded its liability to the plaintiff by allowing a lawsuit to commence against it. 2) WON the chauffeur is a government employee or agent. HELD: 1) NO. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. 2) NO. We will now examine the substantive law touching the defendant's liability for the negligent acts of its officers, agents, and employees. Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the

GRN L-35645 May 22, 1985. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES B. GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I. COLLINS and ROBERT GOHIER vs. HON. V. M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Court of First Instance of Rizal and ELIGIO DE GUZMAN & CO., INC.

The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States. Sometime in May, 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids for a couple of repair projects. Eligio de Guzman land Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Subsequent thereto, the company received from the US two telegrams requesting it to confirm its price proposals and for the name of its bonding company. The company construed this as an acceptance of its offer so they complied with the requests. The company received a letter which was signed by William I. Collins of Department of the Navy of the United States, also one of the petitioners herein informing that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating in repairs, and that the projects were awarded to third parties. The


POLITICAL LAW JURISPRUDENCE ATTY. GOROSPE company filed a complaint against the defendants herein demanding specific performance that the company be allowed to perform the work on the projects and, in the event that specific performance was no longer possible, to order the defendants to pay damages. ISSUE: WON the US is immune from suit having dealt with a private corporation. HELD: YES. A State may be said to have descended the the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order, they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

G.R. No. 129406 March 6, 2006 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION) and ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO. FACTS: The PCGG issued writs placing under sequestration all business enterprises, entities and other properties, real and personal, owned or ed in the name of private respondent Benedicto, or of corporations in which he appeared to have controlling or majority interest due to his involvement in cases of ill-gotten wealth. Among the properties thus sequestered and taken over by PCGG fiscal agents were the 227 shares in NOGCCI owned by and ed under the

name of private respondent. As sequester of the 227 shares formerly owned by Benedicto, PCGG did not pay the monthly hip fee. Later on, the shares were declared to be delinquent to be put into an auction sale. Despite filing a writ of injunction, it was nevertheless dismissed. So petitioner Republic and private respondent Benedicto entered into a Compromise Agreement which contains a general release clause where petitioner agreed and bound itself to lift the sequestration on the 227 NOGCCI shares acknowledging that it was within private respondent’s capacity to acquire the same shares out of his income from business and the exercise of his profession. Implied in this undertaking is the recognition by petitioner that the subject shares of stock could not have been ill-gotten Benedicto filed a Motion for Release from Sequestration and Return of Sequestered Shares/Dividends praying, inter alia, that his NOGCCI shares of stock be specifically released from sequestration and returned, delivered or paid to him as part of the parties’ Compromise Agreement in that case. It was granted but the shares were ordered to be put under the custody of the Clerk of Court. Along with this, PCGG was ordered to deliver the shares to the Clerk of Court which it failed to comply with without any justifiable grounds. In a last-ditch attempt to escape liability, petitioner Republic, through the PCGG, invokes state immunity from suit. ISSUE: WON the Republic can invoke state immunity. HELD: NO. In fact, by entering into a Compromise Agreement with private respondent Benedicto, petitioner Republic thereby stripped itself of its immunity from suit and placed itself in the same level of its adversary. When the State enters into contract, through its officers or agents, in furtherance of a legitimate aim and purpose and pursuant to constitutional legislative authority, whereby mutual or reciprocal benefits accrue and rights and obligations arise therefrom, the State may be sued even without its express consent, precisely because by entering into a contract


POLITICAL LAW JURISPRUDENCE ATTY. GOROSPE the sovereign descends to the level of the citizen. Its consent to be sued is implied from the very act of entering into such contract, breach of which on its part gives the corresponding right to the other party to the agreement.

G.R. No. L-23139 December 17, 1966 MOBIL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION, INC. vs. CUSTOMS ARRASTRE SERVICE and BUREAU of CUSTOMS FACTS: Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad on S.S. "Leoville" consigned to Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., Manila. It was discharged to the custody of the Customs Arrastre Service, the unit of the Bureau of Customs then handling arrastre operations therein. The Customs Arrastre Service later delivered to the broker of the consignee three cases only. Petitioner filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs to recover the value of the undelivered case plus other damages. The respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that not being persons under the law, they cannot be sued. ISSUE: WON the defendants can invoke state immunity. HELD: YES. Now, the fact that a non-corporate government entity performs a function proprietary in nature does not necessarily result in its being suable. If said nongovernmental function is undertaken as an incident to its governmental function, there is no waiver thereby of the sovereign immunity from suit extended to such government entity. The Bureau of Customs, to repeat, is part of the Department of Finance with no personality of its own apart from that of the national government. Its primary function is governmental, that of assessing and collecting

lawful revenues from imported articles and all other tariff and customs duties, fees, charges, fines and penalties. To this function, arrastre service is a necessary incident.

G.R. No. L-33112 June 15, 1978 PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. HON. JUDGE JAVIER PABALAN, Judge of the Court of First Instance, Branch III, La Union, AGOO TOBACCO PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC., PHILIPPINE VIRGINIA TOBACCO ISTRATION, and PANFILO P. JIMENEZ, Deputy Sheriff, La Union FACTS: The reliance of petitioner Philippine National Bank against respondent Judge Javier Pabalan who issued a writ of execution, followed thereafter by a notice of garnishment of the funds of respondent Philippine Virginia Tobacco istration, deposited with it, is on the fundamental constitutional law doctrine of nonsuability of a state, it being alleged that such funds are public in character. ISSUE: WON the funds are public in character, thus immune from suit. HELD: NO. It is to be itted that under the present Constitution, what was formerly implicit as a fundamental doctrine in constitutional law has been set forth in express : "The State may not be sued without its consent." If the funds appertained to one of the regular departments or offices in the government, then, certainly, such a provision would be a bar to garnishment. Such is not the case here. It is well-settled that when the government enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation. By engaging in a particular business thru the instrumentality of a corporation, the government divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as to render the


POLITICAL LAW JURISPRUDENCE ATTY. GOROSPE corporation subject to the rules governing private corporations.

of

law

State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit.

G.R. No. L-31635 August 31, 1971 ANGEL MINISTERIO and ASUNCION SADAYA vs. THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU, Fourth Branch, Presided by the Honorable, Judge JOSE C. BORROMEO, THE PUBLIC HIGHWAY COMMISSIONER, and THE AUDITOR GENERAL

G.R. No. 169304 March 13, 2007 THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, SECRETARY MANUEL M. DAYRIT, USEC. MA. MARGARITA GALON and USEC. ANTONIO M. LOPEZ, vs. PHIL. PHARMAWEALTH, INC.

FACTS: Petitioners sought the payment of just compensation for a ed lot alleging that in 1927 the National Government through its authorized representatives took physical and material possession of it and used it for the widening of a national road, without paying just compensation and without any agreement, either written or verbal. There was an allegation of repeated demands for the payment of its price or return of its possession, but defendants Public Highway Commissioner and the Auditor General refused to restore its possession. ISSUE: WON the defendants are immune from suit. HELD: NO. Where the judgment in such a case would result not only in the recovery of possession of the property in favor of said citizen but also in a charge against or financial liability to the Government, then the suit should be regarded as one against the government itself, and, consequently, it cannot prosper or be validly entertained by the courts except with the consent of said Government. Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the

FACTS: Respondent Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing and supplying pharmaceutical products to government hospitals in the Philippines. Then Secretary of Health Alberto G. Romualdez, Jr. issued istrative Order (A.O.) No. 27 outlining the guidelines and procedures on the accreditation of government suppliers for pharmaceutical products. A.O. No. 27 was later amended by providing for additional guidelines for accreditation of drug suppliers aimed at ensuring that only qualified bidders can transact business with petitioner. Respondent submitted to petitioner DOH a request for the inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited drug products, including the antibiotic "Penicillin G Benzathine." DOH issued an Invitation for Bids for the procurement of 1.2 million units vials of Penicillin G Benzathine. Despite the lack of response from petitioner DOH regarding respondent’s request for inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited products, respondent submitted its bid for the Penicillin G Benzathine contract. Only two companies participated, the respondent being the lower bidder. In view, however, of the nonaccreditation of respondent’s Penicillin G Benzathine product, the contract was awarded to the other company. Hence, respondent filed a complaint injunction, mandamus and damages against DOH. ISSUE: WON DOH can invoke immunity from suit.


POLITICAL LAW JURISPRUDENCE ATTY. GOROSPE HELD: NO. The suability of a government official depends on whether the official concerned was acting within his official or jurisdictional capacity, and whether the acts done in the performance of official functions will result in a charge or financial liability against the government. In the first case, the Constitution itself assures the availability of judicial review, and it is the official concerned who should be impleaded as the proper party. As regards petitioner DOH, the defense of immunity from suit will not avail despite its being an unincorporated agency of the government, for the only causes of action directed against it are preliminary injunction and mandamus.

G.R. No. 131544. March 16, 2001 EPG CONSTRUCTION CO., ET. AL. vs. HONORABLE GREGORIO R. VIGILAR, In His Capacity as Secretary of Public Works and Highways FACTS: The Ministry of Human Settlement, through the BLISS Development Corporation, initiated a housing project on a government property along the east bank of the Manggahan Floodway in Pasig City. For this purpose, the Ministry of Human Settlement entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the Ministry of Public Works and Highways, where the latter undertook to develop the housing site and construct thereon 145 housing units. By virtue of the MOA, the Ministry of Public Works and Highways forged individual contracts with herein petitioners EPG Construction Co., et. al. for the construction of the housing units.

By reason of the verbal request and assurance of then DPWH that additional funds would be available and forthcoming, petitioners agreed to undertake and perform “additional constructions” for the completion of the housing units, despite the absence of appropriations and written contracts to cover subsequent expenses for the “additional constructions.” Petitioners then received payment for the construction work duly covered by the individual written contracts, thereby leaving an unpaid balance representing the “additional constructions.” Petitioners sent a demand letter to the DPWH Secretary and submitted that their claim for payment was favorably recommended by DPWH Assistant Secretary for Legal Services who recognized the existence of implied contracts covering the additional constructions. Respondent argues that the State may not be sued in the instant case, invoking the constitutional doctrine of Non-suability of the State, otherwise known as the Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty. ISSUE: WON immunity.

DPWH

can

invoke

state

HELD: NO. Under these circumstances, respondent may not validly invoke the Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty and conveniently hide under the State’s cloak of invincibility against suit, considering that this principle yields to certain settled exceptions. True enough, the rule, in any case, is not absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued under any circumstance. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. To be sure, this Court – as the staunch guardian of the citizens’ rights and welfare – cannot sanction an injustice so patent on its face, and allow itself to be an instrument in the perpetration thereof. Justice and equity sternly demand that the State’s cloak of invincibility against suit be shred in this particular instance, and that petitioners– contractors be duly compensated – on the


POLITICAL LAW JURISPRUDENCE ATTY. GOROSPE basis of quantum meruit – for construction done on the public works housing project.

G.R. No. L-48214 December 19, 1978 ILDEFONSO SANTIAGO, represented by his Attorney-inFact, ALFREDO T. SANTIAGO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: Santiago’s plea was for the revocation of a deed of donation executed by him and his spouse with the Bureau of Plant Industry as the donee. As alleged in such complaint, such Bureau, contrary to the of the donation, failed to "install lighting facilities and water system on the property donated and to build an office building and parking [lot] thereon which should have been constructed and ready for occupancy. That led him to conclude that under the circumstances, he was exempt from compliance with such an explicit constitutional command.

ISSUE: WON the Bureau is immune from suit. HELD: YES. If an order of dismissal would suffice, then the element of unfairness enters, the facts alleged being hypothetically itted. It is the considered opinion of this Court then that to conform to the high dictates of equity and justice, the presumption of consent could be indulged in safely. That would serve to accord to petitioner as plaintiff, at the very least, the right to be heard. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Under the circumstances, the fundamental postulate of non-suability cannot stand in the way. It is made to accommodate itself to the demands of procedural due process, which is the negation of arbitrariness and inequity. The government, in the final analysis, is the beneficiary. It thereby manifests its adherence to the highest ethical

standards, which can only be ignored at the risk of losing the confidence of the people, the repository of the sovereign power.

G.R. No. L-29993 October 23, 1978 LAUDENCIO TORIO, ET. AL. vs. ROSALINA, ANGELINA, LEONARDO, EDUARDO, ARTEMIO, ANGELITA, ANITA, ERNESTO, NORMA, VIRGINIA, REMEDIOS and ROBERTO, all surnamed FONTANILLA, and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: The Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan, ed a resolution whereby "it resolved to manage the 1959 Malasiqui town fiesta celebration. Another resolution was also ed creating the "1959 Malasiqui 'Town Fiesta Executive Committee" which in turn organized a sub-committee on entertainment and stage. The council appropriated an amount for the construction of 2 stages, one for the "zarzuela" and another for the cancionan Jose Macaraeg supervised the construction of the stage. The "zarzuela" then began but before the dramatic part of the play was reached, the stage collapsed and Vicente Fontanilla who was at the rear of the stage was pinned underneath. Fontanilia was taken to the hospital where he died in the afternoon of the following day. The heirs of Vicente Fontanilia filed a complaint against Municipality. Answering the complaint defendant municipality invoked inter alia the principal defense that as a legally and duly organized public corporation it performs sovereign functions and the holding of a town fiesta was an exercise of its governmental functions from which no liability can arise to answer for the negligence of any of its agents. ISSUE: WON the defendant Municipality was performing sovereign functions therefore immune from suit. HELD: NO.


POLITICAL LAW JURISPRUDENCE ATTY. GOROSPE Holding a fiesta even if the purpose is to commemorate a religious or historical event of the town is in essence an act for the special benefit of the community and not for the general welfare of the public performed in pursuance of a policy of the state. The mere fact that the celebration, as claimed was not to secure profit or gain but merely to provide entertainment to the town inhabitants is not a conclusive test. For instance, the maintenance of parks is not a source of income for the nonetheless it is private undertaking as distinguished from the maintenance of public schools, jails, and the like which are for public service. There can be no hard and fast rule for purposes of determining the true nature of an undertaking or function of a municipality; the surrounding circumstances of a particular case are to be considered and will be decisive. The basic element, however beneficial to the public the undertaking may be, is that it is governmental in essence, otherwise. the function becomes private or proprietary in character. Easily, no governmental or public policy of the state is involved in the celebration of a town fiesta.

G.R. No. L-52179 April 8, 1991 MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION vs. HON. JUDGE ROMEO N. FIRME, ET. AL. FACTS: At about 7am of December 16, 1965, a collision occurred involving a enger jeepney driven by Bernardo Balagot (owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras), a gravel and sand truck driven by Jose Manandeg (owned by Tanquilino Velasquez), and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the impact, several engers of the jeepney including Laureano Baniña Sr. died as a result of the injuries they sustained and four others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries.

The private respondents instituted a complaint for damages against the Estate of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot, owner and driver, respectively, of the enger jeepney. However, the aforesaid defendants filed a Third Party Complaint against the petitioner and the driver of a dump truck of petitioner. Petitioner raised as one of its defenses the non-suability of the State. ISSUE: WON the Municipality of San Fernando is immune from suit. HELD: YES. Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable for the torts committed by its employee, the test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality, is performing governmental or proprietary functions. In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that "he was on his way to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando's municipal streets." We already stressed in the case of Palafox, et. al. vs. Province of Ilocos Norte, the District Engineer, and the Provincial Treasurer (102 Phil 1186) that "the construction or maintenance of roads in which the truck and the driver worked at the time of the accident are ittedly governmental activities." We arrive at the conclusion that the municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee, who was then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions. Hence, the death of the enger –– tragic and deplorable though it may be –– imposed on the municipality no duty to pay monetary compensation.

G.R. No. L-30671 November 28, 1973 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, ET. AL.


POLITICAL LAW JURISPRUDENCE ATTY. GOROSPE FACTS: In the petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines, a summary of facts was set forth thus: A decision was rendered in favor of respondents P. J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction Corporation, and against the petitioner herein, confirming the arbitration award in the amount of P1,712,396.40, subject of Special Proceedings. Respondent Judge Villasor, issued an Order declaring the aforestated decision final and executory, directing the Sheriffs of Rizal Province, Quezon City [as well as] Manila to execute the said decision. Pursuant to the said Order, the corresponding Alias Writ of Execution [was issued]. On the strength of the afore-mentioned Alias Writ of Execution, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal (respondent herein) served notices of garnishment with several Banks, specially on the monies due the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the form of deposits sufficient to cover the amount mentioned in the said Writ of Execution. The Philippine Veterans Bank received the same notice of garnishment. The funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on deposit with the Banks, particularly, with the Philippine Veterans Bank and the Philippine National Bank [or] their branches are public funds duly appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of military and civilian personnel and for maintenance and operations of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. ISSUE: WON the Republic can invoke state immunity from suit. HELD: YES. Since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.

A.M. No. RTJ-05-1959 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JUDGE VICENTE A. HIDALGO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 37 FACTS: Tarcila Laperal Mendoza filed an action for the annulment or declaration of nullity of the title and deed of sale, reconveyance and/or recovery of ownership and possession a property against the Republic of the Philippinesin the RTC of Manila. It is also known as the Arlegui Residence which housed two Philippine presidents and which now holds the Office of the Press Secretary and the News Information Bureau. The case was initially dismissed by the presiding Judge of the Manila RTC (Branch 35) on the ground of state immunity. The case was re-raffled to the Manila RTC (Branch 37), with respondent Vicente A. Hidalgo as presiding Judge. In an Order, Judge Hidalgo declared the Republic in default for failure of Solicitor Gabriel Francisco Ramirez, the handling solicitor, to file the required Answer within the period prayed for in his motion for extension. It is contended that the respondent Judge violated the Constitution and the fundamental rule that government funds are exempt from execution or garnishment when he caused the issuance of the writ of execution against the Republic. ISSUE: WON the Republic can invoke immunity from suit. HELD: It is settled that when the State gives its consent to be sued, it does not thereby necessarily consent to an unrestrained execution against it. Tersely put, when the State waives its immunity, all it does, in effect, is to give the other party an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the state has a liability. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to


POLITICAL LAW JURISPRUDENCE ATTY. GOROSPE paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law

disbursement of public funds without the proper appropriation required under the law. ISSUE: WON the Municipality of Makati is exempt from paying just compensation.

G.R. Nos. 89898-99 October 1, 1990 MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SALVADOR P. DE GUZMAN, JR., as Judge RTC of Makati, Branch CXLII IRAL FINANCE CREDITORS CONSORTIUM, INC., and SHERIFF SILVINO R. PASTRANA FACTS: The present petition for review is an off-shoot of expropriation proceedings initiated by petitioner Municipality of Makati against private respondent iral Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc., Home Building System & Realty Corporation and one Arceli P. Jo, involving a parcel of land and improvements and ed in the name of the latter. It was certified that a bank had been opened with the PNB Buendia Branch under petitioner's name made pursuant to the provisions of Pres. Decree No. 42. After due hearing where the parties presented their respective appraisal reports regarding the value of the property, respondent RTC judge rendered a decision fixing the appraised value of the property at P5,291,666.00, and ordering petitioner to pay this amount minus the advanced payment which was earlier released to private respondent. Petitioner however refused to comply with the garnishment despite its having two bank s in PNB. The first one was dedicated for expropriation proceedings while the other was for public funds. The first bank cannot cover the remaining amount due, while the other had more than enough to satisfy the amount due. Petitioner reasoned out that its funds at the PNB Buendia Branch could neither be garnished nor levied upon execution, for to do so would result in the

HELD: NO. For three years now, petitioner has enjoyed possession and use of the subject property notwithstanding its inexcusable failure to comply with its legal obligation to pay just compensation. Just compensation means not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" for the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a long period. The State's power of eminent domain should be exercised within the bounds of fair play and justice. In the case at bar, considering that valuable property has been taken, the compensation to be paid fixed and the municipality is in full possession and utilizing the property for public purpose, for three (3) years, the Court finds that the municipality has had more than reasonable time to pay full compensation.

G.R. No. 164282 October 12, 2005 TERESITA M. YUJUICO vs. HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, ET. AL. FACTS: On 8 December 1995, the City Council of Manila enacted an ordinance authorizing the City Mayor to acquire by negotiation or expropriation certain parcels of land for utilization as a site for the Francisco Benitez Elementary School. Failing to acquire the land by negotiation, the City filed a case for


POLITICAL LAW JURISPRUDENCE ATTY. GOROSPE eminent domain against petitioner as owner of the property. It is the City School Board which has the authority to a resolution allocating funds for the full satisfaction of the just compensation fixed, the said body is hereby given thirty (30) days from receipt to the necessary resolution for the payments of the remaining balance due to Yujuico. However, despite petitioner demanding compliance from the CSB after 30 days, the latter still did not take action. ISSUE: WON respondent is justified in not paying the petitioner her just compensation. HELD: NO. While this Court recognizes the power of LGU to expropriate private property for public use, it will not stand idly by while the expropriating authority maneuvers to evade the payment of just compensation of property already in its possession. The notion of expropriation is hard enough to take for a private owner. He is compelled to give up his property for the common weal. But to give it up and wait in vain for the just compensation decreed by the courts is too much to bear. In cases like these, courts will not hesitate to step in to ensure that justice and fair play are served.

G.R. No. 77765 August 15, 1988 SEBASTIAN COSCULLUELA vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by NATIONAL IRRIGATION ISTRATION

Iloilo to expropriate two parcels of land in the municipality of Barotac, Iloilo owned by petitioner Sebastian Cosculluela and one Mita Lumampao, for the construction of the canal network of the Barotac Irrigation Project. The trial court rendered a decision granting the expropriation and ordered the public respondent to pay Lumampao, the sum of P20,000 and Cosculluela, the sum of P200,000.00. The Republic contends that the funds of the National Irrigation Authority (NIA) are government funds and therefore, cannot be disbursed without a government appropriation. ISSUE: WON the Republic is exempt from paying the just compensation demanded by the petitioner in view of non-disbursement of funds without prior public appropriation. HELD: NO. One of the basic principles enshrined in our Constitution is that no person shall be deprived of his private property without due process of law; and in expropriation cases, an essential element of due process is that there must be just compensation whenever private property is taken for public use. Just compensation means not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking.

FACTS:

G.R. No. 101949 December 1, 1994 THE HOLY SEE vs. THE HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR., as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 61 and STARBRIGHT SALES ENTERPRISES, INC.

The Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of

FACTS:


POLITICAL LAW JURISPRUDENCE ATTY. GOROSPE This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land, Lot 5-A, located in the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila and ed in the name of petitioner. Said Lot 5-A is contiguous to Lots 5-B and 5-D ed in the name of the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to the sellers. Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private respondent, Starbright Enterprises. The squatters refused to vacate the lots sold to private respondent so a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters occurred. Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation (Tropicana). Private respondent filed a complaint for annulment of the sale of the three parcels of land, and specific performance and damages against petitioner, represented by the Papal Nuncio, and three other defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and Tropicana. ISSUE: WON the immune from suit.

petitioner

Holy

See

is

HELD: YES. The logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of business. If the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit. Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or personal, in a receiving state, necessary for the creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

In Article 31(a) of the Convention, a diplomatic envoy is granted immunity from the civil and istrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving state which the envoy holds on behalf of the sending state for the purposes of the mission. If this immunity is provided for a diplomatic envoy, with all the more reason should immunity be recognized as regards the sovereign itself, which in this case is the Holy See.

G.R. No. 154705. June 26, 2003 THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, HIS EXCELLENCY AMBASSADOR SOERATMIN, and MINISTER COUNSELLOR AZHARI KASIM vs. JAMES VINZON, doing business under the name and style of VINZON TRADE AND SERVICES FACTS: Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia, represented by its Counsellor entered into a Maintenance Agreement with respondent James Vinzon, owner of Vinzon Trade and Services. The Maintenance Agreement stated that respondent shall, for a consideration, maintain specified equipment at the Embassy Main Building, Embassy Annex Building and the Wisma Duta, the official residence of petitioner Ambassador Soeratmin. The equipment covered by the Maintenance Agreement are air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters, and water motor pumps. It is likewise stated therein that the agreement shall be effective for a period of four years and will renew itself automatically unless cancelled by either party by giving thirty days prior written notice from the date of expiry. Petitioners claim that sometime prior to the date of expiration of the said agreement, or before August 1999, they informed respondent that the renewal of the agreement shall be at the discretion of the incoming Chief of istration. When the Chief of istration assumed his position, he allegedly found respondent’s work and services unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the


POLITICAL LAW JURISPRUDENCE ATTY. GOROSPE standards in the Agreement. Hence, the Indonesian Embassy terminated the agreement. Petitioners claim, that they had earlier verbally informed respondent of their decision to terminate the agreement. On the other hand, respondent claims that the aforesaid termination was arbitrary and unlawful. Hence, he filed a complaint against the petitioners which opposed by invoking immunity from suit. ISSUE: WON the Republic of Indonesia can successfully invoke state immunity from suit. HELD: YES. There is no dispute that the establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act jure imperii. A sovereign State does not merely establish a diplomatic mission and leave it at that; the establishment of a diplomatic mission encomes its maintenance and upkeep. Hence, the State may enter into contracts with private entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment of the embassy and the living quarters of its agents and officials. It is therefore clear that petitioner Republic of Indonesia was acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into a contract with respondent for the upkeep or maintenance. The Solicitor General, in his Comment, submits the view that, “the Maintenance Agreement was entered into by the Republic of Indonesia in the discharge of its governmental functions. In such a case, it cannot be deemed to have waived its immunity from suit.”

G.R. No. 142396. February 11, 2003 KHOSROW MINUCHER vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARTHUR SCALZO FACTS: Sometime in May 1986, an Information for violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise also known as the “Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,” was filed against petitioner Khosrow Minucher and one Abbas Torabian. The criminal charge followed a “buy-bust operation” conducted by the Philippine police narcotic agents in the house of Minucher, an Iranian national, where a quantity of heroin, a prohibited drug, was said to have been

seized. The narcotic agents were accompanied by private respondent Arthur Scalzo who would, in due time, become one of the principal witnesses for the prosecution. On 08 January 1988, Presiding Judge Eutropio Migrino rendered a decision acquitting the two accused. ISSUE: WON respondent Scalzo can invoke immunity from suit. HELD: YES. The doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state. The consent of the host state is an indispensable requirement of basic courtesy between the two sovereigns. The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct surveillance on suspected drug suppliers and, after having ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers who would then be expected to make the arrest. In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher, Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties. All told, this Court is constrained to rule that respondent Arthur Scalzo, an agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency allowed by the Philippine government to conduct activities in the country to help contain the problem on the drug traffic, is entitled to the defense of state immunity from suit.

G.R. No. 124772 14, 2007


August

POLITICAL LAW JURISPRUDENCE ATTY. GOROSPE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT and MAGTANGGOL C. GUNIGUNDO, in his capacity as CHAIRMAN thereof vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and OFFICECO HOLDINGS, N.V. FACTS: On 7 April 1986, in connection with criminal proceedings initiated in the Philippines to locate, sequester and seek restitution of alleged ill-gotten wealth amassed by the Marcoses and other accused from the Philippine Government,1 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) wrote the Federal Office for Police Matters in Berne, Switzerland, requesting assistance for the latter office to: (a) ascertain and provide the OSG with information as to where and in which cantons the ill-gotten fortune of the Marcoses and other accused are located, the names of the depositors and the banks and the amounts involved; and (b) take necessary precautionary measures, such as sequestration, to freeze the assets in order to preserve their existing value and prevent any further transfer thereof (herein referred to as the IMAC request). The Office of the District Attorney in Zurich, pursuant to the OSG’s request, issued an Order directing the Swiss Banks in Zurich to freeze the s of the accused. ISSUE: WON the Swiss officials can invoke state immunity from suit. HELD: NO. The act of state doctrine is one of the methods by which States prevent their national courts from deciding disputes which relate to the internal affairs of another State, the other two being immunity and non-justiciability. It is an avoidance technique that is directly related to a State’s obligation to respect the independence and equality of other States by not requiring them to submit to adjudication in a national court or to settlement of their disputes without their consent. It requires the forum court to exercise restraint in the adjudication of disputes relating to legislative

or other governmental acts which a foreign State has performed within its territorial limits. It is petitioners’ contention that the Sandiganbayan "could not grant or deny the prayers in [Officeco’s] complaint without first examining and scrutinizing the freeze order of the Swiss officials in the light of the evidence, which however is in the possession of said officials" and that it would therefore "sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another country." We disagree. The parameters of the use of the act of state doctrine were clarified in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino. There, the U.S. Supreme Court held that international law does not require the application of this doctrine nor does it forbid the application of the rule even if it is claimed that the act of state in question violated international law. Moreover, due to the doctrine’s peculiar nation-to-nation character, in practice the usual method for an individual to seek relief is to exhaust local remedies and then repair to the executive authorities of his own state to persuade them to champion his claim in diplomacy or before an international tribunal.

G.R. No. 125865. January 28, 200 JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG) vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral defamation. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioner’s bail, the MeTC released him to the custody of the Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge received an "office of protocol" from the DFA stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB (hereinafter Agreement) in the country. Based


POLITICAL LAW JURISPRUDENCE ATTY. GOROSPE on the said protocol communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the prosecution dismissed the two criminal cases. ISSUE: WON petitioner Liang is immune from suit. HELD: NO. Slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty. It is well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION OF JUSTICE PUNO:

• The Charter

of the ADB provides under Article 55(i) that officers and employees of the bank shall be immune from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity except when the Bank waives immunity. Section 45 (a) of the ADB Headquarters Agreement accords the same immunity to the officers and staff of the bank. There can be no dispute that international officials are entitled to immunity only with respect to acts performed in their official capacity, unlike international organizations which enjoy absolute immunity

• Clearly,

the most important immunity to an international official, in the discharge of his international functions, is immunity from local jurisdiction. There is no argument in doctrine or practice with the principle that an international official is independent of the jurisdiction of the local authorities for his official acts. Those acts are not his, but are imputed to the organization, and without waiver the local courts cannot hold him liable for them. In strict law, it would seem that even the organization itself could have no right to waive an official’s immunity for his official acts. This permits local authorities to assume jurisdiction over and individual for an act which is not, in the wider sense of the term, his act at all. It is the organization itself, as a juristic person, which should waive its own immunity and

appear in court, not the individual, except insofar as he appears in the name of the organization.

• Historically,

international officials were granted diplomatic privileges and immunities and were thus considered immune for both private and official acts. In practice, this wide grant of diplomatic prerogatives was curtailed because of practical necessity and because the proper functioning of the organization did not require such extensive immunity for its officials. Thus, the current status of the law does not maintain that states grant jurisdictional immunity to international officials for acts of their private lives.

• Under

the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic envoy is immune from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State for all acts, whether private or official, and hence he cannot be arrested, prosecuted and punished for any offense he may commit, unless his diplomatic immunity is waived.[ On the other hand, officials of international organizations enjoy “functional” immunities, that is, only those necessary for the exercise of the functions of the organization and the fulfillment of its purposes. This is the reason why the ADB Charter and Headquarters Agreement explicitly grant immunity from legal process to bank officers and employees only with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity, except when the Bank waives immunity. In other words, officials and employees of the ADB are subject to the jurisdiction of the local courts for their private acts, notwithstanding the absence of a waiver of immunity.

• Considering

that bank officials and employees are covered by immunity only for their official acts, the necessary inference is that the authority of the Department of Affairs, or even of the ADB for that matter, to certify that they are entitled to immunity is limited only to acts done in their official capacity. Stated otherwise, it is not within the power of the DFA, as the agency in charge of the executive department’s foreign relations, nor the ADB, as the international organization vested with the right to waive immunity, to invoke immunity for private acts of bank official and employees, since no such prerogative exists in the first place. If the immunity does not exist, there is nothing to certify.


POLITICAL LAW JURISPRUDENCE ATTY. GOROSPE G.R. No. 152318 April 16, 2009 DEUTSCHE GESELLSCHAFT FÜR TECHNISCHE ZUSAMMENARBEIT, ET. AL. vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET. AL. FACTS: The governments of the Federal Republic of and the Republic of the Philippines ratified an Agreement called Social Health Insurance—Networking and Empowerment (SHINE which was designed to "enable Philippine families–especially poor ones–to maintain their health and secure health care of sustainable quality." Private respondents were engaged as contract employees hired by GTZ to work for SHINE. Nicolay, a Belgian national, assumed the post of SHINE Project Manager. Disagreements eventually arose between Nicolay and private respondents in matters such as proposed salary adjustments, and the course Nicolay was taking in the implementation of SHINE different from her predecessors. The dispute culminated in a signed by the private respondents, addressed to Nicolay, and copies furnished officials of the DOH, Philheath, and the director of the Manila office of GTZ. The letter raised several issues which private respondents claim had been brought up several times in the past, but have not been given appropriate response. In response, Nicolay wrote each of the private respondents a letter, all similarly worded except for their respective addressees. She informed private respondents that they could no longer find any reason to stay with the project unless ALL of these issues be addressed immediately and appropriately. Under the foregoing premises and circumstances, it is now imperative that I am to accept your resignation, which I expect to receive as soon as possible. Negotiations ensued between private respondents and Nicolay, but for naught. Each of the private respondents received a letter from Nicolay, informing them of the pretermination of their contracts of employment

on the grounds of "serious and gross insubordination, among others, resulting to loss of confidence and trust." HELD: NO. This self-description of GTZ in its own official website gives further cause for pause in adopting petitioners’ argument that GTZ is entitled to immunity from suit because it is "an implementing agency." The above-quoted statement does not dispute the characterization of GTZ as an "implementing agency of the Federal Republic of ," yet it bolsters the notion that as a company organized under private law, it has a legal personality independent of that of the Federal Republic of . The Court is thus holds and so rules that GTZ consistently has been unable to establish with satisfaction that it enjoys the immunity from suit generally enjoyed by its parent country, the Federal Republic of .


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