Legal Counseling And Social Responsibility (legal Ethics) 3j135j
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Legal Counseling and Social Responsibility AURORA CAMARA VDA. DE ZUBIRI v. WENCESLAO ZUBIRI alias BEN, ET AL. December 17, 1966, G.R. No. L-16745, EN BANC (Regala, J.) FACTS: Aurora Camara Vda. de Zubiri filed with the CFI of Lanao del Norte a complaint for the recovery of her alleged share in 2 commercial lots in Iligan City against Wenceslao Ben Zubiri and the Standard Vacuum Oil Co., the occupant of portions of the said properties. She alleged that the said lots were conjugal because they have been purchased by her and her late husband during their marriage. Moreover, she claimed that Ben was in the possession of the said properties and has no right, interest, nor participation therein unless proven that he is a duly recognized natural child of her husband.
Case Digests
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already been determined and adjudicated to him in previous decisions. A week before the scheduled hearing for the petition, Ben’s counsel filed a motion to postpone the hearing on the ground that he could not release himself from his current employment as to be free to attend the said hearing. However, the court denied the motion and proceeded with the scheduled hearing despite the absence of the defendant's counsel and, after hearing the plaintiff's argument, likewise denied the petition to set aside judgment. The subsequent motion for reconsideration thereof having been denied too, the defendant-appellant interposed the present appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the denial of the motion to set aside judgment was reasonable and proper.
Four pleadings were filed in this case, namely: 1) the herein appellant's answer; 2) a Stipulation of Facts; 3) a motion to render judgment on the pleadings; and 4) the defendant Standard Vacuum Oil Company's answer to the above complaint.
HELD: No.
The trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the Stipulation of Facts. Since in both the answer and the stipulation of facts Ben itted practically all the allegations of the complaint, thus in favor of Aurora.
In the first place, the motion for postponement under consideration was the very first filed by the counsel for the appellant. It was filed with the court a full week prior to the scheduled hearing, with due and proper notice to the opposing party. Its ground was not unreasonable and hardly flimsy since it is not denied that then, the counsel for the appellant was under some contractual commitments from which he needed time to be release. Under these circumstances, it does seem that the denial of the motion prevented rather than serve the ends of justice.
Ben filed a petition to set aside judgment upon two grounds, to wit: first, the three pleadings filed namely: appellant's answer, the stipulation of facts and the motion to render judgment on the pleadings were all prepared by the plaintiff's counsel and that he, the appellant, was made to sign all of them when he was ill and, therefore, incapable of realizing the full consequences of the act; and, second, that the plaintiff's cause of action was barred by a prior judgment because the properties claimed by the plaintiff had
Appeal GRANTED. The decision denying the motion to set aside judgment is likewise REVOKED.
Secondly, the appellant's petition to set aside judgment, which was verified and duly ed by two affidavits of merit, was grounded on very serious allegations.
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Legal Counseling and Social Responsibility In the defendant’s answer, an ission in paragraph 1 of the same was so total and unqualified a repudiation of the defendant's own interest that indeed, especially as it was avowed in the said pleading that the defendant was unassisted by counsel, the trial court should have insisted upon some assurance that the defendant was solely and fully able therefor. After the defendant represented under oath that the plaintiff's counsel was the principal author of the same, and the one who talked him into participating in it, the intervention of the lower court became an absolute necessity.
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proceedings are void on the ground of fraud. The vice, if any, may well be determined at a hearing.
To be sure, the active participation of a lawyer in one party's affairs relating to a pending case in which the said lawyer is the counsel for the opposing party is brazenly unethical to say the least. The Canons of Legal Ethics very explicitly declare that "it is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests." The simultaneous representation by a lawyer of both parties to a suit constitutes malpractice which should be severely condemned and the lawyer corrected by disciplinary action. Moreover, the affidavits of merit appended to the petition to set aside judgment recited that the defendant-appellant was seriously sick at the time he was made to sign and swear to the above three repudiated pleadings. Under the circumstances, therefore, the mental capacity of the appellant to responsibly assent to commitments set forth in the same three pleadings became doubtful and the trial court should have exerted its earnest efforts to resolve the doubt considering that the subject matter of the suit was not just an insubstantial sum. Finally, one of the grounds invoked by the defendant-appellant in his petition to set aside judgment was the alleged finality of a judicial decision in special proceedings declaring Ben as the sole heir of his deceased father. Aurora assails that the special
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Legal Counseling and Social Responsibility COSMOS FOUNDRY SHOP WORKERS UNION and FILEMON G. ALVAREZ v. LO BU and COURT OF APPEALS March 25, 1975, G.R. No. L-40136, SECOND DIVISION (Fernando, J.)
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ISSUE: Whether or not the appeal made by respondent Lo Bu is a mere dilatory tactic. HELD: Yes. Petitions GRANTED.
FACTS: Cosmos Foundry Shop Workers Union was able to obtain from the Court of Industrial Relations the third alias writ of execution for the satisfaction and enforcement of the judgment in its favor. Thereafter, Deputy Sheriff Abiog of Manila, who was especially deputized to serve the writ, levied on the personal properties of the Cosmos Foundry Shop or the New Century Foundry Shop to conduct the public auction sale. Respondent Lo Bu filed an urgent motion to recall writ of execution, asserting lack of jurisdiction, a point stressed in another motion on the further ground that labor union petitioner failed to put up an indemnity bond. These motions were denied. The subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. An appeal by certiorari was filed by the respondent with the Supreme Court. It was denied. Also, a replevin suit was filed by the Lo Bu with the CIR of Manila pertaining to the same properties. The labor union petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for replevin alleging that the property sold to Lo Bu was fictitious, meaning he is not the true owner thereof. The complaint was dismissed accordingly. The adverse decision was elevated to the Court of Appeals by Lo Bu. A petition was filed by the labor union petitioner contending that the appeal was a delaying tactic to frustrate the awarding of judgment to the union. Petitioner labor union has made out a case for certiorari and prohibition.
From the evidence and the records, the Court finds that after the Cosmos Foundry Shop was burned, Ong Ting established the New Century Foundry Shop. He and his family resided in the premises of the shop. Offers of compromise were made by the counsel of the owner, even hinting that measures would be taken if these offers were not accepted. These offers were rejected and thereafter a deed of absolute sale was executed over the business and its properties to Lo Bu. Despite the sale to Lo Bu, Ong Ting still filed a motion to re-open the case and a motion for reconsideration. In the MR, it was alleged that Ong Ting lost everything after the fire even if an absolute sale had just transpired between him and Lo Bu. The absence of good faith on the part of respondent Lo Bu as the alleged vendee was made clear, i.e. that there was no actual turnover of the business to Lo Bu. Because at the time Ong Ting died, he and his family were still residing at the business premises without payment of rental to Lo Bu. In fact, the of Ong family were the ones in charge of the shop. We arrive at a conclusion that the sale was made in bad faith. It is merely fictitious and in circumvention of the laws. The sad plight of petitioner labor union had been previously noted. It is about time that a halt be called to the schemes utilized by respondent Lo Bu in his far-from-commendable efforts to defeat labor's just claim. It would be repugnant to the principle of social justice and the mandate of protection to labor if there be further delay in the satisfaction of a judgment that ought to have been enforced years ago.
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Legal Counseling and Social Responsibility One last point. Such conduct on the part of counsel is far from commendable. He could, of course, be casuistic and take refuge in the fact that the paragraph of the petition, which he denied, was, in addition to being rather poorly and awkwardly worded, also prolix, with unnecessary matter being included therein without due regard to logic or coherence or even rules of grammar. He could add that his denial was to be correlated with his special defenses, where he concentrated on points not previously itted. That is the most that can be said of his performance, and it is not enough. For even if such be the case, Attorney Busmente had not exculpated himself. He was of course expected to defend his client's cause with zeal, but not at the disregard of the truth and in defiance of the clear purpose of labor statutes. He ought to that his obligation as an officer of the court, no less than the dignity of the profession, requires that he should not act like an errand-boy at the beck and call of his client, ready and eager to do his every bidding. If he fails to keep that onition in mind, then he puts into serious question his good standing in the bar.
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further delay the execution of the subject judgment which became final and executory almost two years ago after a protracted litigation that started way back in 1961, since thirteen yesteryears from now. Law and justice demand that petitioners should not be further denied the fruit of their legal efforts, to secure redress, particularly because in the order of the Industrial Court denying respondent's motion to recall the writ of execution against Cosmos Foundry Shop, the court found said Shop and respondent to have indulged in a simulated transaction covering the properties in question purposely to avoid satisfaction of the judgment in favor of petitioners.
CONCURRING OPINION (Barredo, J.) No doubt, as things stand now, the remedy pursued by petitioners is not the appropriate one. The ground of dismissal upheld by the trial court was in essence res judicata. Ordinarily, against such dismissal, the remedy is appeal and, of course, such an appeal cannot be stopped by prohibition. And if only because the Court of Appeals has not been given any opportunity at all to on its own alleged lack of jurisdiction, the present action would seem to be premature. From another point of view, however, it is quite obvious that to allow the respondent Court of Appeals to entertain respondent's appeal would be sanctioning, as the main opinion finds, the apparently endless ingenious schemes, if judicial, of respondent to
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Legal Counseling and Social Responsibility TERESITA B. TABILIRAN v. ATTY. JOSE C. TABILIRAN, JR. July 30, 1982, A.M. No. 906, SECOND DIVISION (Abad Santos, J.) FACTS: Teresita Tabiliran alleged in her complaint that her husband, Atty. Jose C. Tabiliran, "abandoned the family home and went with another woman by whom he have been living and whom a child was born." Required to answer, the respondent denied the allegations and that it was complainant who abandoned the family home without justifiable reasons. The case was referred to the Solicitor General. It was set for hearing, but on the set date there was no appearance by both parties although the Solicitor General sent an Assistant Solicitor General. It was then resolved to consider the case submitted for decision. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Atty. Tabiliran should be disbarred. HELD: No. Complaint DISMISSED. However, Atty. Tabiliran is subject to reprimand by the court. According to the findings, the complainant failed to substantiate her claim. In fact her evidence belies her charge because a specific paragraph its that she has left the conjugal home against the will and without the consent of her husband. The other evidence (letter and affidavit by the alleged paramour and certificate of baptism of the alleged illegitimate child) offered by Teresita were also incompetent because said exhibits cannot validly constitute competent evidence against respondent on the ground that they were never properly identified as nobody ever testified thereon. The said exhibits are considered hearsay and cannot be made
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issible in court. The rule is well settled that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and for the court to exercise its disciplinary power, the case against the respondent must be established by convincing proof. The Solicitor General recommends "the exoneration of respondent from the charges of having abandoned his family home and lived with another woman with whom he allegedly begot a child, as reflected in his wife's letter-complaint (Exh. "A")." The recommendation is well-taken; accordingly, the respondent is hereby exonerated of the charges of abandonment of family and of immorality. However, in the course of the investigation conducted, it turned out that the complainant and the respondent executed a "Deed of Settlement of Spouses To Live Separately From Bed" which contains, among others, the following stipulation: A. To live separately from each other in home and in bed allowing each of the other spouse to live with another man or woman as the case may be without the objection and intervention of the other. It is obvious that except for the first part, the stipulation is contrary to law, morals and public policy and the respondent who is a lawyer should have perceived the contrariety. In view of the foregoing, the Solicitor General recommends that the respondent be reprimanded only which we hereby do.
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Legal Counseling and Social Responsibility ENCARNACION BANOGON, ZOSIMA MUNOZ, and DAVIDINA MUNOZ v. MELCHOR ZERNA, CONSEJO ZERNA DE CORNELIO, FRANCISCO ZERNA, and the HON. CIPRIANO VAMENTA, JR., Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental (Branch III) October 9, 1987, G.R. No. L-35469, FIRST DIVISION (Cruz, J.) FACTS: Important to consider are the stretched time lapses in the filing of motions in this case: - February 9, 1926 (61 years ago), the original decision was rendered by the cadastral court. - March 6, 1957 (31 years later), a motion to amend the same was filed. - March 18, 1957, a petition for review was filed. - March 26, 1957, an opposition thereto was filed. - October 11, 1971 (14 years later), a motion to dismiss the petition was filed. - December 8, 1971, the motion to dismiss was granted. - February 14, 1972, the motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari to question the abovementioned orders. The petitioners contend that the said judgment had not yet become final and executory because the land in dispute had not yet been ed in favor of the private respondents. The said judgment would become so only after one year from the issuance of the decree of registration. If any one was guilty of laches, it was the private respondents who had failed to enforce the judgment by having the land ed pursuant thereto.
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For their part, the private respondents argue that the decision of February 9, 1926, became final and executory after 30 days, same not having been appealed by the petitioners during that period. They slept on their rights for 31 years before it occurred to them to question the judgment of the cadastral court. In fact, their alleged predecessor-in-interest, Filomeno Banogon, lived for 19 more years after the 1926 decision and did not see fit to challenge it until his death in 1945. The herein petitioners themselves waited another twelve years, or until 1957, to file their petition for review. ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment became final and executory. HELD: Yes. Petition DENIED. Decision IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY. The respondent court dismissed the petition for review of the decision rendered in 1926 on the ground that it had been filed out of time, indeed thirty one years too late. Laches, it was held, had operated against the petitioners. While arguing that they were not guilty of laches because the 1926 decision had not yet become final and executory because the land subject thereof had not yet been ed, the petitioners rationalize: "If an aggrieved party is allowed the remedy of reopening the case within one year after the issuance of the decree, why should the same party be denied this remedy before the decree is issued? Why not indeed? Why then did they not file their petition earlier? Why do they now pretend that they have all the time in the world because the land has not yet been ed and the one-year reglementary period has not yet expired?
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Legal Counseling and Social Responsibility A reading thereof will show that it is against their contentions and that under this doctrine they should not have delayed in asserting their claim of fraud. Their position is clearly contrary to law and logic and to even ordinary common sense.
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merely clutter the already congested judicial dockets. They do not advance the cause of law or their clients by commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit do not deserve the attention of the courts.
This Court has repeatedly reminded litigants and lawyers alike: "Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is assent essential to an effective and efficient istration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them." Regarding the argument that the private respondents took fourteen years to move for the dismissal of the petition for review, it suffices to point out that an opposition thereto had been made as early as March 26, 1957, or nine days after the filing of the petition. Moreover, it was for the petitioners to move for the hearing of the petition instead of waiting for the private respondents to ask for its dismissal. After all, they were the parties asking for relief, and it was the private respondents who were in possession of the land in dispute. As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper istration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing pointless petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary, especially this Court, which is burdened enough as it is. A judicious study of the facts and the law should advise them when a case, such as this, should not be permitted to be filed to
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Legal Counseling and Social Responsibility CORAZON PERIQUET v. NLRC and THE PHIL. NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION (Formerly Construction Development Corp. of the Phils.) June 22, 1990, G.R. No. 91298, FIRST DIVISION (Cruz, J.) FACTS: Corazon Periquet was a toll collector dismissed from work by the Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines for willful breach of trust and unauthorized possession of able toll tickets allegedly found in her purse during an unannounced inspection. She files a complaint for illegal dismissal claiming a frame-up. The labor arbiter ruled in her favor. An order for reinstatement was issued. The order was affirmed in toto during an appeal by the NLRC. The original decision called for her reinstatement, but there is no evidence that she demanded her reinstatement or that she complained when her demand was rejected. What appears is that she entered into a compromise agreement with CD where she waived her right to reinstatement and received from the CD money representing her back wages. Dismissing the compromise agreement, the petitioner now claims she was actually reinstated only on a later date, and so should be granted back pay. After accepting backwages from the private respondent and waiving her right to reinstatement, the petitioner secured employment as kitchen dispatcher at the Tito Rey Restaurant. According to the certification issued by that business, she received a monthly compensation higher than her salary in the CD. For reasons not disclosed by the record, she applied for reemployment with the CD and was given the position of xerox
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machine operator with a basic salary lower than her previous job as a kitchen dispatcher at Tito Rey Restaurant. Later on, she wrote the new management of the CD and asked that the rights granted her by the decision be recognized because the waiver she had signed was invalid. The Corporate Legal Counsel of the private respondent recommended instead a money settlement to the petitioner. This was accepted by Corazon and she signed another quitclaim and release. The petitioner was apparently satisfied with the settlement because she sent a memorandum expressing gratitude and appreciation towards the private respondent. The private respondent also responded favorably to her inquiry about longevity pay, thus adjusting her monthly salary to a higher rate. It is perplexing that she subsequently filed a motion for execution after some time. The same was granted. However, on a later date, the order was reversed by the NRLC as well as the writ of execution. It held that the motion for execution was filed beyond the prescriptive period of 5 years. It also held as valid the 2 quitclaims signed by Corazon waiving her right to reinstatement and acknowledging settlement of her backwages and other benefits. Corazon contends that said decision was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the motion for execution should be granted. HELD: No. Petition DENIED.
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Legal Counseling and Social Responsibility Periquet insists it was the private respondent that delayed and prevented the execution of the judgment in her favor, but that is not the way we see it. The record shows it was she who dilly-dallied. It is difficult to understand the attitude of the petitioner, who has blown hot and cold, as if she does not know her own mind. First she signed a waiver and then she rejected it; then she signed another waiver which she also rejected, again on the ground that she had been deceived. In her first waiver, she acknowledged full settlement of the judgment in her favor, and then in the second waiver, after accepting additional payment, she again acknowledged full settlement of the same judgment. But now she is singing a different tune.
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credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking. As in this case. As officers of the court, counsel are under obligation to advise their clients against making untenable and inconsistent claims like the ones raised in this petition that have only needlessly taken up the valuable time of this Court, the Solicitor General, the Government Corporate Counsel, and the respondents. Lawyers are not merely hired employees who must unquestioningly do the bidding of the client, however unreasonable this may be when tested by their own expert appreciation of the pertinent facts and the applicable law and jurisprudence. Counsel must counsel.
In her petition she is now disowning both acknowledgments and claiming that the earlier payments both of which she had accepted as sufficient, are insufficient. They were valid before but they are not valid now. She also claimed she was harassed and cheated by the past management of the CD and sought the help of the new management of the PNCC under its "dynamic leadership." But now she is denouncing the new management-for also tricking her into g the second quitclaim. Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind. It is only where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the of settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to annul the questionable transaction. But where it is shown that the person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is
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Legal Counseling and Social Responsibility VICTORIA LEGARDA v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, NEW CATHAY HOUSE, INC., THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 94 FACTS: Petitioner Victoria Legarda owned a parcel of land and its improvements located at West Avenue, Quezon City. Respondent New Cathay House, Inc. filed a complaint against the Legarda for specific performance with preliminary injunction and damages in the RTC of Quezon City. The complaint alleged that Legarda entered into a lease agreement with the New Cathay over the said property for a period of 5 years. It also alleged that New Cathay made a downpayment of rentals but Legarda refused to execute and sign the written contract prepared by the respondent despite demands. Respondent suffered damages due to the delay in the renovation and opening of its restaurant business. A writ of preliminary injunction was prayed for to prevent Legarda and her agents from stopping the renovation and other activities of New Cathay on the said property. Petitioner’s counsel filed his appearance with an urgent motion for extension of time to file the answer. However, an answer was not filed within the extended period. Respondent’s counsel filed a motion to declare petitioner in default that was granted by the trial court.
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Petitioner’s counsel filed a petition for annulment of judgment in the Court of Appeals. They contended that they have entered into a compromise agreement with respondent, stipulating that there was no need to file an answer anymore. Because of this, they allege that misrepresentation and fraud were employed by the respondent and its counsel which deprived petitioner to prepare for her defense. This petition was subsequently amended raising a new issue that the assailed decision finds no from the allegations in the pleadings or evidence on record. The Court of Appeals denied the petition. No motion for reconsideration or appeal was filed making the decision final. When petitioner belatedly learned about the adverse decision, she hired a new lawyer to file this present petition for certiorari praying that the previous court decisions and the sale at the public auction be annulled for the reason that the fault is due to the petitioner’s former counsel. Such being the case, the petitioner should not be bound by her former counsel’s hapless mistakes brought about by gross negligence and inefficiency; otherwise, she will be denied due process. ISSUE: Whether or not Victoria Legarda should be bound by her former counsel’s gross negligence and inefficiency. HELD: No. Petition GRANTED.
The subject property was sold at a public auction to Roberto Cabrera, Jr., representative of respondent. The same was not redeemed within the 1-year redemption period, hence ownership was consolidated in the name of Cabrera, Jr. The final deed of sale was also ed with the of Deeds.
Nothing is more settled than the rule that the mistake of a counsel binds the client. It is only in case of gross or palpable negligence of counsel when the courts must step in and accord relief to a client who suffered thereby.
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Legal Counseling and Social Responsibility Petitioner's counsel is a well-known practicing lawyer and dean of a law school. It is to be expected that he would extend the highest quality of service as a lawyer to the petitioner. Unfortunately, counsel appears to have abandoned the cause of petitioner. After agreeing to defend the petitioner in the civil case filed against her by private respondent, said counsel did nothing more than enter his appearance and seek for an extension of time to file the answer. Nevertheless, he failed to file the answer. Hence, petitioner was declared in default on motion of private respondent's counsel. After the evidence of private respondent was received ex-parte, a judgment was rendered by the trial court. Said counsel for petitioner received a copy of the judgment but took no steps to have the same set aside or to appeal therefrom. Thus, the judgment became final and executory. During all the time, the petitioner was abroad. When, upon her return, she learned, to her great shock, what happened to her case and property, she nevertheless did not lose faith in her counsel. She still asked Atty. Coronel to take such appropriate action possible under the circumstances. As above related, said counsel filed a petition for annulment of judgment and its amendment in the Court of Appeals. But that was all he did. After an adverse judgment was rendered against petitioner, of which counsel was duly notified, said counsel did not inform the petitioner about it. He did not even ask for a reconsideration thereof, or file a petition for review before this Court. Thus, the judgment became final. It was only upon repeated telephone inquiries of petitioner that she learned from the secretary of her counsel of the judgment that had unfortunately become final.
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can be taken or withheld from his client except in accordance with the law. He should present every remedy or defense authorized by the law in of his client's cause, regardless of his own personal views. In the full discharge of his duties to his client, the lawyer should not be afraid of the possibility that he may displease the judge or the general public. While this Court is cognizant of the rule that, generally, a client will suffer the consequences of the negligence, mistake or lack of competence of his counsel, in the interest of justice and equity, exceptions may be made to such rule, in accordance with the facts and circumstances of each case. Adherence to the general rule would, in the instant case, result in the outright deprivation of their property through a technicality. As member of the Philippine Bar he owes complete fidelity to the cause of his client. He should give adequate attention, care and time to his cases. This is the reason why a practicing lawyer should accept only so many cases he can afford to handle. And once he agrees to handle a case, he should undertake the task with dedication and care. If he should do any less, then he is not true to his oath as a lawyer.
A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client, warmth and zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, to the end that nothing
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Legal Counseling and Social Responsibility ISMAELA DIMAGIBA v. ATTY. JOSE MONTALVO, JR. October 15, 1991, . Case No. 1424, EN BANC (Per Curiam*) *Unanimous decision or almost a majority FACTS: A case for Probate of Will of the deceased Benedicta de los Reyes was instituted before the CFI of Bulacan by Ismaela Dimagiba, regarding a property also subject of the annulment of sale. Fortunately, the latter case was terminated which allowed the probate of the will. The oppositors (Dionisio Fernandez, Eusebio Reyes, Luisa Reyes, Mariano Reyes, Cesar Reyes, and Leonor Reyes) represented by Atty. Jose Montalvo, Jr. appealed to the Higher Court of the Philippines. It was decided by the Hon. Supreme Court of the Philippines affirming the decision of the trial court.
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In view of these numerous cases, Dimagiba decided to report the said actions of Atty. Montalvo, Jr. which caused harassment on her part to the Supreme Court. The High Court required Atty. Montalvo, Jr. to file an answer within 10 days from notice. In his answer, he claimed that the complaints were proper and that Dimagiba only wanted to intimidate him because she refused to be bound by the court’s decision. Dimagiba, in her reder, reiterated the reasons (res judicata and similarity of causes of action and parties, etc.) why the numerous complaints and petitions filed by the oppositors represented by Atty. Montalvo, Jr. were dismissed. The case was referred to the Solicitor General following the procedure involving disciplinary cases against lawyers. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Montalvo, Jr. should be disbarred.
The same oppositors filed another complaint for the annulment of the will through their counsel Atty. Centeno. The complaint was dismissed. Still aggrieved, they again filed a complaint for the annulment of the will that was dismissed again by the court. Another case was again filed by the same oppositors, this time a partition of the subject property mentioned in the probate proceedings. This was also dismissed by the court. Another case for specific performance by the same oppositors through Atty. Montalvo, Jr. that was dismissed by the court. This case was remanded to the Court of Appeals by the CFI of Bulacan. Again, another case was filed by them through Atty. Montalvo, Jr. which is pending before the CFI of Bulacan.
HELD: Yes. Respondent Atty. Montalvo, Jr. is hereby declared DISBARRED. Clearly, the respondent Montalvo, Jr. repetitively filed several complaints in various forms involving the same parties and the same subject matter, persistently raising issues long laid to rest by final judgment. This misbehavior in facie curia (“in the presence of the court”) consisting of a stubborn refusal to accept this Court's pronouncements is in fact even summarily punishable under Rule 71, Section 1 of the Rules of Court. Any lawyer who assumes the responsibility for a client' cause has the duty to know the entire history of a case, specially if any
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Legal Counseling and Social Responsibility litigation has commenced. In the case at bar, even Atty. Montalvo does not deny the fact that the probate of the will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes has been an over-extended an contentious litigation between the heirs. A lawyer should never take advantage of the seemingly endless channels left dangling by our legal system in order wangle the attention of the court. Atty. Montalvo may have thought that lie could get away with his indiscriminate filing o suits that were clearly intended to harass Ismaela Dimagiba. When court dockets get clogged and the istration of justice is delayed, our judicial system may not be entirely blameless, yet the greater fault lies in the lawyers who had take their privilege so lightly, and in such mindless fashion. The Code of Professional Responsibility states that: Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest immoral or deceitful conduct. Rule 1.03 — A lawyer shall not for any corrupt motive or interest encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man's cause. On the basis of the foregoing, we find him guilty of malpractice as charged. He has violated his oath not to delay any matter for money or malice, besmirched the name of an honorable profession, and has proven himself unworthy of the trust repose in him by law as an officer of the Court. We have not countenanced other less significant infractions among the ranks of our lawyers. He deserves the severest punishment of DISBARMENT.
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MYRNA D. ROQUE and ROBERTO P. CRUZADO v. ATTY. FELICIANO B. CLEMENCIO August 14, 1992, A.M. No. 3187, FIRST DIVISION (Bellosillo, J.) FACTS: Myrna Roque and Roberto Cruzado filed a complaint against Atty. Feliciano Clemencio charging him with gross misconduct and oppression. It was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation. Atty. Clemencio was a legal officer of the Commission on Audit. He was appointed to investigate to investigate charges filed by herein petitioner Roque against o, a COA official. It was alleged in the complaint that Atty. Clemencio exhibited bias and partiality amounting to abuse of discretion when he was seen hanging out with the counsel of o at a restaurant/beerhouse; that the case almost lasted a year in his office; that he conspired with Atty. Tablang to whom the case was re-assigned when he was relieved of the same; and that he drafted the decision against o even after his relief being the “investigator” of the case. He was also charged of threatening a subordinate Roberto Cruzado, the other complainant, after summoning him. In his answer, Atty. Clemencio denied the allegations. The IBP dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Clemencio should be disbarred. HELD: No.
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Legal Counseling and Social Responsibility Atty. Clemencio is hereby CENSURED for his conduct and is WARNED that repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. We differ from the findings and recommendation of the IBP. Although there may not be sufficient evidence to prove that respondent Atty. Feliciano B. Clemencio acted with abuse of discretion resulting in gross misconduct, We believe nevertheless that he displayed ethical infractions. Undisputedly, as specified in COA Office Order No. 869877, respondent was tasked to conduct the formal investigation in . Case No. 86-884 filed by complainant Roque against o, and thereafter to submit his findings and recommendation. What facts to include or exclude in his report, his findings and how to them as well as his recommendation — all these necessarily entail the exercise of sound discretion and impartial judgment. ittedly, it was respondent himself who drafted the decision in the case, which draft became the basis for the final adjudication adopted by the COA. Indeed, the manner of presenting the facts and the consequent recommendation can influence the reviewing authority. In fact, a perusal of both the draft decision submitted by respondent and the decision finally adopted by the COA would reveal that, except for the difference in the penalties imposed, the final decision had all the earmarks of the preliminary draft. Thus, respondent should have refrained from drinking and dining with o's counsel. It is a rule of general application that an attorney (much more an investigator, as in the case of respondent) should avoid, if not altogether eliminate, even the slightest appearances of impropriety.
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Service Unit was precisely to protect his rights, as claimed by respondent. When a lowly employee is summoned to appear before the Chief Security Officer and there questioned by a lawyer who is his superior, and who happens in this case to be respondent himself, and warned of dismissal from employment, a possible litigation and its dire consequences, that employee is, in effect, under threat or intimidation. Here, We take into serious the fact that respondent is a lawyer, a superior who threatened a subordinate complainant with dismissal and a court suit. A man of the law should never use his legal expertise and influence in order to frighten or coerce anyone, specially the ordinary man who looks up to him for justice. Thus, We remind respondent Atty. Feliciano B. Clemencio of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer. Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, immoral or deceitful conduct. A member of the Bar must act with integrity, honesty and professional decorum. He must comport himself in a manner which will secure and preserve the respect and confidence of the public. Both his professional and personal conduct must he kept beyond reproach and above suspicion. He is required not only in fact to be of good moral character, but must also be seen to be leading a life in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. His deportment should be characterized by candor, competence and fairness. One of his duties is to maintain the high ethical standards of the legal profession. Accordingly, respondent must be censured for his failure to comply with the ethical standards required of of the Bar as officers of the Court.
Moreover, we find it difficult to believe that the reason why complainant Cruzado was "invited" to report to the Security Affairs
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already been determined and adjudicated to him in previous decisions. A week before the scheduled hearing for the petition, Ben’s counsel filed a motion to postpone the hearing on the ground that he could not release himself from his current employment as to be free to attend the said hearing. However, the court denied the motion and proceeded with the scheduled hearing despite the absence of the defendant's counsel and, after hearing the plaintiff's argument, likewise denied the petition to set aside judgment. The subsequent motion for reconsideration thereof having been denied too, the defendant-appellant interposed the present appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the denial of the motion to set aside judgment was reasonable and proper.
Four pleadings were filed in this case, namely: 1) the herein appellant's answer; 2) a Stipulation of Facts; 3) a motion to render judgment on the pleadings; and 4) the defendant Standard Vacuum Oil Company's answer to the above complaint.
HELD: No.
The trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the Stipulation of Facts. Since in both the answer and the stipulation of facts Ben itted practically all the allegations of the complaint, thus in favor of Aurora.
In the first place, the motion for postponement under consideration was the very first filed by the counsel for the appellant. It was filed with the court a full week prior to the scheduled hearing, with due and proper notice to the opposing party. Its ground was not unreasonable and hardly flimsy since it is not denied that then, the counsel for the appellant was under some contractual commitments from which he needed time to be release. Under these circumstances, it does seem that the denial of the motion prevented rather than serve the ends of justice.
Ben filed a petition to set aside judgment upon two grounds, to wit: first, the three pleadings filed namely: appellant's answer, the stipulation of facts and the motion to render judgment on the pleadings were all prepared by the plaintiff's counsel and that he, the appellant, was made to sign all of them when he was ill and, therefore, incapable of realizing the full consequences of the act; and, second, that the plaintiff's cause of action was barred by a prior judgment because the properties claimed by the plaintiff had
Appeal GRANTED. The decision denying the motion to set aside judgment is likewise REVOKED.
Secondly, the appellant's petition to set aside judgment, which was verified and duly ed by two affidavits of merit, was grounded on very serious allegations.
1
Legal Counseling and Social Responsibility In the defendant’s answer, an ission in paragraph 1 of the same was so total and unqualified a repudiation of the defendant's own interest that indeed, especially as it was avowed in the said pleading that the defendant was unassisted by counsel, the trial court should have insisted upon some assurance that the defendant was solely and fully able therefor. After the defendant represented under oath that the plaintiff's counsel was the principal author of the same, and the one who talked him into participating in it, the intervention of the lower court became an absolute necessity.
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proceedings are void on the ground of fraud. The vice, if any, may well be determined at a hearing.
To be sure, the active participation of a lawyer in one party's affairs relating to a pending case in which the said lawyer is the counsel for the opposing party is brazenly unethical to say the least. The Canons of Legal Ethics very explicitly declare that "it is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests." The simultaneous representation by a lawyer of both parties to a suit constitutes malpractice which should be severely condemned and the lawyer corrected by disciplinary action. Moreover, the affidavits of merit appended to the petition to set aside judgment recited that the defendant-appellant was seriously sick at the time he was made to sign and swear to the above three repudiated pleadings. Under the circumstances, therefore, the mental capacity of the appellant to responsibly assent to commitments set forth in the same three pleadings became doubtful and the trial court should have exerted its earnest efforts to resolve the doubt considering that the subject matter of the suit was not just an insubstantial sum. Finally, one of the grounds invoked by the defendant-appellant in his petition to set aside judgment was the alleged finality of a judicial decision in special proceedings declaring Ben as the sole heir of his deceased father. Aurora assails that the special
2
Legal Counseling and Social Responsibility COSMOS FOUNDRY SHOP WORKERS UNION and FILEMON G. ALVAREZ v. LO BU and COURT OF APPEALS March 25, 1975, G.R. No. L-40136, SECOND DIVISION (Fernando, J.)
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ISSUE: Whether or not the appeal made by respondent Lo Bu is a mere dilatory tactic. HELD: Yes. Petitions GRANTED.
FACTS: Cosmos Foundry Shop Workers Union was able to obtain from the Court of Industrial Relations the third alias writ of execution for the satisfaction and enforcement of the judgment in its favor. Thereafter, Deputy Sheriff Abiog of Manila, who was especially deputized to serve the writ, levied on the personal properties of the Cosmos Foundry Shop or the New Century Foundry Shop to conduct the public auction sale. Respondent Lo Bu filed an urgent motion to recall writ of execution, asserting lack of jurisdiction, a point stressed in another motion on the further ground that labor union petitioner failed to put up an indemnity bond. These motions were denied. The subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. An appeal by certiorari was filed by the respondent with the Supreme Court. It was denied. Also, a replevin suit was filed by the Lo Bu with the CIR of Manila pertaining to the same properties. The labor union petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for replevin alleging that the property sold to Lo Bu was fictitious, meaning he is not the true owner thereof. The complaint was dismissed accordingly. The adverse decision was elevated to the Court of Appeals by Lo Bu. A petition was filed by the labor union petitioner contending that the appeal was a delaying tactic to frustrate the awarding of judgment to the union. Petitioner labor union has made out a case for certiorari and prohibition.
From the evidence and the records, the Court finds that after the Cosmos Foundry Shop was burned, Ong Ting established the New Century Foundry Shop. He and his family resided in the premises of the shop. Offers of compromise were made by the counsel of the owner, even hinting that measures would be taken if these offers were not accepted. These offers were rejected and thereafter a deed of absolute sale was executed over the business and its properties to Lo Bu. Despite the sale to Lo Bu, Ong Ting still filed a motion to re-open the case and a motion for reconsideration. In the MR, it was alleged that Ong Ting lost everything after the fire even if an absolute sale had just transpired between him and Lo Bu. The absence of good faith on the part of respondent Lo Bu as the alleged vendee was made clear, i.e. that there was no actual turnover of the business to Lo Bu. Because at the time Ong Ting died, he and his family were still residing at the business premises without payment of rental to Lo Bu. In fact, the of Ong family were the ones in charge of the shop. We arrive at a conclusion that the sale was made in bad faith. It is merely fictitious and in circumvention of the laws. The sad plight of petitioner labor union had been previously noted. It is about time that a halt be called to the schemes utilized by respondent Lo Bu in his far-from-commendable efforts to defeat labor's just claim. It would be repugnant to the principle of social justice and the mandate of protection to labor if there be further delay in the satisfaction of a judgment that ought to have been enforced years ago.
3
Legal Counseling and Social Responsibility One last point. Such conduct on the part of counsel is far from commendable. He could, of course, be casuistic and take refuge in the fact that the paragraph of the petition, which he denied, was, in addition to being rather poorly and awkwardly worded, also prolix, with unnecessary matter being included therein without due regard to logic or coherence or even rules of grammar. He could add that his denial was to be correlated with his special defenses, where he concentrated on points not previously itted. That is the most that can be said of his performance, and it is not enough. For even if such be the case, Attorney Busmente had not exculpated himself. He was of course expected to defend his client's cause with zeal, but not at the disregard of the truth and in defiance of the clear purpose of labor statutes. He ought to that his obligation as an officer of the court, no less than the dignity of the profession, requires that he should not act like an errand-boy at the beck and call of his client, ready and eager to do his every bidding. If he fails to keep that onition in mind, then he puts into serious question his good standing in the bar.
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further delay the execution of the subject judgment which became final and executory almost two years ago after a protracted litigation that started way back in 1961, since thirteen yesteryears from now. Law and justice demand that petitioners should not be further denied the fruit of their legal efforts, to secure redress, particularly because in the order of the Industrial Court denying respondent's motion to recall the writ of execution against Cosmos Foundry Shop, the court found said Shop and respondent to have indulged in a simulated transaction covering the properties in question purposely to avoid satisfaction of the judgment in favor of petitioners.
CONCURRING OPINION (Barredo, J.) No doubt, as things stand now, the remedy pursued by petitioners is not the appropriate one. The ground of dismissal upheld by the trial court was in essence res judicata. Ordinarily, against such dismissal, the remedy is appeal and, of course, such an appeal cannot be stopped by prohibition. And if only because the Court of Appeals has not been given any opportunity at all to on its own alleged lack of jurisdiction, the present action would seem to be premature. From another point of view, however, it is quite obvious that to allow the respondent Court of Appeals to entertain respondent's appeal would be sanctioning, as the main opinion finds, the apparently endless ingenious schemes, if judicial, of respondent to
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Legal Counseling and Social Responsibility TERESITA B. TABILIRAN v. ATTY. JOSE C. TABILIRAN, JR. July 30, 1982, A.M. No. 906, SECOND DIVISION (Abad Santos, J.) FACTS: Teresita Tabiliran alleged in her complaint that her husband, Atty. Jose C. Tabiliran, "abandoned the family home and went with another woman by whom he have been living and whom a child was born." Required to answer, the respondent denied the allegations and that it was complainant who abandoned the family home without justifiable reasons. The case was referred to the Solicitor General. It was set for hearing, but on the set date there was no appearance by both parties although the Solicitor General sent an Assistant Solicitor General. It was then resolved to consider the case submitted for decision. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Atty. Tabiliran should be disbarred. HELD: No. Complaint DISMISSED. However, Atty. Tabiliran is subject to reprimand by the court. According to the findings, the complainant failed to substantiate her claim. In fact her evidence belies her charge because a specific paragraph its that she has left the conjugal home against the will and without the consent of her husband. The other evidence (letter and affidavit by the alleged paramour and certificate of baptism of the alleged illegitimate child) offered by Teresita were also incompetent because said exhibits cannot validly constitute competent evidence against respondent on the ground that they were never properly identified as nobody ever testified thereon. The said exhibits are considered hearsay and cannot be made
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issible in court. The rule is well settled that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and for the court to exercise its disciplinary power, the case against the respondent must be established by convincing proof. The Solicitor General recommends "the exoneration of respondent from the charges of having abandoned his family home and lived with another woman with whom he allegedly begot a child, as reflected in his wife's letter-complaint (Exh. "A")." The recommendation is well-taken; accordingly, the respondent is hereby exonerated of the charges of abandonment of family and of immorality. However, in the course of the investigation conducted, it turned out that the complainant and the respondent executed a "Deed of Settlement of Spouses To Live Separately From Bed" which contains, among others, the following stipulation: A. To live separately from each other in home and in bed allowing each of the other spouse to live with another man or woman as the case may be without the objection and intervention of the other. It is obvious that except for the first part, the stipulation is contrary to law, morals and public policy and the respondent who is a lawyer should have perceived the contrariety. In view of the foregoing, the Solicitor General recommends that the respondent be reprimanded only which we hereby do.
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Legal Counseling and Social Responsibility ENCARNACION BANOGON, ZOSIMA MUNOZ, and DAVIDINA MUNOZ v. MELCHOR ZERNA, CONSEJO ZERNA DE CORNELIO, FRANCISCO ZERNA, and the HON. CIPRIANO VAMENTA, JR., Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental (Branch III) October 9, 1987, G.R. No. L-35469, FIRST DIVISION (Cruz, J.) FACTS: Important to consider are the stretched time lapses in the filing of motions in this case: - February 9, 1926 (61 years ago), the original decision was rendered by the cadastral court. - March 6, 1957 (31 years later), a motion to amend the same was filed. - March 18, 1957, a petition for review was filed. - March 26, 1957, an opposition thereto was filed. - October 11, 1971 (14 years later), a motion to dismiss the petition was filed. - December 8, 1971, the motion to dismiss was granted. - February 14, 1972, the motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari to question the abovementioned orders. The petitioners contend that the said judgment had not yet become final and executory because the land in dispute had not yet been ed in favor of the private respondents. The said judgment would become so only after one year from the issuance of the decree of registration. If any one was guilty of laches, it was the private respondents who had failed to enforce the judgment by having the land ed pursuant thereto.
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For their part, the private respondents argue that the decision of February 9, 1926, became final and executory after 30 days, same not having been appealed by the petitioners during that period. They slept on their rights for 31 years before it occurred to them to question the judgment of the cadastral court. In fact, their alleged predecessor-in-interest, Filomeno Banogon, lived for 19 more years after the 1926 decision and did not see fit to challenge it until his death in 1945. The herein petitioners themselves waited another twelve years, or until 1957, to file their petition for review. ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment became final and executory. HELD: Yes. Petition DENIED. Decision IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY. The respondent court dismissed the petition for review of the decision rendered in 1926 on the ground that it had been filed out of time, indeed thirty one years too late. Laches, it was held, had operated against the petitioners. While arguing that they were not guilty of laches because the 1926 decision had not yet become final and executory because the land subject thereof had not yet been ed, the petitioners rationalize: "If an aggrieved party is allowed the remedy of reopening the case within one year after the issuance of the decree, why should the same party be denied this remedy before the decree is issued? Why not indeed? Why then did they not file their petition earlier? Why do they now pretend that they have all the time in the world because the land has not yet been ed and the one-year reglementary period has not yet expired?
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Legal Counseling and Social Responsibility A reading thereof will show that it is against their contentions and that under this doctrine they should not have delayed in asserting their claim of fraud. Their position is clearly contrary to law and logic and to even ordinary common sense.
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merely clutter the already congested judicial dockets. They do not advance the cause of law or their clients by commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit do not deserve the attention of the courts.
This Court has repeatedly reminded litigants and lawyers alike: "Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is assent essential to an effective and efficient istration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them." Regarding the argument that the private respondents took fourteen years to move for the dismissal of the petition for review, it suffices to point out that an opposition thereto had been made as early as March 26, 1957, or nine days after the filing of the petition. Moreover, it was for the petitioners to move for the hearing of the petition instead of waiting for the private respondents to ask for its dismissal. After all, they were the parties asking for relief, and it was the private respondents who were in possession of the land in dispute. As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper istration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing pointless petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary, especially this Court, which is burdened enough as it is. A judicious study of the facts and the law should advise them when a case, such as this, should not be permitted to be filed to
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Legal Counseling and Social Responsibility CORAZON PERIQUET v. NLRC and THE PHIL. NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION (Formerly Construction Development Corp. of the Phils.) June 22, 1990, G.R. No. 91298, FIRST DIVISION (Cruz, J.) FACTS: Corazon Periquet was a toll collector dismissed from work by the Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines for willful breach of trust and unauthorized possession of able toll tickets allegedly found in her purse during an unannounced inspection. She files a complaint for illegal dismissal claiming a frame-up. The labor arbiter ruled in her favor. An order for reinstatement was issued. The order was affirmed in toto during an appeal by the NLRC. The original decision called for her reinstatement, but there is no evidence that she demanded her reinstatement or that she complained when her demand was rejected. What appears is that she entered into a compromise agreement with CD where she waived her right to reinstatement and received from the CD money representing her back wages. Dismissing the compromise agreement, the petitioner now claims she was actually reinstated only on a later date, and so should be granted back pay. After accepting backwages from the private respondent and waiving her right to reinstatement, the petitioner secured employment as kitchen dispatcher at the Tito Rey Restaurant. According to the certification issued by that business, she received a monthly compensation higher than her salary in the CD. For reasons not disclosed by the record, she applied for reemployment with the CD and was given the position of xerox
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machine operator with a basic salary lower than her previous job as a kitchen dispatcher at Tito Rey Restaurant. Later on, she wrote the new management of the CD and asked that the rights granted her by the decision be recognized because the waiver she had signed was invalid. The Corporate Legal Counsel of the private respondent recommended instead a money settlement to the petitioner. This was accepted by Corazon and she signed another quitclaim and release. The petitioner was apparently satisfied with the settlement because she sent a memorandum expressing gratitude and appreciation towards the private respondent. The private respondent also responded favorably to her inquiry about longevity pay, thus adjusting her monthly salary to a higher rate. It is perplexing that she subsequently filed a motion for execution after some time. The same was granted. However, on a later date, the order was reversed by the NRLC as well as the writ of execution. It held that the motion for execution was filed beyond the prescriptive period of 5 years. It also held as valid the 2 quitclaims signed by Corazon waiving her right to reinstatement and acknowledging settlement of her backwages and other benefits. Corazon contends that said decision was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the motion for execution should be granted. HELD: No. Petition DENIED.
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Legal Counseling and Social Responsibility Periquet insists it was the private respondent that delayed and prevented the execution of the judgment in her favor, but that is not the way we see it. The record shows it was she who dilly-dallied. It is difficult to understand the attitude of the petitioner, who has blown hot and cold, as if she does not know her own mind. First she signed a waiver and then she rejected it; then she signed another waiver which she also rejected, again on the ground that she had been deceived. In her first waiver, she acknowledged full settlement of the judgment in her favor, and then in the second waiver, after accepting additional payment, she again acknowledged full settlement of the same judgment. But now she is singing a different tune.
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credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking. As in this case. As officers of the court, counsel are under obligation to advise their clients against making untenable and inconsistent claims like the ones raised in this petition that have only needlessly taken up the valuable time of this Court, the Solicitor General, the Government Corporate Counsel, and the respondents. Lawyers are not merely hired employees who must unquestioningly do the bidding of the client, however unreasonable this may be when tested by their own expert appreciation of the pertinent facts and the applicable law and jurisprudence. Counsel must counsel.
In her petition she is now disowning both acknowledgments and claiming that the earlier payments both of which she had accepted as sufficient, are insufficient. They were valid before but they are not valid now. She also claimed she was harassed and cheated by the past management of the CD and sought the help of the new management of the PNCC under its "dynamic leadership." But now she is denouncing the new management-for also tricking her into g the second quitclaim. Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind. It is only where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the of settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to annul the questionable transaction. But where it is shown that the person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is
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Legal Counseling and Social Responsibility VICTORIA LEGARDA v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, NEW CATHAY HOUSE, INC., THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 94 FACTS: Petitioner Victoria Legarda owned a parcel of land and its improvements located at West Avenue, Quezon City. Respondent New Cathay House, Inc. filed a complaint against the Legarda for specific performance with preliminary injunction and damages in the RTC of Quezon City. The complaint alleged that Legarda entered into a lease agreement with the New Cathay over the said property for a period of 5 years. It also alleged that New Cathay made a downpayment of rentals but Legarda refused to execute and sign the written contract prepared by the respondent despite demands. Respondent suffered damages due to the delay in the renovation and opening of its restaurant business. A writ of preliminary injunction was prayed for to prevent Legarda and her agents from stopping the renovation and other activities of New Cathay on the said property. Petitioner’s counsel filed his appearance with an urgent motion for extension of time to file the answer. However, an answer was not filed within the extended period. Respondent’s counsel filed a motion to declare petitioner in default that was granted by the trial court.
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Petitioner’s counsel filed a petition for annulment of judgment in the Court of Appeals. They contended that they have entered into a compromise agreement with respondent, stipulating that there was no need to file an answer anymore. Because of this, they allege that misrepresentation and fraud were employed by the respondent and its counsel which deprived petitioner to prepare for her defense. This petition was subsequently amended raising a new issue that the assailed decision finds no from the allegations in the pleadings or evidence on record. The Court of Appeals denied the petition. No motion for reconsideration or appeal was filed making the decision final. When petitioner belatedly learned about the adverse decision, she hired a new lawyer to file this present petition for certiorari praying that the previous court decisions and the sale at the public auction be annulled for the reason that the fault is due to the petitioner’s former counsel. Such being the case, the petitioner should not be bound by her former counsel’s hapless mistakes brought about by gross negligence and inefficiency; otherwise, she will be denied due process. ISSUE: Whether or not Victoria Legarda should be bound by her former counsel’s gross negligence and inefficiency. HELD: No. Petition GRANTED.
The subject property was sold at a public auction to Roberto Cabrera, Jr., representative of respondent. The same was not redeemed within the 1-year redemption period, hence ownership was consolidated in the name of Cabrera, Jr. The final deed of sale was also ed with the of Deeds.
Nothing is more settled than the rule that the mistake of a counsel binds the client. It is only in case of gross or palpable negligence of counsel when the courts must step in and accord relief to a client who suffered thereby.
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Legal Counseling and Social Responsibility Petitioner's counsel is a well-known practicing lawyer and dean of a law school. It is to be expected that he would extend the highest quality of service as a lawyer to the petitioner. Unfortunately, counsel appears to have abandoned the cause of petitioner. After agreeing to defend the petitioner in the civil case filed against her by private respondent, said counsel did nothing more than enter his appearance and seek for an extension of time to file the answer. Nevertheless, he failed to file the answer. Hence, petitioner was declared in default on motion of private respondent's counsel. After the evidence of private respondent was received ex-parte, a judgment was rendered by the trial court. Said counsel for petitioner received a copy of the judgment but took no steps to have the same set aside or to appeal therefrom. Thus, the judgment became final and executory. During all the time, the petitioner was abroad. When, upon her return, she learned, to her great shock, what happened to her case and property, she nevertheless did not lose faith in her counsel. She still asked Atty. Coronel to take such appropriate action possible under the circumstances. As above related, said counsel filed a petition for annulment of judgment and its amendment in the Court of Appeals. But that was all he did. After an adverse judgment was rendered against petitioner, of which counsel was duly notified, said counsel did not inform the petitioner about it. He did not even ask for a reconsideration thereof, or file a petition for review before this Court. Thus, the judgment became final. It was only upon repeated telephone inquiries of petitioner that she learned from the secretary of her counsel of the judgment that had unfortunately become final.
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can be taken or withheld from his client except in accordance with the law. He should present every remedy or defense authorized by the law in of his client's cause, regardless of his own personal views. In the full discharge of his duties to his client, the lawyer should not be afraid of the possibility that he may displease the judge or the general public. While this Court is cognizant of the rule that, generally, a client will suffer the consequences of the negligence, mistake or lack of competence of his counsel, in the interest of justice and equity, exceptions may be made to such rule, in accordance with the facts and circumstances of each case. Adherence to the general rule would, in the instant case, result in the outright deprivation of their property through a technicality. As member of the Philippine Bar he owes complete fidelity to the cause of his client. He should give adequate attention, care and time to his cases. This is the reason why a practicing lawyer should accept only so many cases he can afford to handle. And once he agrees to handle a case, he should undertake the task with dedication and care. If he should do any less, then he is not true to his oath as a lawyer.
A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client, warmth and zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, to the end that nothing
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Legal Counseling and Social Responsibility ISMAELA DIMAGIBA v. ATTY. JOSE MONTALVO, JR. October 15, 1991, . Case No. 1424, EN BANC (Per Curiam*) *Unanimous decision or almost a majority FACTS: A case for Probate of Will of the deceased Benedicta de los Reyes was instituted before the CFI of Bulacan by Ismaela Dimagiba, regarding a property also subject of the annulment of sale. Fortunately, the latter case was terminated which allowed the probate of the will. The oppositors (Dionisio Fernandez, Eusebio Reyes, Luisa Reyes, Mariano Reyes, Cesar Reyes, and Leonor Reyes) represented by Atty. Jose Montalvo, Jr. appealed to the Higher Court of the Philippines. It was decided by the Hon. Supreme Court of the Philippines affirming the decision of the trial court.
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In view of these numerous cases, Dimagiba decided to report the said actions of Atty. Montalvo, Jr. which caused harassment on her part to the Supreme Court. The High Court required Atty. Montalvo, Jr. to file an answer within 10 days from notice. In his answer, he claimed that the complaints were proper and that Dimagiba only wanted to intimidate him because she refused to be bound by the court’s decision. Dimagiba, in her reder, reiterated the reasons (res judicata and similarity of causes of action and parties, etc.) why the numerous complaints and petitions filed by the oppositors represented by Atty. Montalvo, Jr. were dismissed. The case was referred to the Solicitor General following the procedure involving disciplinary cases against lawyers. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Montalvo, Jr. should be disbarred.
The same oppositors filed another complaint for the annulment of the will through their counsel Atty. Centeno. The complaint was dismissed. Still aggrieved, they again filed a complaint for the annulment of the will that was dismissed again by the court. Another case was again filed by the same oppositors, this time a partition of the subject property mentioned in the probate proceedings. This was also dismissed by the court. Another case for specific performance by the same oppositors through Atty. Montalvo, Jr. that was dismissed by the court. This case was remanded to the Court of Appeals by the CFI of Bulacan. Again, another case was filed by them through Atty. Montalvo, Jr. which is pending before the CFI of Bulacan.
HELD: Yes. Respondent Atty. Montalvo, Jr. is hereby declared DISBARRED. Clearly, the respondent Montalvo, Jr. repetitively filed several complaints in various forms involving the same parties and the same subject matter, persistently raising issues long laid to rest by final judgment. This misbehavior in facie curia (“in the presence of the court”) consisting of a stubborn refusal to accept this Court's pronouncements is in fact even summarily punishable under Rule 71, Section 1 of the Rules of Court. Any lawyer who assumes the responsibility for a client' cause has the duty to know the entire history of a case, specially if any
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Legal Counseling and Social Responsibility litigation has commenced. In the case at bar, even Atty. Montalvo does not deny the fact that the probate of the will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes has been an over-extended an contentious litigation between the heirs. A lawyer should never take advantage of the seemingly endless channels left dangling by our legal system in order wangle the attention of the court. Atty. Montalvo may have thought that lie could get away with his indiscriminate filing o suits that were clearly intended to harass Ismaela Dimagiba. When court dockets get clogged and the istration of justice is delayed, our judicial system may not be entirely blameless, yet the greater fault lies in the lawyers who had take their privilege so lightly, and in such mindless fashion. The Code of Professional Responsibility states that: Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest immoral or deceitful conduct. Rule 1.03 — A lawyer shall not for any corrupt motive or interest encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man's cause. On the basis of the foregoing, we find him guilty of malpractice as charged. He has violated his oath not to delay any matter for money or malice, besmirched the name of an honorable profession, and has proven himself unworthy of the trust repose in him by law as an officer of the Court. We have not countenanced other less significant infractions among the ranks of our lawyers. He deserves the severest punishment of DISBARMENT.
Case Digests
by Monica S. Cajucom
MYRNA D. ROQUE and ROBERTO P. CRUZADO v. ATTY. FELICIANO B. CLEMENCIO August 14, 1992, A.M. No. 3187, FIRST DIVISION (Bellosillo, J.) FACTS: Myrna Roque and Roberto Cruzado filed a complaint against Atty. Feliciano Clemencio charging him with gross misconduct and oppression. It was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation. Atty. Clemencio was a legal officer of the Commission on Audit. He was appointed to investigate to investigate charges filed by herein petitioner Roque against o, a COA official. It was alleged in the complaint that Atty. Clemencio exhibited bias and partiality amounting to abuse of discretion when he was seen hanging out with the counsel of o at a restaurant/beerhouse; that the case almost lasted a year in his office; that he conspired with Atty. Tablang to whom the case was re-assigned when he was relieved of the same; and that he drafted the decision against o even after his relief being the “investigator” of the case. He was also charged of threatening a subordinate Roberto Cruzado, the other complainant, after summoning him. In his answer, Atty. Clemencio denied the allegations. The IBP dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Clemencio should be disbarred. HELD: No.
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Legal Counseling and Social Responsibility Atty. Clemencio is hereby CENSURED for his conduct and is WARNED that repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. We differ from the findings and recommendation of the IBP. Although there may not be sufficient evidence to prove that respondent Atty. Feliciano B. Clemencio acted with abuse of discretion resulting in gross misconduct, We believe nevertheless that he displayed ethical infractions. Undisputedly, as specified in COA Office Order No. 869877, respondent was tasked to conduct the formal investigation in . Case No. 86-884 filed by complainant Roque against o, and thereafter to submit his findings and recommendation. What facts to include or exclude in his report, his findings and how to them as well as his recommendation — all these necessarily entail the exercise of sound discretion and impartial judgment. ittedly, it was respondent himself who drafted the decision in the case, which draft became the basis for the final adjudication adopted by the COA. Indeed, the manner of presenting the facts and the consequent recommendation can influence the reviewing authority. In fact, a perusal of both the draft decision submitted by respondent and the decision finally adopted by the COA would reveal that, except for the difference in the penalties imposed, the final decision had all the earmarks of the preliminary draft. Thus, respondent should have refrained from drinking and dining with o's counsel. It is a rule of general application that an attorney (much more an investigator, as in the case of respondent) should avoid, if not altogether eliminate, even the slightest appearances of impropriety.
Case Digests
by Monica S. Cajucom
Service Unit was precisely to protect his rights, as claimed by respondent. When a lowly employee is summoned to appear before the Chief Security Officer and there questioned by a lawyer who is his superior, and who happens in this case to be respondent himself, and warned of dismissal from employment, a possible litigation and its dire consequences, that employee is, in effect, under threat or intimidation. Here, We take into serious the fact that respondent is a lawyer, a superior who threatened a subordinate complainant with dismissal and a court suit. A man of the law should never use his legal expertise and influence in order to frighten or coerce anyone, specially the ordinary man who looks up to him for justice. Thus, We remind respondent Atty. Feliciano B. Clemencio of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer. Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, immoral or deceitful conduct. A member of the Bar must act with integrity, honesty and professional decorum. He must comport himself in a manner which will secure and preserve the respect and confidence of the public. Both his professional and personal conduct must he kept beyond reproach and above suspicion. He is required not only in fact to be of good moral character, but must also be seen to be leading a life in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. His deportment should be characterized by candor, competence and fairness. One of his duties is to maintain the high ethical standards of the legal profession. Accordingly, respondent must be censured for his failure to comply with the ethical standards required of of the Bar as officers of the Court.
Moreover, we find it difficult to believe that the reason why complainant Cruzado was "invited" to report to the Security Affairs
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Legal Counseling and Social Responsibility
Case Digests
by Monica S. Cajucom
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