Arun Ice Cream 4x65y
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Arun Ice cream
On June 30 1997 even as he signed the Annual s of Hatsun Milk food Limited for the year to March 1997, it was clear to R.G.Chandramogan, the Chairman and Managing Director that his company was in the middle of strategic cross-roads. The dilemma related to the Strategic direction the Chennai-headquartered makers of
Arun ice cream had to take: this in particular involved the
question of market expansion for ice cream beyond South India vis-a
vis
diversification into products that could leverage on the company's current strengths. Recent years had been momentous for Arun as the company itself had come to be known eponymous with its key brand. Early
1996 saw Hatsun Milk Food
Limited (HMFL) taken public. With the Indian stock market in the grip of a bearish phase, Hatsun's initial public offering (IPO) barely managed to sail through. But the greater visibility and emergence of a powerful stakeholder in the form of public investors meant the taciturn management of Hatsun had to play a completely unfamiliar role in managing expectations. With ice cream sales increasing by a healthy 41 %, the just completed fiscal, the first full year after the IPO. Chandramogan reflected, was probably satisfactory in this respect. This, he felt, however only underscored the urgency to develop a sound short-term strategy to consolidate Arun brand of ice cream in the fast-changing competitive scenario and thus establish a solid platform to launch aggressive growth initiatives and attain a critical mass and scale by the year 2000. Arun Ice cream: Early history and Strategy Chandramogan , son of a vegetable wholesaler from South Indian state of Tamil Nadu, set up Arun Ice Cream in 1970 in Madras (now re-named as Chennai), essentially motivated by the urge to "do something". After his college studies were discontinued at the pre-university stage, Chandramogan agonized over several weeks about starting some business without being quite able to narrow down to any specific line, mainly because of heavy investments entailed. While driven by an urge to succeed as a businessman. He did not quite know how to go about setting up
a business. It was his maternal uncle who suggested the business of ice cream. Investing Rs, 15,000 as his own capital and raising another Rs. 21.000 by way of a bank loan. He set up a small ice candy unit in a rented premise adjacent to his uncle's retail textile outlet. From a quick survey around the Madras market it appeared to Chandramogan that there were about 350 smalltime ice candy manufacturers like himself competing in the low end of the market. These were offering no competition to the up-market segment dominated by the leading brands Dasaprakash .Joy and Kwality. Like the "others in the crowd", Chandramogan was also selling his Arun brand ice candies for 10 paise and 15 paise prestigious institution like the Indian Institute of Technology, Madras. He also felt that college students were more than willing to experiment with a new brand or new flavours. Sensing a competitive vacuum, he stepped in with vastly improved service and deliveries they were unaccustomed to and steadily captured bulk of this segment. Similarly ship-chandlers, who procured and supplied provisions to ships that called at the Madras port, were particular about delivery of ice cream just in time for onward transshipment to ships. Chandramogan felt that this segment, while fastidious about quality, was not that brand-driven. Most leading ice-cream manufacturers were unsurprisingly unexcited about these supplies in view of the small volumes and the erratic delivery requirements. Chandramogan began meeting these agents who were procuring and supplying provisions to various shipping lines, understood their special requirements as to packing and delivery and quickly captured most of this market as well. By 1974, Chandramogan recalls that, Arun had probably captured 95% of the college canteen and ship-chandler segments. However, 95% of the total Madras market, represented by the other three segments, was still outside the reach of Arun. Having firmly established in the city college campuses, Chandramogan toyed with the idea of replicating the approach in the college canteens in the interior districts of Tamil Nadu. Ice-cream majors of the time practically ignored the district towns because of sheer logistics problems. Since the student community in district-level colleges. Included in their midst former students of Madras colleges, brand recognition for Arun was made relatively easier. Chandramogan began supplying ice cream to a few colleges in nearby districts, packed in dry ice containers, employing sales persons for the purpose. Very soon Arun had virtually 100% of the small, but growing upcountry college market.
With Arun's volumes picking up in the following months Chandramogan was able to pay off all his outstanding loans, and the business regained a semblance of financial flexibility. Despite this, Chandrarnogan still did not feel financially strong enough to enter the deep freezer based general stores segment in Madras city. While in these early-days, he did provide some ment to build and enhance the brand image of Arun, very few enquiries for agency or franchisee interest followed. As he continued to stay clear of the top three segments in the Madras market, it was evident to Chandramogan that the business was probably entering a phase of stagnation. So he began looking out for new markets in which he could compete effectively and grow. Breaking into upcountry market As Chandramogan saw, the greatest growth potential was seen 10 the upcountry mofussiltowns that were completely ignored by the ice cream majors. While these- markets were virgin, the cost and logistics of servicing them from a central factory in Madras were indeed daunting. If he could come up with the right marketing and distribution formulae, Chandramogan felt there was a good chance of his striking it big, particularly because of the absence of any serious competition. Having made inroads into upcountry college canteens and hostels, Chandramogan began looking at the feasibility of supplying ice cream to wedding and other important social events in upcountry towns. While ice cream was a standard fare for such events in Madras, this concept was virtually unknown outside the city. So he went around canvassing for orders for wedding and other social events in upmarket households outside Madras city. Through persistent efforts, Arun was able to achieve some measure of success. While these initiatives did help in enhancing brand awareness and additional sales, Chandramogan realized that these would not be adequate to give him stable volumes and a critical mass. And to achieve this, it was important that somehow he got into some kind of mass marketing. Around this time there were a few enquiries indicating interest in stocking and retailing Arun ice cream in some areas of the Madras city provided Chandramogan supplied the deep freezers. Chandramogan firmly, but politely turned down the offers. Initially, Chandramogan identified a few towns like Pondicherry, Madurai, Kumbakonam and Sivakasi in Tamil Nadu for initial foray, particularly because good quality icecream was not
available in these places. (At best a few hotels and, restaurants were serving "home-made", unbranded, plain-vanilla ice cream to their diners). Chandramogan d through banners and hoardings in these selected towns that ice cream from Madras would be supplied on certain pre-announced days and that those interested could book their orders with Arun agents either in person or by phone. Using local telephone directories to obtain addresses, he also' had mailers posted to potential upmarket customers, referring to them as eminent persons figuring in the list of VIPs. Typically Chandramogan had Arun ice cream supplied through the agents within four to five days of the "booking" "Ice cream supplied from Madras" was the key selling point. Mailers to addressees outside the specified locality were rare at that time. As the long-ignored small town consumers felt recognized, there was tremendous response to these "test-marketing" forays. Even as Chandramogan was beginning to feel confident to think in of regular distribution arrangements in place of the ad-hoc "ice cream days", the novelty factor was beginning to wearoff and. customer response started declining . He also felt that. 'fixed-day" selling probably left out a large number of potential customers from places contiguous to these towns as well as walkin customers indulging in impulse purchases. Having made inroads into upcountry college canteens and hostels, Chandramogan began looking at the feasibility of supplying ice cream to wedding and other important social events in upcountry towns. While ice cream was a standard fare for such events in Madras, this concept was virtually unknown outside the city. So he went around canvassing for orders for wedding and other social events in upmarket households outside Madras city. Through persistent efforts, Arun was able to achieve some measure of success. While these initiatives did help in enhancing brand awareness and additional sales, Chandramogan realized that these would not be adequate to give him stable volumes and a critical mass. And to achieve this, it was important that somehow he got into some kind of mass marketing. Around this time there were a few enquiries indicating interest in stocking and retailing Arun ice cream in some areas of the Madras city provided Chandramogan supplied the deep freezers. Chandramogan firmly, but politely turned down the offers. Initially, Chandramogan identified a few towns like Pondicherry, Madurai, Kumbakonam and Sivakasi in Tamil Nadu for initial foray, particularly because good quality ice-cream was not available in these places. (At best a few hotels and, restaurants were serving "home-made",
unbranded, plain-vanilla ice cream to their diners). Chandramogan d through banners and hoardings in these selected towns that ice cream from Madras would be supplied oncertain pre-announced days and that those interested could book their orders with Arun agents either in person or by phone. Using local telephone directories to obtain addresses, he also' had mailers posted to potential upmarket customers, referring to them as eminent persons figuring in the list of VIPs. Typically Chandramogan had Arun ice cream supplied through the agents within four to five days of the "booking”. "Ice cream supplied from Madras" was the key selling point. Mailers to addressees outside the specified locality were rare at that time. As the long-ignored small town consumers felt recognized, there was tremendous response to these "test-marketing" forays. Even as Chandramogan was beginning to feel confident to think in of regular distribution arrangements in place of the ad-hoc "ice cream days", the novelty factor was beginning to wearoff and. customer response started declining . He also felt that. 'fixed-day" selling probably left out a large number of potential customers from places contiguous to these towns as well as walkin customers indulging in impulse purchases. The break-through came by chance. As Chandramogan said, "people see ments; but they seldom read it carefully". On the appointed days when ice-cream was to be supplied as announced in ment mailers and hoarding, even those who had not booked ice creams, came to the premises of the agent whose address appeared in the ments for buying ice cream. Similarly many potential customers also turned up on other days. Excited by the consumer response and seeing that on several occasions, walk-in customers had to be turned back, an agent Kanakaraj from the temple-town of Madurai offered to invest in his own deepfreezer and sought long-term distribution arrangements. This agent provided facilities to people to "sit and eat" ice cream. A novel method of retailing ice cream through "sit-and-eat parlour" thus was born in1981. Though Kanakaraj suggested that price of Arun ice cream be kept low keeping in view of the price-sensitivity of the local market, Chandramogan was not in favour of doing so as be felt that Arun was not the same as unbranded, low-priced ice cream served in local restaurants. Chandramogan ed this agent through t promotions and regular ment campaigns. Even as the first Arun "franchisee" began tasting success with steadily-growing demand, other small town agents also felt emboldened to invest in their own freezers. A 400-litre freezer of reputed brand typically cost about Rs. 12000 to 13,000 around the
time. As Chandramogan recalls, he "accidentally hit the right button". "This was not a credit oriented market”. And he did not have adequate resources to invest in his own freezers and supply them to retail outlets. As it turned out, "there was no investment, no credit, but also no competition in this market". And he was implementing the franchisee concept without ever knowing the term. From 1981 he began replicating the model by opening, on an average, two such franchisee run parlours every month. With over 700 such outlets in Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Kerala and Andhra Pradesh by early 1999, Chandramogan believed that Arun franchisee network was one of the largest in South India. In appointing his franchisees, Chandramogan typically looked at the personal profile and business background of the potential candidates. Typically, he would not offer Arun franchise to big time, successful traders or businessmen. He also avoided, as far as possible, elderly persons or highly educated individuals for distributorship. On the other hand, he would prefer someone who was in his mid or late twenties, preferably completed his schooling, with average family income and had probably failed in his early business endeavors. Very often, friends and relatives of existing franchisees approached him with requests for franchise rights to open parlours in new locations. This made Chandramogan's task easier. Once appointed, the franchisee was assured of certain exclusiveness and "area" protection in that another Arun franchisee was not appointed within a 1.5- 2 kilometre radius. These franchised outlets were exclusive "sit-and-eat" ice cream parlours with good ambience and located in city centre or main roads. Unlike the general stores freezer outlets of other ice cream brands, Arun’s outlets did not stock other items like butter and chocolates. Over the years Chandramogan fine-tuned the parlour and franchisee concepts. Chandramogan had deliberately decided on the strategy of parlours selling Arun Ice Cream exclusively. On its part, the company would ensure that it distributed its products only through its franchisees' parlours and not through any other channels except direct deliveries to customers against specific orders for parties etc. The concept of exclusive parlours, Chandramogan felt, enabled the franchisee to focus on selling Arun range of ice cream and give better customer service. By 1985, Arun emerged as the largest ice-cream manufacturer in Tamil Nadu in of volumes. Arun's turnover, which was about Rs. 150,000 in 1970 and had barely inched up to about Rs. 425000 by1981, had risen to about Rs. 28.0 million, by 1990.
Even as Arun became largest ice cream brand in Tamil Nadu by 1985 thanks to its success in the upcountry districts, Arun still did not have significant presence in the Madras city. Chandramogan now began aggressively attacking the Madras city market initially by establishing the now successful "sit-and-eat" parlours in Madras suburbs and outskirts and only thereafter, he moved into the city. In the next 18 to 24 months, Arun achieved its brand leadership in Madras city as well. While he continued with the strategy of not cultivating the hotel segment, the wedding parties segment came "automatically" to Arun now. It was estimated that Arun had a market share of around 60% in Tamil Nadu by 1999 and about 36% in the four South Indian states. Chandramogan estimates that probably about 120 franchisees came to his fold as friends/relatives of existing Arun agents. One franchisee, Ganesan, was responsible for introducing as many as 32 other agents. Aruns franchisee family, Chandramogan felt, was an extremely loyal lot as most them grew with Arun. There was a strong symbiotic relationship between the company and its franchisees. At a more personal level, many of them enjoyed very warm relationship with Chandramogan. And several of them have named their sons and grandsons as Arun! Chandramogan was clear that in any business decision he took, he would not ignore the collective interests of his extended family of franchisees. Manufacturing Operations and Logistics While the seventies were a period of "learning", the eighties turned out to be one of "earning" for Chandramogan. He also realized that in the business of ice cream, efficient management of inward and outward logistics was extremely important. The most challenging aspect was, procurement of milk, a key input in ice-cream manufacture in a cost-efficient- manner. The problems arose because of the seasonal demand-supply imbalance in respect of the product and its extremely short shelf-life. Summer months of March through June, though peak season for ice cream sales, also, happen to be the lean season for milk supplies in Southern India. Similarly the flush season for milk coincide with the period of low ice cream sales. From fairly early days, Chandramogan decided procure milk directly from dairy farmers and for this purpose set up collection centers’ in major milk-producing villages close to his ice cream plant. The milk procured at these collection centre’s could be brought to the Arun factory within 2 to 3 hours of collection. He offered guaranteed procurement of certain minimum quantity of milk, based on
his lean season requirements. For his additional requirements of milk in the peak ice cream season, he offered to pay a higher price. Typically the payments to the dairy farmers for the milk purchases were made once every three days at the collection centres. According to Chandramogan, Arun's ice cream sales had; on an average, exhibited the kind of seasonal-pattern as given in Table 1. He sourced other Inputs -and ingredients such as sugar, fruits, packing materials etc. from leading wholesalers/manufacturers. For outward transport of ice cream to various franchisees located in different town he recognised that the low volumes to various destinations did not justify the use of expensive refrigerated transport that had to return empty with no compatible load. S o he typically took advantage of the regular enger train services of the Indian Railways for despatch of ice cream to various destinations. For this purpose, ice cream cartons were tightly packed in small wooden boxes (2'x2'x2') with thermacole lining and filled with dry ice (solid carbon dioxide) to prevent melting. Being a highly perishable product, ice cream was accorded high priority by the Railways for transportation. The franchisees would have the "boxes" collected at their respective destinations. They also returned the empty containers by return trains. And it was not until 1995 that he purchased refrigerated vehicles for delivery of ice cream. Chandramogan also felt that in the long run transporting ice cream to long distances by train or by refrigerated vehicles might not be a viable strategy. He also reckoned that a 250 to 300 K.M. radius was probably the optimal area that could be cost-effectively serviced by a central ice cream plant. As the Madras ice cream plant was running out of capacity thanks to Arun’s rapid expansion in the eighties, Chandramogan felt a compelling need to set up another plant both to meet the growing demand and also to improve the overall logistics. In 1991 he set up a spanking new ice cream plant at Salem, some 320 kilometers south west of Madras and also close to both Kerala and Karnataka borders. Moreover the new plant was located in the heart of Tamil Nadu's milk belt which facilitated procurement of high quality milk at competitive prices. See Exhibit: 1 for a map of South India. The Salem plant involving an investment of Rs. 22 million was constructed in record time of about 3 months, right in time for the summer season. The plant capacity at both Madras and Salem were designed for peak seasonal production; during off-season the plant utilization was only partial and all annual maintenance and revamp were typically scheduled during this period. While on an average 7 to 10 new flavours were introduced every year, an equal number were probably phased out.
Chandramogan figured that about 30 to 35 flavours were on offer at any given time. A process diagram in respect of ice cream manufacture is given in Exhibit: 2. In order to conform to the prevailing regulations restricting manufacture of ice cream only in the SSI sector explained elsewhere in the case the Salem plant was' set u pas an SSI unit under a new proprietary concern, Atlantic Foods. In the following years ice cream production in the Salem
factory more than
met the growing demands placed on it. Chandramogan then turned his attention to the Madras plant that required major investments in up-gradation. Rather than attempting a piecemeal revamp and modernization of the decades-old plant, he decided to set up a totally new automatic facility and for this purpose he acquired a new five acre plot in the Red Hills area in the outskirts of the city. This plant with a capacity of 15000 liters of ice cream mix a day and costing about Rs. 45 million (inclusive of the cost- of land) became operational in July 1995.In view of the investment restrictions on individual SS1 unit, the new Madras plant was set up under a separate firm, Hatsun Milk Products Around this time, Chandramogan found it necessary to revamp the distribution logistics. Recent and continuing increase in the number of franchisees on the one hand as well as in the variety of ice cream flavours on the other, he felt, was beginning to take a heavy toll, on the factories. He thought of relieving factories of the responsibility of managing the direct distribution of ice cream to the various destinations on a daily basis. As a first step he set up a depot in Madurai in 1995 with adequate, cold storage facilities and the required istrative personnel to handle ice cream distribution to the franchisee located in the southern districts of Tamil Nadu. The depot would be responsible for sourcing from Arun factories, inventory and cold storage management, order taking and execution as well as collections. With the requirements of milk steadily going up in keeping with the rising ice cream sales, Chandramogan was becoming increasingly concerned about managing the expectations of the dairy farmers particularly during the lean season for ice cream. While he needed increasingly large quantity of milk during the peak summer months, failure to maintain milk procurement at a reasonably high base during off-season could lead to the farmers snapping the links with Arun and moving away to other more "dependable" customers. Brand and promotions strategy From very early days Chandramogan was keen to build and preserve a distinct brand identity
"Arun" for his ice cream. Almost since inception, he was spending fairly large sums of money for promotion and ment. Whether it was a Madras city college campus or an upcountry high-traffic junction, the brand "Arun" was heavily promoted through colorful banners, posters or flyers. In the early years, the main ment media were newspapers and magazines. When colour television coverage received a big boost in the mid-eighties, Chandramogan immediately took to the popular visual medium of advertising. As the turnover went up sharply following the success of the franchise strategy, Chandramogan stepped up brand-focused ment and began investing in technology. The fact that he did not have to invest in working capital and in deep freezers meant that his liquidity remained unimpaired. This gave him considerable freedom to invest in brand building. By 1991, according to Chandramogan, Arun’s ment spending was probably higher than the total turnover of Dasaprakash. From 1987 Chandramogan began carrying out focused sales promotion activities. The first such promotion was "Eat All You Can" Ice Cream Mela conducted in madras city. Under this scheme, for a fixed entry fee of, say, Rs. 8/-, the participants were allowed to eat any amount of ice cream on display and the one who "consumes" the maximum quantity was declared winner. The specific purpose of this sales promotion campaign was to encourage consumers to try out higherend, expensive flavours, which, in the normal course they were normally reluctant to experiment with. (Consumers normally consumed Vani1la flavour, the cheapest). Altogether, about 4200 people participated in campaign that probably cost about RS. 270000. Similar campaigns were later repeated in other cities like Hyderabad. Another successful scheme was "slow speed driving competition". From 1993 onwards, Arun also began conducting "slow-speed" driving competition for two wheelers like motor cycles and scooters. An intending participant typically is required to purchase ice cream worth, say, Rs. 15/as "entry fee". Conducted in association with the local traffic police in cities like Madras and Bangalore, such competitions turned out to be big hit with some 3400 Persons participating in one such event. The objective of such campaigns was 'again to encourage customer trial of highend flavours that hopefully would lead to greater flow of two-wheeler traffic to Arun' s parlours. Another mode of promotion was the "Phone and Have an Ice Cream" (Dial-a-Number) campaign. It was widely d that anyone dialing up certain specified telephone numbers during specified time slots on a given day would win Rs. 100/- worth Arun ice cream for free.
During 1993-94 the "Dial-a-Number" campaign was conducted in 20 towns attracting participation by over 12,000 callers costing an estimated at Rs.1.60 million. Often such campaigns were also launched at the time of entering a new market or introducing' new flavours. Sales promotion campaigns similar to these were conducted regularly in different places. Such promotional campaigns .were routinely planned as key element of the overall marketing plan. Arun also encouraged its parlors to come with local initiatives such as "the home-delivery scheme" etc. Approach to pricing and franchisee management Typically Chandramogan followed a cost-plus approach for setting retail price. of ice cream. Franchisees were given margins @ 20% to 25% of maximum retail price (MRP), depending factors such as on their location and the costs borne by them (such as relating to ordering, return of empty containers etc). This left him with 75% to 80% of the MRP towards manufacturing and other expenses as well as profits. Chandramogan estimated that for other ice cream manufacturers, this margin was probably in the region 65% of the MRP. Unlike the reported two-tier distribution structure of some of the other leading ice cream players such as Vadilal, a market leader in Western India, Chandramogan decided to follow a single-tier distribution strategy, directly supplying ice cream to the point of retail customer sales . Companies like Vadilal were believed to have very large number of distribution outlets. -. While the turnover of these companies were 50 to 70% higher than Arun, their profitability was believed to be significantly lower which probably impaired their ability to continuously their brands. Their three-tier distribution structure, Chandramogan believed, added substantially to their over-all cost of distribution in areas s u c ha s packaging, transportation (in refrigerated environment) and distribution margins. According to his estimates, the overall distribution cost of Arun was about 3-4% of sales (mainly outward freight), compared to 8- 9% for other leading ice cream manufacturers. This also gave him room for maneuver. In the case of other leading ice cream, retailer probably enjoyed a margin of about 12% to 15% of MRP. Arun’s factory took orders from franchisees by phone. The number of such calls during peak Seasonal months could be as high as 800 a day. Upcountry franchisees were typically expected to make advance payment by demand draft to Arun against which fresh dispatches would be
made. As regards the franchisees based in Madras city, Arun's franchisee control department would bank the cheques collected in advance, no sooner ice cream supplies were made. Chandramogan strongly discouraged sale of ice cream except in pre-packaged factory packs with MRP marked thereon made available in different quantities/sizes. Franchisees were required to display prominently in the parlours the price list issued by Arun. Chandramogan figures that some 60 to 70 franchise arrangements might have been terminated for violation of MRP guidelines or of payment Management and organization Over the years Chandramogan had recruited a group of senior managers in various functional positions. He was of the view that for a fledgling, entrepreneur-managed organization like Arun, the- CEO had to be actively involved in the Personnel and Human Resources Management function and maintain a direct line of communication with the managers. One of his earliest recruitment was Shankar, an experienced ice-cream technologist for the production function at a time when Arun could barely afford him. Another key executive during Arun’s growth phase was Adinarayan who played a stellar role in completing the Salem project in record time. By mid-nineties a professional management team was in place in key functional positions. These included R. Chandramouli as Financial Controller and Company Secretary, V. Jaganathan an MBA as Marketing Manager and Prasanna kumar Mehta as Head of Production. While the organization was - adequately staffed with most employees growing with the organization, Chandramogan recognized that in the coming years Arun would definitely need to strengthen the senior and middle management cadres, preferably with executives having experience in large, more structured organizations such as multi-national companies. Chandramogan was proud of the fact that except for a few days of strike/lockout in 1995, employee relations remained cordial Emerging competitive scenario The organized segment of ice--cream market in India had been historically controlled by strong regional players such as Kwality in the North and the East, Kwality and Vadilal in the West and Dasaprakash, Joy and later Arun in the South. For every Vadilal or Arun there were hundreds of small time ice cream producers in the unorganized sector selling ice cream under local brands or private labels. Moreover most hotels and restaurants also made a limited range of ice cream
flavours in-house for their captive needs. The fact that ice cream manufacture was reserved for the small scale industry (SSI) sector meant that even the bigger players had to necessarily source their ice cream requirements from SSI units which were often specifically set up by the ice cream company owners or their family . The established brands by and large were initially confined to the metropolitan cities in their region-and later expanded to service other principal towns in the region. Vadilal, for example, had fairly wide presence in Gujarat and was steadily extending its reach to other states in the West and even beyond. In the late eighties, the multinational company, Cadbury India entered the ice-cream market with the brand “Dollops". After the initial surge of consumer interest created by its launch, Dollops seemed to have failed to establish itself in the market. It also appeared that Cadbury itself was somewhat wavering in its to the brand. The ice-cream market- in India was completely shaken up by the entry of the consumer product giant Unilever, through one of its Indian subsidiaries, 13rooke Bond India Limited 5 (BBIL). BBIL, which has been traditionally a tea and coffee beverage company, had identified ice cream and other food products as thrust area for future growth. It entered processed-fruit segment (such as jam and sauce) by acquiring the market leader Kissan from the UB Group, the leading liquor manufacturers. BBIL also entered the frozen foods segment by establishing a new, state-of-theart plant at Nashik in Western India and launched the well-known international brand of Unilever, Walls. As part of India's economic reforms launched in 1991 several of the extant restrictions relating to entry, capacity, output and size in a variety of sectors were being phased out or relaxed. BBIL and its leading stable-mate Hindustan Lever Limited (HLL) undertook a series of transactions· to consolidate and strengthen the Unilever group's presence in several product-markets. Having identified frozen desserts as growth area, BBIL took no time in acquiring Dollops from Cad bury India and other leading brands of Kwality and Milkfood. With a leading international brand such as Walls and leading Indian brands such as Kwality in its· portfolio, BBIL· emerged as a major player in the ice cream/frozen dessert market overnight. With the entry of an international food giant with deep pockets and tremendous staying power and one who would not be content with mere regional leadership, the rules of competitive game in the ice cream market were being completely re-written. In February 1997, the Government of India announced de-reservation of ice cream manufacture from the list of products earmarked for exclusive development in the SSI sector. This meant that large companies like Hindustan Lever
could restructure the supply configuration of the business by setting up world-class ice cream ice cream manufacturing facilities with Unilever's technological . Even as Arun emerged to the top spot in the four Southern states, Chandramogan had to contend with the new competitive dynamics and re-work his own strategy. Ownership structure and finances When Chandramogan entered the ice cream business in 1970, it was through· a partnership firm styled Chandramohan &. Co: In March 1986, a private limited company by the name of Hatsul1 Foods Private Limited (HFPL) was incorporated in Madras. On April 30, 1986, HFPL took over the business of Chandramohan . & Co. as a going concern. The ownership of the brand name ARUN was also later transferred to HFPL whereby, the company was allowed to the brand name Arun in its own name, subject to a royalty payment of 1% on the gross ice cream sales. In August, 1995 the company’s name was changed to Hatsun Milk Food Private Limited (HMFPL)and was also converted into a public limited company, Hatsun Milk food Limited (HMFL) very soon thereafter In January 1996 HMFL was taken public through an initial public offering of 1.80 million shares at an issue price of Rs. 45/- per share. Following this IPO, by March 1996. HMFL paid-up capital increased to Rs. 38.4 million from under Rs. 0.50 million and its net-worth including share to Rs. 84.0 million from about Rs. 11.0 million just a year before. In view of the reservation of ice cream manufacture in the SSI sector6 which precluded HMFL from carrying out ice cream production, HMFL was conceived to be a marketing company. Actual ice cream manufacturing was continued to be carried out in the two closely-held ,; small scale units Atlantic Foods in Salem and Hatsun Foods Company in Madras, HMFL sourced its ice cream requirements from these two SSI units.
The financial performance of the ice cream business Arun over the years reflected the sharp growth in volumes arising from aggressive franchise expansion and strong- promotion of the Arun brand. For example, HMFL's spending on ment; promotion and related items amounted to Rs.21.7 million in the year to March 1997, nearly 12% of its fiscal 1997 sales of Rs.
184.1 million. The spending in rupee· represented a near 100% increase over the previous year. As can be seen from Exhibits 3 and 4, with a net-worth of over Rs. 100 million as of March 1997, the company's financial position had indeed been further strengthened. While this gave substantial strategic elbowroom for Chandramogan, be was acutely aware of the fact the competitive and regulatory scenario had changed dramatically in recent months. Strategic challenges and dilemmas The principal worrying factor for Arun management was the dramatic developments in the market place that could seriously undermine's Arun's growth plans. The aggressive entry of the Unilever group (through BBIL since merged into HLL) into the ice-cream/frozen dessert market through a series of acquisition of well-known regional brands, as noted earlier, was indeed a pregnant pointer to the remaining independent players. The enormous array of product portfolio and financial resources at its command meant HLL could its Rs. 1500 million ice_cream/frozen dessert business for any length of time and aggressively seek market share, even if this meant taking eyes off the business's profitability temporarily. And-unlike the regional players who were happy not to disturb the regional competitive balance, HLL would not be content with anything less than leadership position in every single market. HLL's announced strategies for its Frozen Dessert and Ice Cream product group carried in its recent Annual Report were ringing ominous bells for the likes of Arun. Your Company's Frozen Products business consolidated its leadership in the Ice Cream market with its national share exceeding 50% despite strong low-priced competition in key markets. Your Company’s brand have been consolidated under the house name "KwalityWalls” Extensive consumer research has provided valuable insights into the development and application of relevant technologies in product formulation and refrigerated product handling which have begun to set new standards in of delivered product quality. The standard Ice Cream portfolio was consolidated under the "Dairy Classic" brand, a new recipe having better product stability and innovative virgin board food grade packaging were established. This is a significant move for an industry, which had hitherto been using non food grade recycled
packaging. The business strengthened its efforts on brand building and innovation, which are the key drivers for the overall development of the Ice Cream category. The key brand franchises in the impulse segment, "Cornetto" and “Feast”, the cornerstone of Unilever's Ice Cream presence worldwide. and "Chocobar" were strengthened with appropriate advertising – the first individual brands to be d in the Ice Cream category in the country. These brands have ed significant growth in all the markets A major exercise was undertaken to upgrade the manufacturing facilities of your Company's Ice Cream sourcing units. Products, marketed under the KW.1lity-Walls brand name, conform fully to the stringent standards specified by the Bureau of Indian Standards and also to the more exacting Unilever norms on product safety and hygiene. This is a major milestone and a key differentiator for the Kwality-Walls brand.
For Chandramogan it was clear that he had to quickly rework the competitive strategy for Arun. The key question was whether to aggressively reinforce Arun's competitive profile and further expand its franchisee network in the face of HLL’s competitive onslaught or pursue alternative business opportunities woven around Arun's limited strengths and competencies. The latter strategy, be thought, while providing an alternative platform of growth might also be necessary from the point of his ability and the need to give continued to the Ice Cream business. He was certainly determined that unlike several other Indian entrepreneurs in the FMCG sector, he would not sell-out to the MNCs.
Exhibit III Key Financial & other Information (Rs Million) 1 2 3
Sales PBT Advt.
&
1988-89 8.6 0.07 0.7
89-90 27.8 0.1 3.8
90-91 38.4 4.2 3.6
91-92 36.7 0.2 5.6
92-93 42.5 2.3 6.1
93-94 55.3 2.7 7.3
94-95 65.6 3.7 6.5
95-96 138.5 18.1 11.1
96-97 184.1 21.3 21.7
0.5
0.7
3.2
2.9
6.5
9.4
11.1
83.9
107.0
157
182
250
277
355
404
453
524
Promotion 4
Expenses Shareholders
5
Fund No.
of
Franchisees
Table 1 (manufacturing Operations & Logistics) Month April - June July – September Oct- Dec Jan- March
Percentage of annual Sale 34% 22% 19% 25%
Exhibit
On June 30 1997 even as he signed the Annual s of Hatsun Milk food Limited for the year to March 1997, it was clear to R.G.Chandramogan, the Chairman and Managing Director that his company was in the middle of strategic cross-roads. The dilemma related to the Strategic direction the Chennai-headquartered makers of
Arun ice cream had to take: this in particular involved the
question of market expansion for ice cream beyond South India vis-a
vis
diversification into products that could leverage on the company's current strengths. Recent years had been momentous for Arun as the company itself had come to be known eponymous with its key brand. Early
1996 saw Hatsun Milk Food
Limited (HMFL) taken public. With the Indian stock market in the grip of a bearish phase, Hatsun's initial public offering (IPO) barely managed to sail through. But the greater visibility and emergence of a powerful stakeholder in the form of public investors meant the taciturn management of Hatsun had to play a completely unfamiliar role in managing expectations. With ice cream sales increasing by a healthy 41 %, the just completed fiscal, the first full year after the IPO. Chandramogan reflected, was probably satisfactory in this respect. This, he felt, however only underscored the urgency to develop a sound short-term strategy to consolidate Arun brand of ice cream in the fast-changing competitive scenario and thus establish a solid platform to launch aggressive growth initiatives and attain a critical mass and scale by the year 2000. Arun Ice cream: Early history and Strategy Chandramogan , son of a vegetable wholesaler from South Indian state of Tamil Nadu, set up Arun Ice Cream in 1970 in Madras (now re-named as Chennai), essentially motivated by the urge to "do something". After his college studies were discontinued at the pre-university stage, Chandramogan agonized over several weeks about starting some business without being quite able to narrow down to any specific line, mainly because of heavy investments entailed. While driven by an urge to succeed as a businessman. He did not quite know how to go about setting up
a business. It was his maternal uncle who suggested the business of ice cream. Investing Rs, 15,000 as his own capital and raising another Rs. 21.000 by way of a bank loan. He set up a small ice candy unit in a rented premise adjacent to his uncle's retail textile outlet. From a quick survey around the Madras market it appeared to Chandramogan that there were about 350 smalltime ice candy manufacturers like himself competing in the low end of the market. These were offering no competition to the up-market segment dominated by the leading brands Dasaprakash .Joy and Kwality. Like the "others in the crowd", Chandramogan was also selling his Arun brand ice candies for 10 paise and 15 paise prestigious institution like the Indian Institute of Technology, Madras. He also felt that college students were more than willing to experiment with a new brand or new flavours. Sensing a competitive vacuum, he stepped in with vastly improved service and deliveries they were unaccustomed to and steadily captured bulk of this segment. Similarly ship-chandlers, who procured and supplied provisions to ships that called at the Madras port, were particular about delivery of ice cream just in time for onward transshipment to ships. Chandramogan felt that this segment, while fastidious about quality, was not that brand-driven. Most leading ice-cream manufacturers were unsurprisingly unexcited about these supplies in view of the small volumes and the erratic delivery requirements. Chandramogan began meeting these agents who were procuring and supplying provisions to various shipping lines, understood their special requirements as to packing and delivery and quickly captured most of this market as well. By 1974, Chandramogan recalls that, Arun had probably captured 95% of the college canteen and ship-chandler segments. However, 95% of the total Madras market, represented by the other three segments, was still outside the reach of Arun. Having firmly established in the city college campuses, Chandramogan toyed with the idea of replicating the approach in the college canteens in the interior districts of Tamil Nadu. Ice-cream majors of the time practically ignored the district towns because of sheer logistics problems. Since the student community in district-level colleges. Included in their midst former students of Madras colleges, brand recognition for Arun was made relatively easier. Chandramogan began supplying ice cream to a few colleges in nearby districts, packed in dry ice containers, employing sales persons for the purpose. Very soon Arun had virtually 100% of the small, but growing upcountry college market.
With Arun's volumes picking up in the following months Chandramogan was able to pay off all his outstanding loans, and the business regained a semblance of financial flexibility. Despite this, Chandrarnogan still did not feel financially strong enough to enter the deep freezer based general stores segment in Madras city. While in these early-days, he did provide some ment to build and enhance the brand image of Arun, very few enquiries for agency or franchisee interest followed. As he continued to stay clear of the top three segments in the Madras market, it was evident to Chandramogan that the business was probably entering a phase of stagnation. So he began looking out for new markets in which he could compete effectively and grow. Breaking into upcountry market As Chandramogan saw, the greatest growth potential was seen 10 the upcountry mofussiltowns that were completely ignored by the ice cream majors. While these- markets were virgin, the cost and logistics of servicing them from a central factory in Madras were indeed daunting. If he could come up with the right marketing and distribution formulae, Chandramogan felt there was a good chance of his striking it big, particularly because of the absence of any serious competition. Having made inroads into upcountry college canteens and hostels, Chandramogan began looking at the feasibility of supplying ice cream to wedding and other important social events in upcountry towns. While ice cream was a standard fare for such events in Madras, this concept was virtually unknown outside the city. So he went around canvassing for orders for wedding and other social events in upmarket households outside Madras city. Through persistent efforts, Arun was able to achieve some measure of success. While these initiatives did help in enhancing brand awareness and additional sales, Chandramogan realized that these would not be adequate to give him stable volumes and a critical mass. And to achieve this, it was important that somehow he got into some kind of mass marketing. Around this time there were a few enquiries indicating interest in stocking and retailing Arun ice cream in some areas of the Madras city provided Chandramogan supplied the deep freezers. Chandramogan firmly, but politely turned down the offers. Initially, Chandramogan identified a few towns like Pondicherry, Madurai, Kumbakonam and Sivakasi in Tamil Nadu for initial foray, particularly because good quality icecream was not
available in these places. (At best a few hotels and, restaurants were serving "home-made", unbranded, plain-vanilla ice cream to their diners). Chandramogan d through banners and hoardings in these selected towns that ice cream from Madras would be supplied on certain pre-announced days and that those interested could book their orders with Arun agents either in person or by phone. Using local telephone directories to obtain addresses, he also' had mailers posted to potential upmarket customers, referring to them as eminent persons figuring in the list of VIPs. Typically Chandramogan had Arun ice cream supplied through the agents within four to five days of the "booking" "Ice cream supplied from Madras" was the key selling point. Mailers to addressees outside the specified locality were rare at that time. As the long-ignored small town consumers felt recognized, there was tremendous response to these "test-marketing" forays. Even as Chandramogan was beginning to feel confident to think in of regular distribution arrangements in place of the ad-hoc "ice cream days", the novelty factor was beginning to wearoff and. customer response started declining . He also felt that. 'fixed-day" selling probably left out a large number of potential customers from places contiguous to these towns as well as walkin customers indulging in impulse purchases. Having made inroads into upcountry college canteens and hostels, Chandramogan began looking at the feasibility of supplying ice cream to wedding and other important social events in upcountry towns. While ice cream was a standard fare for such events in Madras, this concept was virtually unknown outside the city. So he went around canvassing for orders for wedding and other social events in upmarket households outside Madras city. Through persistent efforts, Arun was able to achieve some measure of success. While these initiatives did help in enhancing brand awareness and additional sales, Chandramogan realized that these would not be adequate to give him stable volumes and a critical mass. And to achieve this, it was important that somehow he got into some kind of mass marketing. Around this time there were a few enquiries indicating interest in stocking and retailing Arun ice cream in some areas of the Madras city provided Chandramogan supplied the deep freezers. Chandramogan firmly, but politely turned down the offers. Initially, Chandramogan identified a few towns like Pondicherry, Madurai, Kumbakonam and Sivakasi in Tamil Nadu for initial foray, particularly because good quality ice-cream was not available in these places. (At best a few hotels and, restaurants were serving "home-made",
unbranded, plain-vanilla ice cream to their diners). Chandramogan d through banners and hoardings in these selected towns that ice cream from Madras would be supplied oncertain pre-announced days and that those interested could book their orders with Arun agents either in person or by phone. Using local telephone directories to obtain addresses, he also' had mailers posted to potential upmarket customers, referring to them as eminent persons figuring in the list of VIPs. Typically Chandramogan had Arun ice cream supplied through the agents within four to five days of the "booking”. "Ice cream supplied from Madras" was the key selling point. Mailers to addressees outside the specified locality were rare at that time. As the long-ignored small town consumers felt recognized, there was tremendous response to these "test-marketing" forays. Even as Chandramogan was beginning to feel confident to think in of regular distribution arrangements in place of the ad-hoc "ice cream days", the novelty factor was beginning to wearoff and. customer response started declining . He also felt that. 'fixed-day" selling probably left out a large number of potential customers from places contiguous to these towns as well as walkin customers indulging in impulse purchases. The break-through came by chance. As Chandramogan said, "people see ments; but they seldom read it carefully". On the appointed days when ice-cream was to be supplied as announced in ment mailers and hoarding, even those who had not booked ice creams, came to the premises of the agent whose address appeared in the ments for buying ice cream. Similarly many potential customers also turned up on other days. Excited by the consumer response and seeing that on several occasions, walk-in customers had to be turned back, an agent Kanakaraj from the temple-town of Madurai offered to invest in his own deepfreezer and sought long-term distribution arrangements. This agent provided facilities to people to "sit and eat" ice cream. A novel method of retailing ice cream through "sit-and-eat parlour" thus was born in1981. Though Kanakaraj suggested that price of Arun ice cream be kept low keeping in view of the price-sensitivity of the local market, Chandramogan was not in favour of doing so as be felt that Arun was not the same as unbranded, low-priced ice cream served in local restaurants. Chandramogan ed this agent through t promotions and regular ment campaigns. Even as the first Arun "franchisee" began tasting success with steadily-growing demand, other small town agents also felt emboldened to invest in their own freezers. A 400-litre freezer of reputed brand typically cost about Rs. 12000 to 13,000 around the
time. As Chandramogan recalls, he "accidentally hit the right button". "This was not a credit oriented market”. And he did not have adequate resources to invest in his own freezers and supply them to retail outlets. As it turned out, "there was no investment, no credit, but also no competition in this market". And he was implementing the franchisee concept without ever knowing the term. From 1981 he began replicating the model by opening, on an average, two such franchisee run parlours every month. With over 700 such outlets in Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Kerala and Andhra Pradesh by early 1999, Chandramogan believed that Arun franchisee network was one of the largest in South India. In appointing his franchisees, Chandramogan typically looked at the personal profile and business background of the potential candidates. Typically, he would not offer Arun franchise to big time, successful traders or businessmen. He also avoided, as far as possible, elderly persons or highly educated individuals for distributorship. On the other hand, he would prefer someone who was in his mid or late twenties, preferably completed his schooling, with average family income and had probably failed in his early business endeavors. Very often, friends and relatives of existing franchisees approached him with requests for franchise rights to open parlours in new locations. This made Chandramogan's task easier. Once appointed, the franchisee was assured of certain exclusiveness and "area" protection in that another Arun franchisee was not appointed within a 1.5- 2 kilometre radius. These franchised outlets were exclusive "sit-and-eat" ice cream parlours with good ambience and located in city centre or main roads. Unlike the general stores freezer outlets of other ice cream brands, Arun’s outlets did not stock other items like butter and chocolates. Over the years Chandramogan fine-tuned the parlour and franchisee concepts. Chandramogan had deliberately decided on the strategy of parlours selling Arun Ice Cream exclusively. On its part, the company would ensure that it distributed its products only through its franchisees' parlours and not through any other channels except direct deliveries to customers against specific orders for parties etc. The concept of exclusive parlours, Chandramogan felt, enabled the franchisee to focus on selling Arun range of ice cream and give better customer service. By 1985, Arun emerged as the largest ice-cream manufacturer in Tamil Nadu in of volumes. Arun's turnover, which was about Rs. 150,000 in 1970 and had barely inched up to about Rs. 425000 by1981, had risen to about Rs. 28.0 million, by 1990.
Even as Arun became largest ice cream brand in Tamil Nadu by 1985 thanks to its success in the upcountry districts, Arun still did not have significant presence in the Madras city. Chandramogan now began aggressively attacking the Madras city market initially by establishing the now successful "sit-and-eat" parlours in Madras suburbs and outskirts and only thereafter, he moved into the city. In the next 18 to 24 months, Arun achieved its brand leadership in Madras city as well. While he continued with the strategy of not cultivating the hotel segment, the wedding parties segment came "automatically" to Arun now. It was estimated that Arun had a market share of around 60% in Tamil Nadu by 1999 and about 36% in the four South Indian states. Chandramogan estimates that probably about 120 franchisees came to his fold as friends/relatives of existing Arun agents. One franchisee, Ganesan, was responsible for introducing as many as 32 other agents. Aruns franchisee family, Chandramogan felt, was an extremely loyal lot as most them grew with Arun. There was a strong symbiotic relationship between the company and its franchisees. At a more personal level, many of them enjoyed very warm relationship with Chandramogan. And several of them have named their sons and grandsons as Arun! Chandramogan was clear that in any business decision he took, he would not ignore the collective interests of his extended family of franchisees. Manufacturing Operations and Logistics While the seventies were a period of "learning", the eighties turned out to be one of "earning" for Chandramogan. He also realized that in the business of ice cream, efficient management of inward and outward logistics was extremely important. The most challenging aspect was, procurement of milk, a key input in ice-cream manufacture in a cost-efficient- manner. The problems arose because of the seasonal demand-supply imbalance in respect of the product and its extremely short shelf-life. Summer months of March through June, though peak season for ice cream sales, also, happen to be the lean season for milk supplies in Southern India. Similarly the flush season for milk coincide with the period of low ice cream sales. From fairly early days, Chandramogan decided procure milk directly from dairy farmers and for this purpose set up collection centers’ in major milk-producing villages close to his ice cream plant. The milk procured at these collection centre’s could be brought to the Arun factory within 2 to 3 hours of collection. He offered guaranteed procurement of certain minimum quantity of milk, based on
his lean season requirements. For his additional requirements of milk in the peak ice cream season, he offered to pay a higher price. Typically the payments to the dairy farmers for the milk purchases were made once every three days at the collection centres. According to Chandramogan, Arun's ice cream sales had; on an average, exhibited the kind of seasonal-pattern as given in Table 1. He sourced other Inputs -and ingredients such as sugar, fruits, packing materials etc. from leading wholesalers/manufacturers. For outward transport of ice cream to various franchisees located in different town he recognised that the low volumes to various destinations did not justify the use of expensive refrigerated transport that had to return empty with no compatible load. S o he typically took advantage of the regular enger train services of the Indian Railways for despatch of ice cream to various destinations. For this purpose, ice cream cartons were tightly packed in small wooden boxes (2'x2'x2') with thermacole lining and filled with dry ice (solid carbon dioxide) to prevent melting. Being a highly perishable product, ice cream was accorded high priority by the Railways for transportation. The franchisees would have the "boxes" collected at their respective destinations. They also returned the empty containers by return trains. And it was not until 1995 that he purchased refrigerated vehicles for delivery of ice cream. Chandramogan also felt that in the long run transporting ice cream to long distances by train or by refrigerated vehicles might not be a viable strategy. He also reckoned that a 250 to 300 K.M. radius was probably the optimal area that could be cost-effectively serviced by a central ice cream plant. As the Madras ice cream plant was running out of capacity thanks to Arun’s rapid expansion in the eighties, Chandramogan felt a compelling need to set up another plant both to meet the growing demand and also to improve the overall logistics. In 1991 he set up a spanking new ice cream plant at Salem, some 320 kilometers south west of Madras and also close to both Kerala and Karnataka borders. Moreover the new plant was located in the heart of Tamil Nadu's milk belt which facilitated procurement of high quality milk at competitive prices. See Exhibit: 1 for a map of South India. The Salem plant involving an investment of Rs. 22 million was constructed in record time of about 3 months, right in time for the summer season. The plant capacity at both Madras and Salem were designed for peak seasonal production; during off-season the plant utilization was only partial and all annual maintenance and revamp were typically scheduled during this period. While on an average 7 to 10 new flavours were introduced every year, an equal number were probably phased out.
Chandramogan figured that about 30 to 35 flavours were on offer at any given time. A process diagram in respect of ice cream manufacture is given in Exhibit: 2. In order to conform to the prevailing regulations restricting manufacture of ice cream only in the SSI sector explained elsewhere in the case the Salem plant was' set u pas an SSI unit under a new proprietary concern, Atlantic Foods. In the following years ice cream production in the Salem
factory more than
met the growing demands placed on it. Chandramogan then turned his attention to the Madras plant that required major investments in up-gradation. Rather than attempting a piecemeal revamp and modernization of the decades-old plant, he decided to set up a totally new automatic facility and for this purpose he acquired a new five acre plot in the Red Hills area in the outskirts of the city. This plant with a capacity of 15000 liters of ice cream mix a day and costing about Rs. 45 million (inclusive of the cost- of land) became operational in July 1995.In view of the investment restrictions on individual SS1 unit, the new Madras plant was set up under a separate firm, Hatsun Milk Products Around this time, Chandramogan found it necessary to revamp the distribution logistics. Recent and continuing increase in the number of franchisees on the one hand as well as in the variety of ice cream flavours on the other, he felt, was beginning to take a heavy toll, on the factories. He thought of relieving factories of the responsibility of managing the direct distribution of ice cream to the various destinations on a daily basis. As a first step he set up a depot in Madurai in 1995 with adequate, cold storage facilities and the required istrative personnel to handle ice cream distribution to the franchisee located in the southern districts of Tamil Nadu. The depot would be responsible for sourcing from Arun factories, inventory and cold storage management, order taking and execution as well as collections. With the requirements of milk steadily going up in keeping with the rising ice cream sales, Chandramogan was becoming increasingly concerned about managing the expectations of the dairy farmers particularly during the lean season for ice cream. While he needed increasingly large quantity of milk during the peak summer months, failure to maintain milk procurement at a reasonably high base during off-season could lead to the farmers snapping the links with Arun and moving away to other more "dependable" customers. Brand and promotions strategy From very early days Chandramogan was keen to build and preserve a distinct brand identity
"Arun" for his ice cream. Almost since inception, he was spending fairly large sums of money for promotion and ment. Whether it was a Madras city college campus or an upcountry high-traffic junction, the brand "Arun" was heavily promoted through colorful banners, posters or flyers. In the early years, the main ment media were newspapers and magazines. When colour television coverage received a big boost in the mid-eighties, Chandramogan immediately took to the popular visual medium of advertising. As the turnover went up sharply following the success of the franchise strategy, Chandramogan stepped up brand-focused ment and began investing in technology. The fact that he did not have to invest in working capital and in deep freezers meant that his liquidity remained unimpaired. This gave him considerable freedom to invest in brand building. By 1991, according to Chandramogan, Arun’s ment spending was probably higher than the total turnover of Dasaprakash. From 1987 Chandramogan began carrying out focused sales promotion activities. The first such promotion was "Eat All You Can" Ice Cream Mela conducted in madras city. Under this scheme, for a fixed entry fee of, say, Rs. 8/-, the participants were allowed to eat any amount of ice cream on display and the one who "consumes" the maximum quantity was declared winner. The specific purpose of this sales promotion campaign was to encourage consumers to try out higherend, expensive flavours, which, in the normal course they were normally reluctant to experiment with. (Consumers normally consumed Vani1la flavour, the cheapest). Altogether, about 4200 people participated in campaign that probably cost about RS. 270000. Similar campaigns were later repeated in other cities like Hyderabad. Another successful scheme was "slow speed driving competition". From 1993 onwards, Arun also began conducting "slow-speed" driving competition for two wheelers like motor cycles and scooters. An intending participant typically is required to purchase ice cream worth, say, Rs. 15/as "entry fee". Conducted in association with the local traffic police in cities like Madras and Bangalore, such competitions turned out to be big hit with some 3400 Persons participating in one such event. The objective of such campaigns was 'again to encourage customer trial of highend flavours that hopefully would lead to greater flow of two-wheeler traffic to Arun' s parlours. Another mode of promotion was the "Phone and Have an Ice Cream" (Dial-a-Number) campaign. It was widely d that anyone dialing up certain specified telephone numbers during specified time slots on a given day would win Rs. 100/- worth Arun ice cream for free.
During 1993-94 the "Dial-a-Number" campaign was conducted in 20 towns attracting participation by over 12,000 callers costing an estimated at Rs.1.60 million. Often such campaigns were also launched at the time of entering a new market or introducing' new flavours. Sales promotion campaigns similar to these were conducted regularly in different places. Such promotional campaigns .were routinely planned as key element of the overall marketing plan. Arun also encouraged its parlors to come with local initiatives such as "the home-delivery scheme" etc. Approach to pricing and franchisee management Typically Chandramogan followed a cost-plus approach for setting retail price. of ice cream. Franchisees were given margins @ 20% to 25% of maximum retail price (MRP), depending factors such as on their location and the costs borne by them (such as relating to ordering, return of empty containers etc). This left him with 75% to 80% of the MRP towards manufacturing and other expenses as well as profits. Chandramogan estimated that for other ice cream manufacturers, this margin was probably in the region 65% of the MRP. Unlike the reported two-tier distribution structure of some of the other leading ice cream players such as Vadilal, a market leader in Western India, Chandramogan decided to follow a single-tier distribution strategy, directly supplying ice cream to the point of retail customer sales . Companies like Vadilal were believed to have very large number of distribution outlets. -. While the turnover of these companies were 50 to 70% higher than Arun, their profitability was believed to be significantly lower which probably impaired their ability to continuously their brands. Their three-tier distribution structure, Chandramogan believed, added substantially to their over-all cost of distribution in areas s u c ha s packaging, transportation (in refrigerated environment) and distribution margins. According to his estimates, the overall distribution cost of Arun was about 3-4% of sales (mainly outward freight), compared to 8- 9% for other leading ice cream manufacturers. This also gave him room for maneuver. In the case of other leading ice cream, retailer probably enjoyed a margin of about 12% to 15% of MRP. Arun’s factory took orders from franchisees by phone. The number of such calls during peak Seasonal months could be as high as 800 a day. Upcountry franchisees were typically expected to make advance payment by demand draft to Arun against which fresh dispatches would be
made. As regards the franchisees based in Madras city, Arun's franchisee control department would bank the cheques collected in advance, no sooner ice cream supplies were made. Chandramogan strongly discouraged sale of ice cream except in pre-packaged factory packs with MRP marked thereon made available in different quantities/sizes. Franchisees were required to display prominently in the parlours the price list issued by Arun. Chandramogan figures that some 60 to 70 franchise arrangements might have been terminated for violation of MRP guidelines or of payment Management and organization Over the years Chandramogan had recruited a group of senior managers in various functional positions. He was of the view that for a fledgling, entrepreneur-managed organization like Arun, the- CEO had to be actively involved in the Personnel and Human Resources Management function and maintain a direct line of communication with the managers. One of his earliest recruitment was Shankar, an experienced ice-cream technologist for the production function at a time when Arun could barely afford him. Another key executive during Arun’s growth phase was Adinarayan who played a stellar role in completing the Salem project in record time. By mid-nineties a professional management team was in place in key functional positions. These included R. Chandramouli as Financial Controller and Company Secretary, V. Jaganathan an MBA as Marketing Manager and Prasanna kumar Mehta as Head of Production. While the organization was - adequately staffed with most employees growing with the organization, Chandramogan recognized that in the coming years Arun would definitely need to strengthen the senior and middle management cadres, preferably with executives having experience in large, more structured organizations such as multi-national companies. Chandramogan was proud of the fact that except for a few days of strike/lockout in 1995, employee relations remained cordial Emerging competitive scenario The organized segment of ice--cream market in India had been historically controlled by strong regional players such as Kwality in the North and the East, Kwality and Vadilal in the West and Dasaprakash, Joy and later Arun in the South. For every Vadilal or Arun there were hundreds of small time ice cream producers in the unorganized sector selling ice cream under local brands or private labels. Moreover most hotels and restaurants also made a limited range of ice cream
flavours in-house for their captive needs. The fact that ice cream manufacture was reserved for the small scale industry (SSI) sector meant that even the bigger players had to necessarily source their ice cream requirements from SSI units which were often specifically set up by the ice cream company owners or their family . The established brands by and large were initially confined to the metropolitan cities in their region-and later expanded to service other principal towns in the region. Vadilal, for example, had fairly wide presence in Gujarat and was steadily extending its reach to other states in the West and even beyond. In the late eighties, the multinational company, Cadbury India entered the ice-cream market with the brand “Dollops". After the initial surge of consumer interest created by its launch, Dollops seemed to have failed to establish itself in the market. It also appeared that Cadbury itself was somewhat wavering in its to the brand. The ice-cream market- in India was completely shaken up by the entry of the consumer product giant Unilever, through one of its Indian subsidiaries, 13rooke Bond India Limited 5 (BBIL). BBIL, which has been traditionally a tea and coffee beverage company, had identified ice cream and other food products as thrust area for future growth. It entered processed-fruit segment (such as jam and sauce) by acquiring the market leader Kissan from the UB Group, the leading liquor manufacturers. BBIL also entered the frozen foods segment by establishing a new, state-of-theart plant at Nashik in Western India and launched the well-known international brand of Unilever, Walls. As part of India's economic reforms launched in 1991 several of the extant restrictions relating to entry, capacity, output and size in a variety of sectors were being phased out or relaxed. BBIL and its leading stable-mate Hindustan Lever Limited (HLL) undertook a series of transactions· to consolidate and strengthen the Unilever group's presence in several product-markets. Having identified frozen desserts as growth area, BBIL took no time in acquiring Dollops from Cad bury India and other leading brands of Kwality and Milkfood. With a leading international brand such as Walls and leading Indian brands such as Kwality in its· portfolio, BBIL· emerged as a major player in the ice cream/frozen dessert market overnight. With the entry of an international food giant with deep pockets and tremendous staying power and one who would not be content with mere regional leadership, the rules of competitive game in the ice cream market were being completely re-written. In February 1997, the Government of India announced de-reservation of ice cream manufacture from the list of products earmarked for exclusive development in the SSI sector. This meant that large companies like Hindustan Lever
could restructure the supply configuration of the business by setting up world-class ice cream ice cream manufacturing facilities with Unilever's technological . Even as Arun emerged to the top spot in the four Southern states, Chandramogan had to contend with the new competitive dynamics and re-work his own strategy. Ownership structure and finances When Chandramogan entered the ice cream business in 1970, it was through· a partnership firm styled Chandramohan &. Co: In March 1986, a private limited company by the name of Hatsul1 Foods Private Limited (HFPL) was incorporated in Madras. On April 30, 1986, HFPL took over the business of Chandramohan . & Co. as a going concern. The ownership of the brand name ARUN was also later transferred to HFPL whereby, the company was allowed to the brand name Arun in its own name, subject to a royalty payment of 1% on the gross ice cream sales. In August, 1995 the company’s name was changed to Hatsun Milk Food Private Limited (HMFPL)and was also converted into a public limited company, Hatsun Milk food Limited (HMFL) very soon thereafter In January 1996 HMFL was taken public through an initial public offering of 1.80 million shares at an issue price of Rs. 45/- per share. Following this IPO, by March 1996. HMFL paid-up capital increased to Rs. 38.4 million from under Rs. 0.50 million and its net-worth including share to Rs. 84.0 million from about Rs. 11.0 million just a year before. In view of the reservation of ice cream manufacture in the SSI sector6 which precluded HMFL from carrying out ice cream production, HMFL was conceived to be a marketing company. Actual ice cream manufacturing was continued to be carried out in the two closely-held ,; small scale units Atlantic Foods in Salem and Hatsun Foods Company in Madras, HMFL sourced its ice cream requirements from these two SSI units.
The financial performance of the ice cream business Arun over the years reflected the sharp growth in volumes arising from aggressive franchise expansion and strong- promotion of the Arun brand. For example, HMFL's spending on ment; promotion and related items amounted to Rs.21.7 million in the year to March 1997, nearly 12% of its fiscal 1997 sales of Rs.
184.1 million. The spending in rupee· represented a near 100% increase over the previous year. As can be seen from Exhibits 3 and 4, with a net-worth of over Rs. 100 million as of March 1997, the company's financial position had indeed been further strengthened. While this gave substantial strategic elbowroom for Chandramogan, be was acutely aware of the fact the competitive and regulatory scenario had changed dramatically in recent months. Strategic challenges and dilemmas The principal worrying factor for Arun management was the dramatic developments in the market place that could seriously undermine's Arun's growth plans. The aggressive entry of the Unilever group (through BBIL since merged into HLL) into the ice-cream/frozen dessert market through a series of acquisition of well-known regional brands, as noted earlier, was indeed a pregnant pointer to the remaining independent players. The enormous array of product portfolio and financial resources at its command meant HLL could its Rs. 1500 million ice_cream/frozen dessert business for any length of time and aggressively seek market share, even if this meant taking eyes off the business's profitability temporarily. And-unlike the regional players who were happy not to disturb the regional competitive balance, HLL would not be content with anything less than leadership position in every single market. HLL's announced strategies for its Frozen Dessert and Ice Cream product group carried in its recent Annual Report were ringing ominous bells for the likes of Arun. Your Company's Frozen Products business consolidated its leadership in the Ice Cream market with its national share exceeding 50% despite strong low-priced competition in key markets. Your Company’s brand have been consolidated under the house name "KwalityWalls” Extensive consumer research has provided valuable insights into the development and application of relevant technologies in product formulation and refrigerated product handling which have begun to set new standards in of delivered product quality. The standard Ice Cream portfolio was consolidated under the "Dairy Classic" brand, a new recipe having better product stability and innovative virgin board food grade packaging were established. This is a significant move for an industry, which had hitherto been using non food grade recycled
packaging. The business strengthened its efforts on brand building and innovation, which are the key drivers for the overall development of the Ice Cream category. The key brand franchises in the impulse segment, "Cornetto" and “Feast”, the cornerstone of Unilever's Ice Cream presence worldwide. and "Chocobar" were strengthened with appropriate advertising – the first individual brands to be d in the Ice Cream category in the country. These brands have ed significant growth in all the markets A major exercise was undertaken to upgrade the manufacturing facilities of your Company's Ice Cream sourcing units. Products, marketed under the KW.1lity-Walls brand name, conform fully to the stringent standards specified by the Bureau of Indian Standards and also to the more exacting Unilever norms on product safety and hygiene. This is a major milestone and a key differentiator for the Kwality-Walls brand.
For Chandramogan it was clear that he had to quickly rework the competitive strategy for Arun. The key question was whether to aggressively reinforce Arun's competitive profile and further expand its franchisee network in the face of HLL’s competitive onslaught or pursue alternative business opportunities woven around Arun's limited strengths and competencies. The latter strategy, be thought, while providing an alternative platform of growth might also be necessary from the point of his ability and the need to give continued to the Ice Cream business. He was certainly determined that unlike several other Indian entrepreneurs in the FMCG sector, he would not sell-out to the MNCs.
Exhibit III Key Financial & other Information (Rs Million) 1 2 3
Sales PBT Advt.
&
1988-89 8.6 0.07 0.7
89-90 27.8 0.1 3.8
90-91 38.4 4.2 3.6
91-92 36.7 0.2 5.6
92-93 42.5 2.3 6.1
93-94 55.3 2.7 7.3
94-95 65.6 3.7 6.5
95-96 138.5 18.1 11.1
96-97 184.1 21.3 21.7
0.5
0.7
3.2
2.9
6.5
9.4
11.1
83.9
107.0
157
182
250
277
355
404
453
524
Promotion 4
Expenses Shareholders
5
Fund No.
of
Franchisees
Table 1 (manufacturing Operations & Logistics) Month April - June July – September Oct- Dec Jan- March
Percentage of annual Sale 34% 22% 19% 25%
Exhibit
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