Legal Maxim Compilation 3i1d36

[LEGAL MAXIMS – STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION] Absoluta sententia expositore non indigent – “When the language of law is clear, no explanation of it is required.” It is an elementary rule in statutory construction that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. An interesting case involving the foregoing principle is Gan vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 145527, May 28, 2002., the private respondent filed a complaint against herein petitioner for with prayer for pendente lite on behalf of her daughter. For failure to file an answer within the reglementary period, petitioner was declared in default. Hence, the court received the evidence of private respondent ex-parte; after finding that the claim of filiation and was adequately proved, the trial court rendered its decision ordering petitioner to recognize Francheska as his illegitimate child and to her monthly. Petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, Bernadette moved for execution of the judgment of , which the trial court granted by issuing a writ of execution. Petitioner questioned the issuance of the writ of execution by filing a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, however, dismissed his petition on the ratiocination that judgments for pendente lite are immediately executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal. His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner went to the Supreme Court to impugn the dismissal of his petition. The Supreme Court found no reversible error in the decision sought to be reviewed, hence, denied the petition. According to the Court, Section 4, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court clearly states that, unless ordered by the trial court, judgments in actions for are immediately executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal. This is an exception to the general rule which provides that the taking of an appeal stays the execution of the judgment and that advance execution will only be allowed if there are urgent reasons therefor. To consider petitioner's argument that there should be good reasons for the advance execution of a judgment would violate the clear and explicit language of the rule mandating immediate execution.

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[LEGAL MAXIMS – STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION] Actus me invito factus non est meus actus – “An act done by me against my will is not my act.” The general rule is that a penal statute will not be construed to make the commission of certain prohibited acts criminal without regard to the intent of the doer, unless there is a clear legislative intent to the contrary. In the case of People of the Philippine vs. del Rosario, G.R. No. 127755. April 14, 1999, the accused was found guilty as co-principal in the crime of Robbery with Homicide and he was sentenced to suffer the death penalty and to pay damages to the heirs of the victim.The accused alleged that he was just hired by Virgilio Santos to drive him to a cockpit and he was not aware of the plan of Santos and his two companions to rob and kill the victim. He was not able to seek assistance because Santos threatened to shoot him if he did. He also failed to inform the police authorities about the incident because the culprits has threatened him and his family. He claimed exemption from criminal liability as he allegedly acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force. The conviction of the accused must be set aside and his claim for exemption sustained. He was then unarmed and unable to protect himself when he was prevented at gunpoint from leaving the crime scene during the commission of the robbery and killing. He was also forced to help the culprits escape after the commission of the crime. Further, the accused’s failure to disclose what he knew about the incident to the authorities does not affect his credibility. The natural hesitance of most people to get involved in a criminal case is of judicial notice. Given his quite limited means, the accused understandably did not want to get involved in the case so he chose to keep his silence and he was threatened with physical harm should he squeal. A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, is exempt from criminal liability because he does not act with freedom. Actus me invito factus non est meus actus. An act done by me against my will is not my act. The force contemplated must be so formidable as to reduce the actor to a mere instrument who acts not only without will but against his will. The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a 2|Page

[LEGAL MAXIMS – STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION] well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity for the accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat.

Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea – “The act itself does not make a man guilty unless his intention were so.” To constitute a crime evil, intent must combine with an act. In the case of People of the Philippine vs. Moreno, G.R. No. 126921, August 28, 1998, the appellant raped a twenty-six year (26) old girl, who is mentally retardate with the mind of a sixyear-old child. From her perspective, appellant's acts were sufficient to engender fear in her mind. Jocelyn's testimony sufficiently demonstrated that the sexual act was forced on her. The appellant was found guilty. The Court adopt the principle of Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. Jurisprudence instructs us that a crime cannot be committed if the mind of the one performing the act is innocent and without any criminal intent; that is, bereft of mens rea which is defined as "a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent."

Ad proximum antecedents fiat relatio nisi impediatur sentential – “Relative words refer to the nearest antecedents, unless the context otherwise requires.” In the absence of legislative intent to contrary, preferential and qualifying words and phrases must be applied only to their immediate or last antecedent, and not to the other remote or preceding words or association of words. This rule is called the doctrine of last antecedent. It means that a qualifying word or phrase should be understood as referring to the nearest antecedent.

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[LEGAL MAXIMS – STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION] It has been held that the qualifying effect of modifying word or phrase will be confined to its immediate antecedent if the latter is separated by a comma from the other antecedents. In the case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144057, January 17, 2005, the private respondent seeks judicial confirmation of respondent's imperfect title over the aforesaid land. The land was originally declared for taxation purposes in the name of Ramon Urbano; on July 9, 1992, Urbano executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favor of the heirs of Honorato Maming, wherein he renounced all his rights to the subject property and confirmed the sale made by his father to Maming sometime in 1955 or 1956. The heirs of Maming executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of private respondent who thereupon started occupying the same. She constituted Manuel Blanco, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact and . The introduced improvements, and paid the corresponding taxes due on the subject land. At present, there are parcels of land surrounding the subject land which have been issued titles by virtue of judicial decrees. Private respondent and her predecessors-in-interest have occupied the land openly and in the concept of owner without any objection from any private person or even the government until she filed her application for registration. The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration, stressing that the land applied for was declared alienable and disposable only on October 15, 1980. Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character of the land should have already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1) of PD 1529. "Since June 12, 1945," as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase "under a bonafide claim of ownership." Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they are immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely located. Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.

The reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) of PD 1529 is that it

merely requires the property sought to be ed as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. The need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith; the property has

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[LEGAL MAXIMS – STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION] already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property. The Supreme Court held , the possession since 1945 was established through proof of the existence of 50 to 60-year old trees at the time private respondent purchased the property as well as tax declarations executed by Urbano in 1945. Although tax declarations and realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of the possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only one's sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens one's bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.

Aregumentum a contrario – “Negative – opposite doctrine.” In the case of Chung Fook vs. White, 264 U.S. 443, 1924, the statutue involves in this case exempts the wife of natuealized American from detention for treatment in a hospital, who is afflicted with a contagious disease. In denying a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by a native-born American on behalf of his wife who was detained in a hospital for treatment of a contagious disease, the court resorted to the negative-opposite doctrine by stating that the statute plainly relates only to have the wife of a naturalized citizen and that it cannot interpolate theword “native-born citizen” without usurping the legislative function.

Casus omisus pro omisso habendus est - “A person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. 5|Page

[LEGAL MAXIMS – STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION]

The maxim operates and applies only if and when the omission has been clearly established, and in such a case what is omitted in the enumeration may not, by construction, be included therein. The court cannot under its power of interpreation supply the omission even though the omission may have resulted from inadvertence or because the case in question was not foreseen or contemplated. In the case of Roxas & Co., Inc, vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127876, December 17, 1999, petitioner corporation voluntarily offered for sale to the government the land they owned on May 6, 1988 before the effectivity of the CARL. The properties were later placed under compulsory acquisition by the DAR in accordance with the CARL. For a valid implementation of the CAR Program, two notices are required: (1) the Notice of Coverage and letter of invitation to a preliminary conference sent to the landowner, the representatives of the BARC, LBP, farmer beneficiaries and other interested parties pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 12, Series of 1989; and (2) the Notice of Acquisition sent to the landowner under Section 16 of the CARL. The importance of the first notice, i.e., the Notice of Coverage and the letter of invitation to the conference, and its actual conduct cannot be understated. They are steps designed to comply with the requirements of istrative due process. The implementation of the CARL is an exercise of the State's police power and the power of eminent domain. The issue here with regards to delivery of the notices, the procedure prescribed speaks of only two modes of service of notices of acquisition — personal service and service by ed mail. The non-inclusion of other modes of service can only mean that the legislature intentionally omitted them. In other words, service of a notice of acquisition other than personally or by ed mail is not valid. Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est. The reason is obvious. Personal service and service by ed mail are methods that ensure receipt by the addressee, whereas service by ordinary mail affords no reliable proof of receipt. Since it governs the extraordinary method of expropriating private property, the CARL should be strictly construed. Consequently, faithful compliance with its provisions, especially those which relate to the procedure for acquisition of expropriated lands, should be observed. Therefore, the service by respondent DAR of the notices

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[LEGAL MAXIMS – STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION] of acquisition to petitioner by ordinary mail, not being in conformity with the mandate of R.A. 6657, is invalid and ineffective.

Cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex – “When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases.” The reason of the law plays decisive role in its construction. Consequently, its cessation or nullification renders the law inoperative. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that when the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases. A subsequent statute may render a prior law devoid of reason. In such a case, the later will operate to repeal the prior law, even though the two laws contain no conflicting provisions. Thus, where a later law has a purpose in conflict with that of a prior statute on the same subject, the latter has lost all meaning and function and has ceased to exist. In the case of People of the Philippines vs. Almuete, G.R. No. L-26551, February 27, 1976, the defendant charged before the trial court with violation of section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law; the defendant moved to quash the information on the following grounds: (1) insufficient allegations of facts to constitute the offense charged; (2) that there is no law punishing it; (3) lack of jurisdiction over the alleged crime. As the court a quo granted the motion and ordered the information dismissed, the prosecution appealed. The prohibition against prethreshing has no more raison d' etre because the lessee is obligated to pay a fixed rental as prescribed in section 34 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code, or the Code of Agrarian Reforms, as redesignated in Republic Act No. 6389 which took effect on September 10, 1971. Thus, the legal maxim cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex (the reason for the law ceasing, the law itself also ceases), applies to the case at bar. The Supreme Court affirmed the order of dismissal because as held in the case of People vs. Adillo, L-23785, November 27, 1975, Section 39 was impliedly repealed by the Agricultural Law Reform Code of 1963, as amended by Republic Act No. 6389 (as and implemented by P.D. Nos. 9, 27 and 316). 7|Page


Contemporanea expositio est fortissima in lege- “The contemporary construction is strongest in law.” CONTEMPORANEOUS EXPOSITION. The construction of a law, made shortly after its enactment, when the reasons for its age were then fresh in the minds its enactment, when the reasons for its age were then fresh in the minds of the judges, is considered as of great weight: contemporanea expositio est of the judges, is considered as of great weight: contemporanea expositio est optima et fortissima in lege. 1 Cranch, 299. optima et fortissima in lege. 1 Cranch, 299. Contemporary or practical construction are the construction placed upon statutes at the time of, or after, their enactment by the executive, legislature, or judicial authorities, as well as by those who, because of their involvement in the process of legislation, are knowledgeable of the intent and purpose of the law, such as draftsmen and bill sponsors. Contemporary or contemporaneous construction is an invaluable aid in the construction, by the courts, of ambiguous or doubtful provision of law. Contemporarnea exposition est optim et fortissima in lege- the contemporary construction is strongest in law. Philippine Sugar Central vs. Collector of Customs, G.R. No. 79156, June 22, 1989 The question raised in this case is whether the government can legally collect duties “ as a charge for wharfage” required by a statute upon all articles exported through privately-owned wharves. It appears that for the last twenty-six years, wharfage duties have been levied and collected even during the period the period when the government never owned nor operated any wharf. The court resolving the question ruled: “When we consider that the tax in question has at all times for twenty-six years been levied and collected by the government before it owned or operated any wharf, and that it has spent millions of pesos in the construction of wharves in its principal ports of entries .

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***The importance of the instant case and its far reaching effect upon the finances of the government*** stands out in bold relief and becomes very apparent, and this court is now called upon to overthrow that long continued construction and in legal effect to wharf, the government is not entitled to collect the money in question ‘as a charge in wharfage.’ The long acquiescence in its construction and the far reaching effect of such a decision makes it imperative for this court to sustain the law, if there are any reasonable grounds upon which it can be done. ***The law in question could have been repealed or changed at any times by an act of congress. In view of the long continued construction which has been placed upon it by the government official, and for which they now continue, the very fact that Congress has not seen fir to repeal or change the law is a very potent argument in favour of sustaining the construction. The language of the Act could have been made more specific and certain, but in view of its history, its long continuous construction, and what has been done and accomplished by and under it, we are clearly of the opinion that the government is entitled to have and receive the money in question, even though the sugar was shipped from a private wharf.” The rule that contemporaneous construction is entitled to great weight and respect in the interpretation of a statute is especially true under the 1973 Constitution, where some ministers or heads of executive ministries of departments are also of the Batasang Pambansa. In this situation, it is presumed that the executive official, being a member of the legislature, knew the legislative intent and reflected that intent in his construction of the law.

Distingue tempora et concordabis jura- “distinguish times and you will harmonize laws” Where two or more statutes on the same subjects were enacted at different times and under dissimilar circumstances or conditions, their interpretation should be in accordance with the circumstances or conditions peculiar to each, in order that the statutes may be harmonized or better understood.

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[LEGAL MAXIMS – STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION] In cases involving harmonization of two or more laws relating to the same subject matter, the usual question is whether the later act has impliedly amended or repealed the earlier statute. A statute will not, however, be construed as repealing prior act or acts on the same subject in the absence of words to that effect, unless there is an irreconcilable repugnancy between them or unless the new law is evidently intended to supersede all prior acts on the matter and to comprise itself the sole and complete system of legislation on the subject. The rule in this connection is that in case of doubt, the doubt will be resolved against implied amendment or repeal and in favour of harmonization of all the laws on the subject. And assuming that there is an implied amendment, the latter statute should be so construed as to modify the prior law on the subject no further than may be necessary to effect the specific purpose of the latter enactment. THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS vs. SUPERIOR GAS AND EQUIPMENT CO. and the COURT OF TAX APPEALS, G.R. No. L14115, May 25, 1960 The Customs Commissioner has brought up for review the order of the Court of Tax Appeals requiring him to refund the sum of P2,400.00, which his office had collected as wharfage fees. In August 1956, the steamship "Chi Chung" arrived in Manila, from Formosa, carrying 1,200 metric tons of industrial salt consigned to Superior Gas & Equipment Co. (Sugeco for short). With official permit, the cargo was discharged and delivered shipside, within the harbor sea wall but outside the breakwater, into four lighters of the Luzon Stevedoring Co. for final unloading at the private wharf of Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co. at Punta, Sta. Ana, Manila. There the shipment was transferred by means of a derrick to trucks owned by Sugeco. Before taking its cargo, Sugeco was required to pay and did pay — upon demand of the customs authorities, the sum of P2,400.00 as wharfage fee on August 23, 1956. After protesting the payment in vain, Sugeco resorted to the Tax Court, contending that its importation should not pay wharfage fees because it made no use of the facilities of government wharves or piers, the cargo having been discharged through the private wharf of Atlantic Gulf Co. As stated, the Tax Court sustained Sugeco's contention. This appeal hinges on the interpretation of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 1371 — the law in August, 1956 — levying a charge of two pesos per metric ton "as a fee for wharfage" upon all 10 | P a g e

[LEGAL MAXIMS – STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION] articles imported into the Philippines; but with the proviso that no such fee shall be levied on articles imported "which are unloaded on private wharves." As the section imposes wharfage fees upon goods exported, the petitioner-appellant invokes this court's decision under the Tariff Act of 19091 upholding the collection of "wharfage" fees upon sugar which was loaded for exportation from a wharf owned by a private individual. This decision shows, petitioner claims, that even if not loaded from a Government wharf, goods exported (or imported) shall pay wharfage fees. For one thing, as to importations unloaded on private wharves, this claim squarely contradicts the exemption in the proviso to sec. 3 abovementioned. Distingue tempora et concordabis jura, says the old legal maxim. We have laws enacted at different times, under dissimilar circumstances. At the time the Tariff of Act of 1909 was approved — in the first years of American occupation — the Government had no wharves of its own; therefore, the wharfage fee imposed by it could not have meant charges for the use of Government wharves, which was the generally accepted idea3 ; so this Court in view of the surrounding circumstances believed and held (in the Sugar Centrals case) that the charges were payable even if no Government wharf be used, because they were meant to be used as a trust fund "for the purpose of acquiring and constructing wharves by the Government of the Philippine Islands." However, at the time Republic Act 1371 was approved, the Government had wharves; and the discussions in the Legislature showed the intention not to levy wharfage fees on merchandise unloaded at places other than Government wharves or without making use of pier facilities. Here are portions of the Congressional Record: Mr. Tible: The bill as amended imposes wharfage fees. Now, what will the ship pay for wharfage fee if it loads off the coast and does not avail itself of port facilities? Mr. Moreno: There is no wharfage fee on vessels, there is only a wharfage fee on merchandise, if the vessel is loading merchandise. Where there are no piers or wharves, naturally it will not have to pay anything, but it would be violating customs rules. Mr. Tible: But there are ships that load and unload merchandise off the coast. Mr. Moreno: That would be smuggling. Mr. Tible: In the case what would be the fee that the ship would pay? 11 | P a g e

[LEGAL MAXIMS – STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION] Mr. Moreno: There is no such provision because to unload off the coast is illegal. Tible: That is actually being done. Mr. Moreno: Assuming that it is being done, it is being done illegally. Mr. Tible: But this is done with the consent of port authorities. Mr. Moreno: In that case there are other fees chargeable, but certainly it will not be charged wharfage because there is no wharf or pier facility required. (Emphasis Ours.) (Congressional Record, House of Representatives, Vol. II No. 69, p. 2862.) The proviso exempting from the wharfage fee all the imported merchandise on private wharves makes this intention all the more evident. In other words, the Congress at last accepted the ordinary concept of "wharfage charge" as the "charge for use of wharf by way of rent landing goods upon, or loading them from a wharf" or the "fee or duty paid for the privilege of using a wharf" or the "fee or duty paid for the privilege of using a wharf"4 ; and itted that goods not landed via the Government wharves should not pay wharfage.. Our intention is invited to the circumstances that Republic Act 1937 approved June 22, 1957, amended Republic Act 1371 by eliminating the proviso which expressly exempted from the wharfage fee all imported articles "unloaded on private wharves." Whatever the effect of such elimination may be, we do not regard it to be material in this case, inasmuch as Sugeco's importation, and the assessment and collection of the tax occurred before the age of said Republic Act 1937. The refunding order should be, and is hereby affirmed. Dura lex sed lex- “ the law may be harsh, but that is the law” A statute, being the will of the legislature, should be applied in exactly the way the legislature has expressed itself clearly in the law. The clear, unambiguous and unequivocal language of a statute precludes the court from construing it and gives it no discretion but to apply the law.

People vs Patricio Amigo, GR 116719, January 18, 1996 Facts: Accused-Appellant Patricio Amigo was charged and convicted of murder by the regional trial court, Davao City and was sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua 12 | P a g e

[LEGAL MAXIMS – STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION] Issue: whether or not that the penalty reclusion perpetua is too cruel and harsh and plead for sympathy. Held: The duty of the court is to apply the law disregarding their feeling of sympathy or pity for the accused, “Dura lex sed lex.” Ejusdem generis- “of the same kind or specie.” General words or expressions in a statute are, as a rule, accorded their full, natural and generic sense, they will not be given such meaning if they are used in association with specific words or phrases. The general rule is that where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class or where the latter follow the former, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include, or to be restricted to, persons, things or cases akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned. Or where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular meaning, such general words are to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class specifically mentioned. Otherwise stated, where a statute describes things of particular class or kind accompanied by words of a generic character, the generic words will usually be limited to things of a kindred nature with those particularly enumerated, unless there be something in the context of a statute to repel such inference. Amelito Mutuc vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-32717, November 26, 1970 Ejusdem Generis Mutuc was a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention (1970). His candidacy was given due course by the COMELEC but he was prohibited from playing his campaign jingle on his mobile units because this is an apparent violation of COMELEC’s band “to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin.” It was COMELEC’s contention that the jingle proposed to be used by petitioner is the recorded or taped

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[LEGAL MAXIMS – STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION] voice of a singer and therefore a tangible propaganda material (falling under and the like’s category), under the above COMELEC statute subject to confiscation. HELD: 1. By virtue of Ejusdem Generis, general words following any enumeration must be of the same class as those specifically referred to. It did contend, however, that one of its provisions referred to above makes unlawful the distribution of electoral propaganda gadgets, mention being made of pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, and cigarettes, and concluding with the words “and the like.” For respondent Commission, the last three words sufficed to justify such an order. We view the matter differently. What was done cannot merit our approval under the well-known principle of ejusdem generis, the general words following any enumeration being applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to. It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution. 2. This is a curtailment of Freedom of Expression. The Constitution prohibits the abridgment of the freedom of speech Excepto firmat regulim in casibus, non excepti – “ a thing not being excepted must be regarded as coming within the purview of the general rule.” A. IMELDA ARGEL and HON. DEMETRIO M. BATARIO, JR. IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 48, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and ROSENDO G. GUEVARA, respondents., G.R. No. 128805. October 12, 1999

On the first issue, petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in holding that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in itting the petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration; that the trial court had the inherent authority and discretion to it the same under Rule 135, section 5 (g) of the Rule of Court;

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[LEGAL MAXIMS – STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION] To amend and control the process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and Justice xxx] that the appellate court should have taken notice of the fact that she is an Australian resident and therefore, needed time to be notified about the trial court’s judgement and to confer with her counsel regarding her next move. The doctrine in Habalayus should not, therefore, be strictly applied to her. Habalayus laid down two prohibitions. First, is the doctrine that the 15- day period for filing an appeal is non-extendible. Second, the prohibitions against the filing of a motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration in all courts, except the supreme. The Habaluyas ruling has been continuously reiterated.[see, for instance, Uy v. Court of Appeals, 286 SCRA 343 (1998); Caltex (Phil.) Inc. v. Intermediate Appelate Court, 215 SCRA 580 (1992); Rolloque, et al. v. Court of Appeala, 193 SCRA 47 (1991); Bayaca v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 144 SCRA 161 (1986)]. It has likewise been enshrined in Section 2, Rule 40 and Section 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rule of Civil procedure. Neither the jurisprudence nor the procedural rules just referred to provide for an exception. Even the situation in the instant case involving a permanent resident in Australia is no exception. The legal maxim “Excepto firnat regulim in casibus, non excepti” applies. Besides, nowhere in the “Motion for Extension of time to file Motion for Reconsideration was it stated that petitioner is a permanent resident of Australia. We must rule that the Court of Appeals did not err in finding that the trial court acted with grave abuse of jurisdiction for violating the Habalayus ruling. We find no reason for the trial court to be unaware of the doctrine in Habalayus. Whether through mistake or negligence, failure of the trial judge to keep abreast of the latest developments of the law cannot be sanctioned, considering that more than twelve years have ed since the decision in Habalayus was first promulgated and given the number of times the ruling has been reiterated.

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[LEGAL MAXIMS – STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION] Ex dolo malo non oritur actio –“ No man can be allowed to found a claim upon his own wrong doing.” No court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon an immoral or an illegal act. The maxim lies at the foundation of a general rule of public policy, the rule that the courts will not sustain an action which arises out of the moral turpitude of the plaintiff or out of his violation of a general law enacted to carry into effect the public policy of the state or nation. [Marshall v. Lovell, 19 F.2d 751, 755 (8th Cir. Minn. 1927)] THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

vs.

TOMAS MANANSALA, ET AL GALICANO ALON and RICARDO CABRALES, G.R. No. L-38948 , November 18, 1933 With respect to the other accused, Galicano Alon and Ricardo Cabrales, the evidence for the prosecution sufficiently shows that about a week prior to February 19, 1932, the former who gave his name as "Grego" and the latter known by the name of "Maning" in company with another person whom they called "Pepe" offered to sell Attorney Perfecto Abordo 17,000 tins of opium at P1.50 each telling him that he could sell them for P10 a tin. Tempted with the prospect of an enormous profit, Mr. Perfecto Abordo agreed to buy the merchandise, and the accused agreed to sell it to him in lots of 1,000 tins at P600 lot. It was agreed that the delivery of P1,000 tins would take place at P5.30 p. m., at the corner of Taft Avenue Extension and Vito Cruz within the jurisdiction of this city. Attorney Perfecto Abordo accordingly went to the place indicated with the money, and there waited for them. The accused Galicano Alon arrived alone in an automobile and invited Abordo to go with him to the place where the 1,00 tins of opium were kept. trusting Gallicano Alon, who always called Abordo "brother" because he claimed to be a Mason like Mr. Abordo, the latter went with him in his automobile to the rotunda of Rizal Avenue Extension. Chauffeur Jose Jonsay was at the wheel. It was already twilight when they arrived at the rotunda, and there they met Maning, or the accused Ricardo Cabrales, who, in company with others, was waiting for Abordo in another automobile. The accused Cabrales alighted and shortly thereafter appeared Pepe who was ordered by Cabrales to get the tins of opium. Pepe got from a lot nearby the can Exhibit A, the top of which was ordered by Cabrales in order to show Abordo the six tins of opium contained in a wooden box, Exhibit B, which 16 | P a g e

[LEGAL MAXIMS – STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION] Abordo saw when the top of said Exhibit A was opened. Finding that said tins really contained opium, Abordo believed that the rest of the contents of the can also consisted of tins of opium. He handed the six hundred pesos to Maning, who, after receiving the money, immediately went to the automobile where his companions were waiting. At the same time Abordo returned to his car with the accused Galicano Alon and the person named Pepe, carrying the can. While proceeding towards Taft Avenue Extension Abordo noticed that the accused Cabrales was following in his automobile, and that when they were nearing the corner of Taft Avenue Extension and Vito Cruz the car in which Cabrales was riding attempted to block Abordo's way, while Galicano Alon told Attorney Abordo that those in the other automobile were constabulary men and it would be better to get rid of the can Exhibit A. The accused Cabrales, whom Attorney Abordo was able to recognize very well, and the companions of the former whom Abordo was not able to identify because it was already dark, approached his car saying that they were constabulary agents and told Abordo that he was under arrest. Knowing that they were not constabulary agents and that their purpose was to get possession of the can Exhibit A, Abordo drew his revolver and ordered his chauffeur to proceed. Cabrales and his companions again followed him in their car and for the second time tried to head off Abordo somewhere before the intersection of F. B. Harrison and Vito Cruz streets, but Abordo proceeded until he arrived at his house. There he opened the can Exhibit A and inside he found the wooden box Exhibit B, but the rest of the contents of the can was sand. He bore a hole in one of the tins and found that it only contained molasses. The accused tried to give, by their testimony and that of Miguel Rosales, who had been convicted twelve times of estafa, a long story to the effect that Abordo engaged the accused Cabrales, through the intervention of Miguel Rosales, to prepare 1,000 tins of molasses resembling tins of opium, that on the afternoon agreed upon for the payment of the value of said tins, Abordo refused to deliver the money on the pretext that the purchaser of said tins had not arrived, and invited the accused to his house in Pasay in order to make the payment inasmuch as they insisted upon collecting from him; but before arriving in Pasay Cabrales stopped Abordo's automobile and required the latter to hand over the money, at the same time placing at the side of Abordo's automobile a sack which he said contained the 1,000 tins of molasses asked for by Abordo. 17 | P a g e

[LEGAL MAXIMS – STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION] In the instant case, whether we regard the liability as arising ex contractu or ex delicto, no recovery by way of damages or indemnification should be allowed the complaining witness. On the one hand, we have the legal maxim, "Ex turpi causa non oritur actio"; on the other, "Ex dolo malo non oritur actio," and also "In pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis." The rule is that an agreement contrary to law or morals can give rise to no right of action in any party to it, either for the enforcement of it, or for the recovery of property parted with in pursuance of it. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius- “The express mention of one person, thing or consequence implies the exclusion of all others.” The expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. In construing statutes, contracts, wills, and the like under this maxim, the mention of one thing within the statute or other document implies the exclusion of another thing not so mentioned. See 95 P. 2d 1007, 1012. “The maxim . . . though not a rule of law, is an aid to construction. It has application when, in the natural association of ideas, that which is expressed is so set over by way of contrast to that which is omitted that the contrast enforces the affirmative inference that that which is omitted must be intended to have opposite and contrary treatment.” See 34 So. 2d 132. Thus a statute granting certain rights to “police, fire, and sanitation employees” would be interpreted to exclude other public employees not enumerated from the legislation. This is based on presumed legislative intent and where for some reason this intent cannot be reasonably inferred the court is free to draw a different conclusion. Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos, G.R. No. 113092 September 1, 1994 The issue is whether the solicitation for religious purposes, i.e, renovation of church, without first securing a permit from the Regional Office concerned of the Department of Social Services, constitute a violation of P.D. No. 1564, making it a criminal offence for any person ” to solicit or receive contribution for charitable or public welfare purposes” without securing such permit. The resolution of the issue depends on whether the phrase “charitable xxx purposes” includes a

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[LEGAL MAXIMS – STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION] religious purpose . The Court ruled in the negative, by applying the maxim, expression unius est exclusion alterius, thus: “It will be observed that the 1987 Constitution, as well as several other statutes, treat the words ‘charitable’ and ‘religious’ separately and independently of each other. Thus, the word ‘charitable’ is only one of three descriptive words used in section 28(3), Article VI of the Constitution which provides that ‘charitable institution, churches and parsonages xxx and all lands, building and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.xxx That these legislative enactments specifically spelled out ‘charitable’ and ‘religious’ in the enumeration, whereas Presidential Decree No. 1564 merely stated ‘charitable or public welfare purposes,’ only goes to show that the framers of the law in question never intended to include solicitation for religious purposes within its coverage. Otherwise, there is no reason why it would not have so stated expressly.”

Expressium facit cessare tacitum – “What is expressed puts an end to that which is implied.” This means that where a statute, by its , is expressly limited to matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters. This is one variation of the rule expressio unius est exclusion alterius. In the case of Espiritu v Cipriano GR 32743, 15 February 1974, the respondent had an oral contract of lease with the plaintiff. The yearly rates of rentals had been stipulated from 1954 to 1968 by both parties. But effective January 1969, the lease was converted to a month-to-month basis and the rental was increased to P30.00 a month by the plaintiff. Since the defendant failed to pay the rent, a formal notice was sent to him through ed mail. The defendant invoked that such increase in rental was prohibited under Republic Act No. 6126 (approved on June 17, 1970). He argued that there was no perfected contract covering the increased rate of rentals as he did not give his consent thereto.

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[LEGAL MAXIMS – STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION] Supreme Court ruled on that “The law being a "temporary measure designed to meet a temporary situation", it had a limited period of operation as in fact it was so worded in clear and unequivocal language that "No lessor of a dwelling unit or land ... shall, during the period of one year from March 31, 1970, increase the monthly rental agreed upon between the lessor and lessee prior to the approval of this Act." Hence the prohibition against the increase in rentals was effective on March, 1970, up to March, 1971. Outside and beyond that period, the law did not, by the express mandate of the Act itself, operate. The said law, did not, by its express , purport to give a retroactive operation. It is a well-established rule of statutory construction that "Expressium facit cessare tacitum" and, therefore, no reasonable implication that the Legislature ever intended to give the law in question a retroactive effect may be accorded to the same.”

Ex necessitate legis – “By necessary implication of law.” Every statutes is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants , including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its . In the case of Pepsi-Cola Products Phils. v Secretary of Labor, G.R. No. 96663, 10 August 1999, in 1990, the Pepsi-Cola Employees Organization-UOEF (Union) filed a petition for certification of election to the Med-Arbiter seeking to be exclusive bargaining agent of supervisors of PepsiCola Philippines Inc. The Med-arbiter granted the petition with an explicit statement that the union was an of Union de Oberos Estivadores de Filipinas (federation) together with two rank and file unions Pepsi-Cola Labor Unity (PCLU) and Pepsi-Cola Employees Union of the Philippines (PEUP). PEPSI filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations a petition to Set Aside Cancel and /or revoke Charter Affiliation of the Union, entitled PPI- vPCEU-UEOF on the grounds that the member of the union are managers and a supervisors union can not with a federation whose include the rank and file union of the same company. After the petitioner’s appeal questioning the Charter Affiliation of the Union was denied by the Secretary 20 | P a g e

[LEGAL MAXIMS – STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION] of Labor, the petitioner then found its way through the Supreme Court through its petition for certiorari. The said Union, through a resolution dated September 1, 1992 withdrew from the Federation. Also, the petitioner questions the hip of Credit and Collection managers in the supervisors union. The court ruled that Credit and Collection managers and ing Managers are regarded as highly confidential employees in nature and must not be deemed eligible to such supervisors union. The court asserts that while Article 245 of the Labor Code singles out managerial employee as ineligible to , assist or form any labor organization, under the doctrine of necessary implication, confidential employees are similarly disqualified. According to the doctrine of necessary implication, what is impelled in a statue is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed.

Favorabilia sunt amplianda, adiosa restrigenda – “Penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect.” Favorable construction or interpretation should be encouraged, prejudicial comments or expressions should be restrained. In the case of Laceste v Santos, G.R. No. L-36886, 1 February 1932, the petitioner and Nicola Lachica had been prosecuted, found guilty, and sentenced to the commitment for the crime of rape. Nicola married the victim and was relieved from criminal prosecution by the in force, which provided that such a marriage extinguished penal liability, and hence, the penalty. But the petitioner continued serving his sentence, which was not affected by the marriage of his coaccused and the offended party. He is not entitled to the benefits accruing from such marriage by subsequent law issued, which provides that the marriage of the offender with the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action against the offender, co-principal, accomplices and accessories, or remit the penalty already imposed upon them.

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[LEGAL MAXIMS – STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION] SC held that “the principle underlying our laws granting to the accused in certain cases an exception to the general rule that laws shall not be retroactive when the law in question favors the accused, has evidently been carried over into the Revised Penal Code at present in force in the Philippines through article 22. This is an exception to the general rule that all laws are prospective, not retrospective, variously contained in the following maxims: Lex prospicit, non respicit (the law looks forward, not backward); lex de futuro, judez de praeterito (the law provides for the future, the judge for the past); and adopted in a modified form with a prudent limitation in our Civil Code (article 3). Conscience and good law justify this exception, which is contained in the well-known aphorism: Favorabilia sunt amplianda, odiosa restringenda. As one distinguished author has put it, the exception was inspired by sentiments of humanity, and accepted by science.” Thus, the court let the petitioner be immediately set at liberty.

Generali dictum genaliter est interpretandum – “A general statement is understood in a general sense.” A word of significance in a statute is to be taken in its ordinary and comprehensive sense, unless it is shown that the word is intended to be given a different or restricted meaning. The concurring opinion in the case of Macalintal v Comelec, G.R. No. 157013, 10 July 2003, a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the petitioner, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity. The maxim was used by Judge Callejo, Sr. in concurring with SC decision that the provision in Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 should be harmonized with Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution and that should be taken to mean that COMELEC can only proclaim the winning Senators and the party-partylist representatives but not the President and Vice-president. Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides that the overseas absentee voter may vote for president, vice-president, senators and partylist representatives. The same provision states that “the Commission is empowered to order the proclamation of the winning candidates…”

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[LEGAL MAXIMS – STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION] Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution gives the Congress the duty to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates for president and vice-president. The judge reiterated the majority opinion the phrase proclamation of winning candidates used in the assailed statute is a sweeping statement, which thus includes even the winning candidates for the presidency and vice-presidency. Following a basic principle in statutory construction, generali dictum genaliter est interpretandum (a general statement is understood in a general sense), the said phrase cannot be construed otherwise. To uphold the assailed provision of Rep. Act No. 9189 would in effect be sanctioning the grant of a power to the COMELEC, which under the Constitution, is expressly vested in Congress; it would validate a course of conduct that the fundamental law of the land expressly forbids.

Generalia verba sunt generaliter inteligencia – “What is generally spoken shall be generally understood.” This maxim means that a general word should not be given a restricted meaning where no restriction is indicated. In the case of Diaz v IAC, G.R. No. L-66574, 21 February 1990, the petitioner had illegitimate children with Pablo Santero, who was a legitimate son of Simona and Pascual. When Pablo died, the petitioner claimed that her illegitimate children have the right to inherit from intestate estate of Pablo’s legitimate parents. On the other hand, the respondent claimed that she was the only legitimate heir to such estates and that the illegitimate children were barred by NCC 992 which prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father and mother of such illegitimate child. Supreme Court ruled that “the determining factor is the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the person to be represented. If the person to be represented is an illegitimate child, then his decendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, may represent him; however, if the person to be represented is 23 | P a g e

[LEGAL MAXIMS – STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION] legitimate, his illegitimate descendants cannot represent him because the law provides that only his legitimate descendants may exercise right of representation by reason of the barrier imposed Article 992.” Amicus curiae Prof. Ruben Balane has this to say: “The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is not defined by it. In accordance therefore with the canons of statutory interpretation, it should be understood to have a general and inclusive scope, inasmuch as the term is a general one. Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda.” Thus, the word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it embraces not only collateral relatives but also all the kindred of the person spoken of, unless the context indicates that it was used in a more restrictive or limited sense. The court declared the respondent as the sole legitimate heir.

Generalia specialibus non derogant – “A general law does not nullify a specific or special law.” This simply means that the general do not restrict or modify special provisions. In the case of Villegas v Subido, G.R. No. L-25835, 30 September 1971, Mayor Villegas, the petitioner, appointed Lapid as Assistant City Treasurer, claiming the power to make such appointment under the Decentralization Act of 1967 which allows the the provincial governor, city or municipal mayor to appoint other employees, except teachers who will be paid out of provincial, city or municipal general funds, and other local funds. On the other hand Subido, respondent and Commissioner of Civil Service, opposed such appointment since there is no legal basis for such a claim in the light of what is expressly ordained in the Charter of the City of Manila, enacted in 1949, which expressly confer such power to the President of the Philippines. The Supreme Court held that “a subsequent statute, general in character as to its and application, is not to be construed as repealing a special or specific enactment, unless the legislative purpose to do so is manifest. A special law is not regarded as having been amended or repealed by a general law unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest.” Thus, petition of the Mayor was denied.

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Hoc quidem per quam durum est sed ital ex scripta est – “It is exceedingly hard but so the law is written.” The principle requires that the statute should be applied regardless of whether it is unwise, hard or harsh. In the case of People vs. Palermo, G.R. No. 120630, 28 June 2001, the court had established that Marcelo Palermo succeeded in having carnal knowledge of his 14 year old daughter, Merly Palermo. During the arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty. But when he was crossed examined, he itted that he indeed raped his daughter. He was convicted and sentenced to suffer the penalty of death by RTC. His counsel appealed that the accused deserves a reduction of penalty for the sake of comionate justice, and that reclusion perpetua would be enough for him to pay his wrong doing to his daughter in particular and to society. Supreme Court considered the plea for “comionated justice” is legally impermissible by allowing the reduction of his penalty from death to reclusion perpetua. Comionate justice is accorded only to one deserving of comion within the bounds of the law. As perfectly stated in People vs. Malagar, through Justice Jose C. Vitug, "(a) father is looked up to as the protector and x x x guardian of his family, remaining ever wary of even the slightest harm that might befall it. It is difficult to thus imagine that any such man could instead stand as the predator of his own flesh and blood." Appellant has shown his bestiality and deserves the supreme penalty, lest he might feast again on Merly's younger sisters to satisfy his insatiable greed for lust. It may now be trite, but nonetheless apt, to restate the legal maxim "Hoc quidem per quam durum est sed ita lex scripta est." (The law may be exceedingly hard, but so the law is written.). Thus, SC affirmed the decision of RTC, and ordered the accused to pay damages.

Impossibilium nulla obligatio est– “There is no obligation to do an impossible thing.”

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[LEGAL MAXIMS – STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION] This legal percept states that when an act cannot be performed due to nature, physical impediments, or unforeseen events. It can be a legitimate basis to rescind (mutually cancel) a contract. In the Denied Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus made by AKBAYAN-Youth, SCAP, UCSC, MASP, KOMPIL II (YOUTH) et. al. docketed as G.R. NO. 147066 and G.R. No. 147179, praying that the Court must direct the COMELEC to provide for another special registration day under the continuing registration provision under the Election code, the court recognized the operational impossibility of conducting a special registration, which in its own language, "can no longer be accomplished within the time left to the Commission. Moreover, the determination of istrative agency as to the operation, implementation and application of a law would be accorded great weight considering that these specialized government bodies are, by their nature and functions, in the best position to know what they can possible do or not do, under prevailing circumstances. This was in accordance to the legal maxim Impossibilium nulla obligatio est. Hence no one is obliged to perform an impossibility.

Index amini sermo est- “Speech is the index of intention” In this principle of statutory construction, if a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. In the case of Yolonda Signey vs SSS docketted as G.R. No. 173582, whereas to whom will the death benefits be granted (the legitimate wife or common-law wife). Section 8(e) and (k) of R. A. No. 8282[27] is very clear. Nevertheless we only need to apply the law; Index amini sermo est.

Interest rei publicae ut finis sit litum- “Public interest requires that by the very nature of things there must be an end to a legal controversy. 26 | P a g e


This principle implies that once judgment or an order of a court has become final, the issues raised therein should be laid to rest. In the case of Salandanan vs CA docketted as G.R. 127783, June 5 1998, the petitioners cannot seek the re-opening of the probate proceedings which had long been terminated. They cannot, in the same manner, question the order validating the transfer and/or sale of their shares which was issued thirty-two years ago. It is a fundamental principle of public policy in every jural system that at the risk of occasional errors, judgment of courts should become final at some definite time fixed by law, interest rei publicae ut finis sit litum. The very object of which the courts were constituted was to put an end to controversies. Interpotare et concordare legibus est optimus ineterpotandi- “Every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form uniform system of law. This Latin maxim expresses that a statute must be interpreted, not only to be consistent with itself, but also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible system. This legal principle was discussed in the case of Natividad v Felix docketted as G.R. No. 111616, February 4, 1994 whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in itting the amended information filed by the provincial fiscal and in directing petitioner's arrest. Based on Section 15(1) of Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), petitioner contends that it is the Ombudsman and not the provincial fiscal who has the authority to conduct a preliminary investigation over his case for the alleged murder of Severino Aquino. The rule is expressed in the maxim, "interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi," or every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. Thus, in the application and interpretation of Article XI, Sections 12 and 13 of the 1987 Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989, Pres. Decree No. 1861 must be taken into consideration. It must be assumed that when the 1987 Constitution was written, its framers had in mind previous statutes relating to the same subject matter. In the 27 | P a g e

[LEGAL MAXIMS – STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION] absence of any express repeal or amendment, the 1987 Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989 are deemed in accord with existing statute, specifically, Pres. Decree No. 1861.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual

Interpret fiend est ut res valeat quam perea- “A law should be interpreted with a view of to upholding rather than destroying it.” The maxim states such an interpretation is to be adopted that the measure may take effect rather fail. This legal principle was applied in the case of Cecilia v National Labor Relations and Singapore Airlines Limited, docketted as G.R. No. L-65786, July 16, 1984 in which the Supreme Court granted the maternity benefits to petitioner based on Article XI of the CBA. The Supreme Court ruled that very title of Article XI alone gives to the sections of an act or contract are of ' ten resorted to for the purpose of determining the scope of the provisions and their relation to other portions of the act. Section 1, Article XI provides hospitalization and medical care benefits. From the language of the Article in question, no qualification as to cause of confinement or need of medical care is made. The contention that pregnancy or childbirth is not sickness per se so as to be reimbursable under the CBA is untenable. Article XI neither states nor implies that its provisions apply only to sickness. In fact, it speaks of "illness or disablement", for one may be hospitalized not only for treatment of disease but also for injury, disability or incapacity. To adopt respondent's strained interpretation would be to create an absurd situation whereby an employee may no longer avail of the benefits under Article XI when one is on vacation, sick, or comionate leave, which are also separated granted in the same way that maternity leave benefits are provided as distinct privileges. Such a construction would, of course, be absurd, and yet the respondents would apply it to another form of leave. Reasonable and practical interpretation must be placed on contractual provisions. Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat. Such interpretation is to be adopted, that the thing may continue to have efficacy rather than fail. 28 | P a g e


Interpretatio talis in abiguis semper fienda est, ut evitur inconveniens et absurdum- “Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted.” This legal principle means that statutes should receive a sensible construction so as to avoid an ujust or an absurd conclusion. This was adopted in the case of Serana v Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 162059, January 22, 2008 wherein Serana, accused of estafa, petitioned and claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent.She claimed that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended by R.A. No. 8249, enumerates the crimes or offenses over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.8 It has no jurisdiction over the crime of estafa.9 It only has jurisdiction over crimes covered by Title VII, Chapter II, Section 2 (Crimes Committed by Public Officers), Book II of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Estafa falling under Title X, Chapter VI (Crimes Against Property), Book II of the RPC is not within the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction. The Suppreme Court ruled that Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offense of estafa.Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, petitioner contends that estafa is not among those crimes cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. We note that in hoisting this argument, petitioner isolated the first paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, without regard to the succeeding paragraphs of the said provision. The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should receive a sensible construction so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion.33 Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper fienda est, ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum. Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted.

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[LEGAL MAXIMS – STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION] Legis interpretation legis vim obtinet- “The authoritative interpretation of the court of a statute acquires the force of law by becoming a part thereof. This legal maxim simply means that judicial construction and interpretation of a statute acquires the force of law. This principle was applied in the case of THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.CARMEN, G.R. No. L-30061 February 27, 1974 wherein Carmen, an appointed secret agent by an official, was accused of illegal possession of firearms. The issue in this case was should the appellant be acquitted on the basis on the Supreme Court’s rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the complete reversal of the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system ... ." The interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that law originally ed, since this Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule ed by numerous authorities is a restatement of legal maxim "legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet" - the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence of the law, of the land, at the time appellant was found in possession of the firearm in question and when he arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the construction and application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It follows, therefore, that considering that appellant conferred his appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and Lucero, under which no criminal liability would attach to his possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a license and permit therefor, appellant must 30 | P a g e

[LEGAL MAXIMS – STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION] be absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable. The judgement was hereby reversed and appellant was acquitted.

Legis posteriors priores contrarias abrogant – “A later law repeals a prior law on the same subject which is repugnant thereto”. Subsequent laws repeal those before enacted to the contrary as the legal dictionary defines it. In the case of

Carabao, Inc. v Agricultural Productivity Commission, G.R. No L-29304,

September 30, 1970, Petitioner appealed the decision of the lower court on the order of dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. Plaintiff filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal its complaint to recover the sum of P238,500.00 representing unpaid price of 300 units of fire extinguishers sold and delivered to the Defendant. With lack of action from the Defendant, it alleged that it had acquired the right under Act No. 3083 to file the original action for collection in the lower court. Defendants moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the lower court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter. It alleged that sections 2 and 3, Article XI of the Philippine Constitution, creating the General Auditing Office as a constitutional office and defining its functions, in relation to Commonwealth Act 327 enacted in 1938 as an implementing law. Moreover, Rule 44 of the Revised Rules of Court says that settlement of money claims against government of the Philippines has been placed under jurisdiction of the Auditor General to the exclusion of the Courts of First Instance, Supreme court is vested appellate jurisdiction. The lower court sustained defendant’s dismissal motion. Plaintiff appealed on question of law on whether the governing rule is Act 3083 which it contends that has not been amended nor repealed. However, the Supreme Court said that the 31 | P a g e

[LEGAL MAXIMS – STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION] governing law under which parties may sue to seek settlement by the Philippine Government is Commonwealth Act No. 327. Supreme Court held

that “The corresponding provisions of Act 3083 which are utterly

incompatible with those of Commonwealth Act must therefore be deemed superseded and abrogated under the principle of “leges posteriors contrarias abrogant” – a later statute which is repugnant to an earlier statute is deemed to have abrogated the earlier one on the same subject matter.”

Lex de futuro, judex de praterito – “The law provides for the future, the judge for the past.” In Re: Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank, Inc.; Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation v Stockholders of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank, G.R. No. 181556, December 14, 2009, it has been held that: “Statutes are prospective and not retroactive in their operation, they being the formulation of rules for the future, not the past. Hence, the legal maxim lex de futuro, judex de praeterito — the law provides for the future, the judge for the past, which is articulated in Article 4 of the Civil Code: “Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.” The reason for the rule is the tendency of retroactive legislation to be unjust and oppressive on of its liability to unsettle vested rights or disturb the legal effect of prior transactions.” In this case, the parties stipulated in the trial court that the sole issue for determination was whether RA 9302 may be applied retroactively; that the payment of additional liquidating dividends should be deemed approved since they never opposed it and that the trial court specifically disapproved only the payment of surplus dividends. In addition, RA 9302 cannot be given retroactive effect absent a provision providing for it. Republic Act No. 9302 (RA 9302) was enacted, Section 12 of which provides that before any distribution of assets of the closed bank, the Corporation shall charge against assets, reasonable 32 | P a g e

[LEGAL MAXIMS – STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION] amount of receivership expenses….After payment of all liabilities and claims against closed bank, the Corporation shall pay any surplus dividends to creditors and claimants in accordance with legal priority. However, prior to its enactment the Intercity Bank creditors has been paid with their claim on 2002 which is prior to enactment of RA 9302 on 2004 . The court denied the petition of Defendant on the ground that the law shall not be given retroactive effect absent the provision that states it should and doing so in this case, will prejudice the Plaintiff.

Lex prospicit, non respicit – “The law looks forward, not backward” It can be also expressed saying that “The law is prospective, not retrospective”. In the case of Pesca v Pesca, G.R. No. 136921. April 17, 2001. The court denied the Petitioner’s appeal to have her marriage declared null and void due to psychological incapacity of Respondent. In the ruling of the court in Santos and Molina, the term psychologically incapacitated has been defined. However, according to the Petitioner, it should not apply to their case as to do so would mean it to be a retroactive application. The court, in citing People vs. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607, held that “The interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of “lex prospicit, non respicit.” 33 | P a g e


Maledicta exposition qua corrupit textum – “It is dangerous construction which is against the text.” This means that we should not interpret the statute with what is not the intent of the legislature. In the case of China Banking Corporation (CBC) v The Honorable Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 140687, December 18, 2006, Petitioner claims that the law provides that even the name of the depositor is being protected in cases of foreign deposits since there was no mention that it was not. However, the Supreme Court held that to uphold the theory of petitioner CBC is reading into the statute “something that is not within the manifest intention of the legislature as gathered from the statute itself, for to depart from the meaning expressed by the words, is to alter the statute, to legislate and not to interpret, and judicial legislation should be avoided. Maledicta expositio quae corrumpit textum – It is a dangerous construction which is against the words. Expressing the same principle is the maxim: Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos, which simply means that where the law does not distinguish, we should not make any distinction.” (Gonzaga, Statutes and their Construction, p. 75.)

Noscitur a sociis – “Associated words” It is a legal maxim that means the meaning of an unclear word or phrase is to be determined (constructed) on the basis of its context the words or phrases surrounding it. According to UK Judge J. Stamp put it (in the 1967 case of Bourne vs. Norwich Crematorium Ltd.), "Sentences are not mere collections of words to be taken out of the sentence, defined separately by reference to the dictionary or decided cases, and then put back into the sentence with the meaning you have assigned to them as separate words ...." Latin for, it is known by the company it keeps.

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In the case of Coca-Cola Bottlers, Phils., Inc. (CCBPI), Naga Plant v Quintin Gomez and Danilo Galicia, G.R. No. 154491, November 14, 2008, Petitioners argue that Respondents violated the Intellectual Property Code by hoarding its empty bottles and shells. Respondent argued that no violation of the IP Code as done as there was no deceit nor fraud which should be attendant in the consummation of the activities prohibited by the said law. However, Petitioner contends that the law covers the act of hoarding and mentioned that the act of hoarding could be a crime under the IP code. The Supreme Court held that, “Separately from these tests is the application of the principles of statutory construction giving particular attention, not so much to the focus of the IP Code generally, but to the of Section 168 in particular. Under the principle of “noscitur a sociis,” when a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is found or with which it is associated.”

Nova constitution futuris forman imponers debit non praeteritis- “A new statute should affect the future, not the past.” A new statute/amendment should affect the future not the past because in general, first and strong presumptions of any law enacted for the first time or amending the enacted law, is its prospective applicability. Even Lopes, L.J. observed that “Every statute which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation or imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect of transactions already past, must be presumed to be intended not to have a retrospective effect.” (From http://indiantaxsolutions.com)

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[LEGAL MAXIMS – STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION] Nullis commodum protest de injura propria; Pari delicto potior est canditio defendantis – “No man should be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong.” In the case of Abacus Securities Corporation v

Ruben Ampil, G.R. No. 160016, February 27,

2006, Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the Court of Appeals that find both parties in pari delicto. The decision of the court states that in the final analysis, both parties acted in violation of the law and did not come to court with clean hands with regard to transactions. Thus, the peculiar facts of the present case bar the application of the pari delicto rule -- expressed in the maxims “Ex dolo malo non oritur action” and “In pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis” -- to all the transactions entered into by the parties. The pari delecto rule refuses legal remedy to either party to an illegal agreement and leaves them where they were. Nullim crimen sine poena, nulla poena sine legis – “There is no crime without a penalty, and there is no penalty without a law.” In the case of Juanito Rimando v Commission on Elections and Norma Magno, G.R. No. 176364, September 18, 2009, the Petitioners, in their appeal to the Supreme Court alleged of Respondent’s grave abuse of discretion ruling without its discretion in disregarding the timehonored doctrine of “Nullum Crimen, Nulla Poena Sine Lege”. The Respondent found no violation of Omnibus Election Code that states one way of committing the offense of violation of the gun ban is when the offender is in possession of a gun while guarding the residence of private persons, or guarding private residences, buildings or offices, without the necessary written approval or permission from the Commission. The Supreme Court upheld this decision.

Nullum tempus accunit regi – “There can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.” 36 | P a g e


The Wikipedia explains this as - Nullum tempus occurrit regi ("no time runs against the king"), sometimes abbreviated nullum tempus, is a common law doctrine originally expressed by Bracton in his De legibus et consuetudinibus Angliae in the 1250s. It states that the crown is not subject to statute of limitations.[1] This means that the crown can proceed with actions that would be barred if brought by an individual due to the age of time. The doctrine is still in force in common law systems today, in a republic it is often referred to as nullum tempus occurrit reipublicae. Nullum tempus occurit regi – “There can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.” This legal maxim can also be phrased as “no time runs against the king” thus the crown is not subject statute limitations. If we apply this to our jurisprudence, “king” would refer to the sovereign. The dissenting opinion in the case of Mindanao Development Corporation now The Southern Philippines Development istration v. The Court of Appeals and Francisco Ang Bansing, G.R. No. L-49087, April 5, 1982 states that the disputed land should have been granted to the government. The exact words were: In any event, the real plaintiff in this case is the Republic of the Philippines and prescription does not run against the State (De la Vina vs. Government of the P.I., 65 Phil. 262, 265; Republic vs. Ruiz, L-23712, April 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 348). The maxim is nullum tempus occurrit regi or nullum tempus occurrit reipublicae (lapse of time does not bar the right of the crown or lapse of time does not bar the commonwealth). The rule is now embodied in article 1108(4) of the Civil Code. It is a maxim of great antiquity in English law. The best reason for its existence is the great public policy of preserving public rights and property from damage and loss through the negligence of public officers. (34 Am Jur. 301; Ballentines's Law Dictionary, p. 891; U.S. vs. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway Co., 118 U.S. 120,125). Thus, the right of reversion or reconveyance to the State of lands fraudulently ed or not susceptible of private appropriation or acquisition does not prescribe (Martines vs. Court of Appeals, L-31271, April 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 647, 655; Republic vs. Ramos, 117 Phil. 45, 49). 37 | P a g e


Optima statute interpretatrix est ipsum statutum – “The best interpreter of a statute is the statute itself.” This maxim is adopted when in interpreting a statute one must interpret it as a whole. In the case of Hannah Eunice D. Serena v. Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 162059, January, 22, 2008; the Supreme Court denied her petition her interpretation of Section 4 P.D. No. 1606 is in direct opposition of the doctrine of optima statute interpretatrix ipsum statutum when she claimed that estafa was not listed as one of the crimes in the said provision. Optimus interpres rerum usus – “The best interpreter of the law is usage.” This phrase is in its simplest explanation, wherein if there’s ambiguity in a statute the best way to interpret is by looking into cases where such statute was applied. In that way stare decisis doctrine is related with this legal maxim. The case of Republic of the Philippines v. Dayot, G.R. No. 175581, March 28, 2008 the court applied the Niñal case wherein in order for a marriage without securing a marriage license to be valid the couple should have lived together for 5 years as husband and wife. In Niñal case the Court used the provision of cohabitation (the couple should have lived in exclusivity meaning there are no legal impediments for both of them to marry each other). Pari materia – “Relating to same matter.” According to Jose Laurel, “Where there are different statutes in pari materia, though made at different times, or even expired and not referring to each other, they shall be taken and construed together as one system and as explanatory of each other. In the case of Tan Co v. Civil Registry, G.R. No. 138496, February 23, 2004, Supreme Court granted the petition following in pari materia rule; the court held that LOI No.270 and CA No.473 both refers to naturalization of foreigners and no repeal was made in both expressed and implied therefore both are to be construed together in uniformity. 38 | P a g e


Privilegia reciprint largan interpretationem voluntate consonan concedentis – “Privileges are to be interpreted in accordance with the will of him who grants it.” This legal maxim strictly construe that if one fails to comply with the will of a grantor the said privilege will cease to exist. In the case of Butuan Sawmills, Inc. v. Bayview Theatre Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-5619 November 22, 1954 Supreme Court held that franchise should be forfeited since petitioner failed to comply to start operations in the specified period. Potior est in tempore, potior est in jure – “He who is first in time is preferred in right.” For easier understanding let’s apply this maxim on land titles, the person who was first granted with the title will have the preferential right. In the case of Garcia v. Gozon, G.R. No. L-48971, January 22, 1980 where the issue is whether the first title of the disputed land issued to Lapus which his heirs are now holding should be valid and the subsequent titles issued to appellants be void. The Supreme Court held that Lapus was an innocent buyer of the disputed land when he acquired the said title the maxim of potior est in termpore, potior est in jure was observed regardless whether the action was taken 4 decades after the issuance of the said title. In light of that the court ordered that the subsequent land title in custody of the appellants be cancelled. Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum – “What is prohibited directly is prohibited indirectly.” When a statute prohibits directly it also prohibits every indirect action derived from it. In the case of CIR v. Seagate Technology Phils., G.R. No. 153866, February 11, 2005 the Supreme Court stated that since under RA 7916 no VAT shall be imposed on establishments operating within the ecozone therefore these establishments may not indirectly impose or on

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[LEGAL MAXIMS – STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION] any VAT liability to their purchasers. VAT’s burden is usually ed on to purchaser of goods while the actual liability lies with the seller. Ratihabito acquiparatur mandate – “Legislative ratification is equivalent to a mandate” Ratio legis – “Interpretation according to spirit” Ratio legis est anima – “The reason of the law is its soul” It was stressed out in the case of Gonzales v. Gonzales, CV-00212 that it is the reason behind the law which should be considered as paramount, for when the reason behind the law ceases, so does the law. Reddendo singular singulis – “Referring each to each; referring each phrase or expression to its appropriate object; or let each be put in its proper place”

Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos- “Where the law does not distinguish, we ought not to distinguish.” This particular legal precept simply states that when the law does not allow for distinctions, it should be accordingly applied to all instances or situations that fall within its purview. In the case of Yu v Samson-Tatad, G.R. No. 170979, 09 February 2011, the respondent judge did not apply the Neypes doctrine (which provides for a “... fresh period of 15 days from a denial of a motion for reconsideration within which to appeal...”) in a criminal case involving estafa. After having her motion to have a new trial denied, petitioner Yu contended that she had a fresh period to file a notice of appeal with the lower court and as such, the trial court had lost jurisdiction to act upon the motions by the prosecution to dismiss the appeal and execute the adverse decision. In granting the petition for prohibition, the Supreme Court stated that “...BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules of Court is based, makes no distinction between the periods 40 | P a g e

[LEGAL MAXIMS – STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION] to appeal in a civil case and in a criminal case. Section 39 of BP 129 categorically states that "[t]he period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from." Accordingly, the decision directed the respondent judge to give due course to the petitioner’s appeal and elevate the records of the case to the appellate court.

Utile per inutile non vitiatur – “The useful is not vitiated by the non-useful.” This phrase involves a word or clause of a statute that is unrelated to the context of a statute or renders it senseless in light of the intent of the law. Consequently, the word or clause is treated as mere surplusage and the remainder continues to be valid. The dissenting opinion in the case of Sales v Director of Prisons, 87 Phil. 502, 13 October 1950, a petition for habeas corpus, should provide some insight on the proper usage of the phrase. The crux of the case’s controversy lay in the power of the President to order the arrest and incarceration of a person who violates their conditional pardon, pursuant to section 64 (i) of the Revised istrative Code (to wit: “...to grant to convicted persons reprieves or pardons, either plenary or partial, conditional, or unconditional; to suspend sentences without pardon, remit fines, and order the discharge of any convicted person upon parole, subject to such conditions as he may impose; and to authorize the arrest and reincarceration of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition, or conditions of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence...”). Justice Jose Y. Feria, in contesting the summary manner by which offenders lose their liberty without due process, argued that “...the word "pardon" in the last line of said section must have been inserted through inadvertence, and according to the maxims "utile par inutile non vitialur," and "surplusagium non nocet," it must be disregarded.” Verba accipiendo sunt secumdum materiam – “A word is to be understood in the context in which it is used.”

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[LEGAL MAXIMS – STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION] This rule states that the context in which a word is employed decides its meaning. The famous case of People v Ferrer, G.R. No. 32613, 27 December 1972, which involves the Anti-Subversion Act, discussed the use of the word “overthrow” in light of the aforementioned statute. Accordingly, it spurned the “metaphorical” use of the word. “Moreover, the word "overthrow' sufficiently connotes the use of violent and other illegal means. Only in a metaphorical sense may one speak of peaceful overthrow of governments, and certainly the law does not speak in metaphors. In the case of the Anti-Subversion Act, the use of the word "overthrow" in a metaphorical sense is hardly consistent with the clearly delineated objective of the ‘overthrow’ namely, ‘establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime and place [sic] the Government under the control and domination of an alien power.’ What this Court once said in a prosecution for sedition is appropos: "The language used by the appellant clearly imported an overthrow of the Government by violence, and it should be interpreted in the plain and obvious sense in which it was evidently intended to be understood. The word 'overthrow' could not have been intended as referring to an ordinary change by the exercise of the elective franchise. The use of the whip [which the accused exhorted his audience to use against the Constabulary], an instrument designed to leave marks on the sides of adversaries, is inconsistent with the mild interpretation which the appellant would have us impute to the language."

Verba intentioni non a contra debent inservire – “Words ought to be more subservient to the intent and not the intent to the words.” The legal maxim stresses the importance of taking into the legislative intent and the purpose of the law if the statute requires further construction. In the controversial Cityhood Cases (League of Cities v Commission of Elections, G.R. No. 176951, 18 November 2008), Justice Ruben T. Reyes, arguing for the constitutionality of the laws that would grant cityhood to sixteen (16) municipalities, used the phrase in his dissenting 42 | P a g e

[LEGAL MAXIMS – STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION] opinion, noting: “Legislative intent or spirit is the controlling factor, the leading star and guiding light in the application and interpretation of a statute. If a statute needs construction, the influence most dominant in that process is the intent or spirit of the act. The spirit, rather than the letter, of a statute, determines its construction. Thus, a statute must be read according to its spirit or intent. For what is within the spirit is within the statute although it is not within its letter, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute. Stated otherwise, a thing which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter; and a thing which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers. Legislative intent is part and parcel of the law. It is the controlling factor in interpreting a statute. In fact, any interpretation that runs counter with the legislative intent is unacceptable and invalid. Verba intentioni, non e contra debent inservire. Words ought to be more subservient to the intent than intent to the words.”

Verba legis – “Plain-meaning rule.” Verba legis non est recedendum – “From the words of the statute there should be no departure.” This rule states that when the law is clear, plain and unambiguous, it should be applied without further recourse to additional interpretation. In Victoria v Commission of Elections, G.R. No. 109005, 10 January 1994, a dispute arose in relation to Section 44 of the Local Government Code (Republic Act 7160) and how candidates in the Sanggunian should be ranked. The Court held that “...the law is clear that the ranking in the Sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of the votes obtained by each winning candidate of the total number of ed voters who actually voted. In such a case, the Court has no recourse but to merely apply the law.” Vigilantibus non dormientibus aequitas subvenit – “The law aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights.”

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[LEGAL MAXIMS – STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION] A maxim involving equity, this contemplates a situation where a plaintiff must comply with the responsibility that he must pursue his claim in a timely manner in order to obtain the relief provided by law. Accordingly, this legal concept has given rise to the defence of laches- where a plaintiff is barred from asserting his rights (and thus obtaining a favourable judgement) by virtue of his neglect in pursuing his claim within an unreasonable amount of time, the same being to the detriment of the defendant.

In the case of Salandanan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127783, 5 June 1998, the petitioners assailed the orders of a probate court providing for the partition of the decedent’s estate. The contested orders had been approved thirty-eight (38) years earlier, and the petitioners, by failing to timely assert their right of appeal, cannot question the decision which had become final by operation of law.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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[LEGAL MAXIMS – STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION] Agpalo, Ruben E. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION. Rex, Manila, Philippines, 1998. Moreno, Federico B. The PHILIPPINE LAW DICTIONARY. . Rex, Manila, Philippines, 1988.

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