00 Crimpro Bail Compiled Digests g2x55

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not have place the petitioners in jeopardy if respondent judge had taken the precaution of making sure that the dismissal was with their consent. In this case, it is not very clear that the petitioners consented to the dismissal of the case. o It is the practice of some judges before issuing an order of provisional dismissal in a case wherein the accused had already been arraigned to require the accused and his counsel to sign the minutes of the session or any available part of the record to show the conformity of the accused or his lack of objection to the provisional dismissal. o The judge specifies in the order of provisional dismissal that the accused and his counsel signified their assent thereto. That procedure leaves no room for doubt as to the consent of the accused and precludes jeopardy from attaching to the dismissal. The petitioners were insisting on a trial. They relied on their constitutional right to have a speedy trial. The fiscal was not ready because his witness was not in court. Respondent judge on his own volition provisionally dismissed the case. The petitioners did not expressly manifest their conformity to the provisional dismissal. Hence, the dismissal placed them in jeopardy. Even if the petitioners, after invoking their right to a speedy trial, moved for the dismissal of the case and, therefore, consented to it, the dismissal would still place them in jeopardy. The use of the word "provisional" would not change the legal effect of the dismissal (Esguerra vs. De la Costa, 66 Phil. 134; Gandicela vs. Lutero, 88 Phil. 299) If the defendant wants to exercise his constitutional right to a speedy trial, he should ask, not for the dismissal, but for the trial of the case. After the prosecution's motion for postponement of the trial is denied and upon order of the court the fiscal does not or cannot produce his evidence and, consequently, fails to prove the defendant's guilt, the court upon defendant's motion shall dismiss the case, such dismissal amounting to an acquittal of the defendant" (4 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1980 Ed., p. 202, citing Gandicela vs. Lutero, 88 Phil. 299, 307 and People vs. Diaz, 94 Phil. 714-717). The dismissal of a criminal case upon motion of the accused because the prosecution was not prepared for trial since the complainant and his witnesses did not appear at the trial is a dismissal equivalent to an acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the defendant for the same offense (Salcedo vs. Mendoza, L-49375, February 28, 1979, 88 SCRA 811; Lagunilia vs. Hon. Reyes, etc. and Motas, 111 Phil. 1020 citing People vs. Tacneng, 105 Phil. 1298 and People vs. Robles, 105 Phil. 1016. See Taladua vs. Ochotorena, L-25595, February 15, 1974, 55 SCRA 528; Acebedo vs. Sarmiento, L28025, December 16, 1970, 36 SCRA 247; Baesa vs. Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Sur, L-30363, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 437; People vs. Cloribel, 120 Phil. 775; People vs. Abaño 97 Phil. 28; People vs. Labatete, 107 Phil. 697)

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien People v. Villalon December 21, 1990 Regalado, J. Facts:  Federico de Guzman was charged with estafa through falsification of public documents for allegedly forging the signature of Carrera to make it appear that the former was made the latter’s attorney-in-fact, and subsequently mortgaging the parcel of land which Carrera owns.  De Guzman raised the issue of prescription – he claims that the crime has prescribed since more than 10 years has elapsed from the time the crime was committed.  Judge Villalon dismissed the complaint on basis of prescription Issue: W/N this appeal by the people would constitute double jeopardy. Held/Ratio: NO. PP v. City Court of Manila As a general rule, the dismissal or termination of a case after arraignment and plea of the defendant to a valid information shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the complaint or information (Sec. 9, Rule 113). However, an appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal (of the criminal case) by the trial court shall not constitute double jeopardy if (1) the dismissal is made upon motion, or with the express consent, of the defendant, and (2) the dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon consideration of the evidence or of the merits of the case; and (3) the question to be ed upon by the appellate court is purely legal so that should the dismissal be found incorrect, the case would have to be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings, to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Irrele – on issue of whether the charge of estafa thru falsification of a public document has sufficient basis to exist in fact and in law – COURT: YES The falsification of a public document may be a means of committing estaga bacuase before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being an element of the crime of the falsification of public, official or commercial documents. The damage to another is caused by the commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the public, official or commercial document, hence, the falsification of said document is only a necessary meanse to commit the estafa.

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien People vs. Lagui 171 SCRA 305      

Hizon lent money to Sorriano who in turn issued a post dated check to answer for the debt. When they tried to encash the check, the was already closed. He was charged with a violation under BP 22 and estafa The RTC dismissed the BP 22 charge because the information was “fatally defective” and convicted him of the estafa charge Upon appeal of the accused, the CA reversed the estafa conviction The people now is appealing the other case (BP 22) saying that the info was not fatally defective.

W/N info was fatally defective? NO 3 Elements of BP 22 1. Issuance of check for or for value 2. At time of issue, maker does not have sufficient funds or credit 3. Subsequently dishonored. The judge said that the information failed to allege that the accused knew when he issued the check that the then did not have sufficient funds in the bank; the information should have allege that the accused knew that he would not have sufficient funds in the bank to pay the check in full upon its presentment. --Wrong The presence of the 1st and 3rd elements of the offense constitutes prima facie evidene that the second element exists. (Look at Sec 2 of Law.) W/N if it wasn’t, can he still be convicted? NO  Decision cannot be annulled or set aside because it amounted to a judgment of acquittal. It became final and executory upon its promulgation. The state may not appeal that decision for it would place the accused twice in jeopardy of punishment for the offense in violation of his constitutional rights against double jeopardy.  Soriano had been arraigned, pleaded not guilty, and was tried upon a valid and sufficient information and case was dismissed by trial court (without his consent), he has been placed in jeopardy for the offense charged so re-assesing the evidence against him pursuant to the appeal of the gov’t would put him in double jeopardy.

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien Galvez vs. CA Oct. 24, 1994  

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Galvez, the incumbent mayor of San Ildefonso, Bulacan was charged with 3 infos for homicide and 2 infos for frustrated homicide. The prosecution filled a motion to defer arraingment to review the evidence to determine the proper charges as well as change of venue because complainants fear for their safety and to prevent miscarriage of justice. Before their arraignment, petitioners filed a motion to withdraw information’s, and subsequently filed information’s for murder and illegal possession of firearms. They filed a motion to quash saying the court never acquired jurisdiction, which was denied and judge set arraignment. –Assailed resolution.

Which set of informations should Galvez be tried with? The 1 st or 2nd? Corollary issues: 1. Whether the ex parte motion to withdraw the original informations is null and void on the ground that (a) there was no notice and hearing as required by Sections 4, 5 and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court; and (b) the appropriate remedy which should have been adopted by the prosecution was to amend the informations by charging the proper offenses pursuant to Section 14 of Rule 110; 2. Whether the order granting the withdrawal of the original informations was immediately final and executory; 3. Whether Judge Pornillos was correct in denying the motion to quash and thereby acquired jurisdiction over the new informations considering that (a) the designated public prosecutor allegedly had no authority to file the second set of informations; and (b) the filing thereof constituted forum shopping; and 4. Whether the arraignment proceeding held on January 24, 1994 in Criminal Cases Nos. 4004-M-93 to 4007-M-93 was valid.

1. considering that in the original cases before Branch 14 of the trial court petitioners had not yet been placed in jeopardy, and the ex parte motion to withdraw was filed and granted before they could be arraigned, there would be no imperative need for notice and hearing thereof. In actuality, the real grievance of herein accused is not the dismissal of the original three informations but the filing of four new informations, three of which charge graver offenses and the fourth, an additional offense. Had these new informations not been filed, there would obviously have been no cause for the instant petition. Accordingly, their complaint about the supposed procedural lapses involved in the motion to dismiss filed and granted in Criminal Cases

Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93 does not impress us as a candid presentation of their real position. 2. the absence of notice and hearing does not divest a trial court of authority to on the merits of the motion. It is only an irregularity.Besides, when petitioners were given by Judge Villajuan the opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration, even assuming the alleged procedural infirmity in his issuance of the order of dismissal, the same was thereby deemed cured. 3. Sec 11 rule 119 governs the trial stage vs sec 10 rule 114 governs procedural governance for prosecution of offenses, from the filing of info to just before the trial. 4. Sec 10 rule 114- The first paragraph provides the rule for amendment of the information or complaint, while the second paragraph refers to the substitution of the information or complaint. Under the second paragraph, the court can order the filing of another information to charge the proper offense, provided the accused would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy and that could only be true if the offense proved does not necessarily include or is not necessarily included in the offense charged in the original information. Petition dismissed.

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien People v. Pilpa 79 SCRA 82  

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Was charged with frustrated murder and pleaded not guilty The prosecution filed a motion to dismiss because intent to kill was not alleged in the information which initially was not objected to by the accused’s lawyer but subsequently changed his mind. A second information was then filed and a motion to quash from the defense claiming double jeopardy. Judge granted the motion and prosecution now appeals.

Whether the second information would place the accused twice in jeopardy of being punished for the crime of frustrated murder? NO  Under section 9 of Rule 117 the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked in cases of (a) previous acquittal (autrefois acquit), (b) conviction (autrefois convict) of the same offense, or (c) when the case against the accused has been dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.  In any of these three cases, in order that there be former kill jeopardy, it is in the first case that (a) there was a valid competent or information (b) before a court of competent jurisdiction, (c) and that the had been and had entered his plea. When these conditions or requotes are present, the acquittal or conviction of the accused, or the dismissal or termination of the case without his express consent constitutes res judicata and is a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof,or for carry offense which necessarily includes or is included therein.  here is former jeopardy when in the first case there was a valid COMPLAINT of information filed in a court of competent jurisdiction and, after the defendant had pleaded to the charge, he was acquitted or convicted or the case against him was terminated without his express consent  We hold that the oral manifestation at the hearing made by the counsel of the accused that he had no objection to the dismissal of the case was equivalent to a declaration of conformity to its dismissal or to an express consent to its termination within the meaning of section 9 of Rule 117. He could not thereafter revoke that conformity since the court had already acted upon it by dismissing the case. He was bound by his counsel's assent to the dismissal  Later, the cases were revived. The accused contended that the revival of the cases would place her in double jeopardy. That contention was rejected because the provisional dismissal did not place the in jeopardy. There was no jeopardy in such dismissal because the words "No objection" conveyed the Idea of full concurrence with the dismissal and was equivalent to saying "I agree."

Petition Granted, assailed order set aside.

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien People v. Obsania  On November 22, 1964, barely a day after the occurence of the alleged crime, Erlinda Dollente, the 14-year old victim, and her parents, Ciriaco Dollente and Carmelita Lureta, filed in the municipal court of Balungao, Pangasinan a complaint for rape with robbery 

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After the case was remanded to the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for further proceedings, the assistant provincial fiscal filed an information for rape against the accused, embodying the allegations of the above complaint, with an additional averment that the offense was committed "with lewd designs". The accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment, and forthwith his counsel moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that the complaint was fatally defective for failure to allege "lewd designs" and that the subsequent information filed by the fiscal which averred "lewd designs" did not cure the jurisdictional infirmity. The court a quo granted the motion and ordered dismissal of the action, ruling that "the failure of the complaint filed by the offended party to allege that the acts committed by the accused were with 'lewd designs' does not give this Court jurisdiction to try the case." From this order, the fiscal brought the instant appeal

W/N “lewd designs” should be alledged in complaint? NO 

Rape does not require that specific allegation.Lascivious intent inheres in rape and the unchaste design is manifest in the very act itself — the carnal knowledge of a woman through force or intimidation, or when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when the woman is under twelve years of age.

W/N there is double jeopardy? NO 

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In order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure in favor of an accused, the following requisites must have obtained in the original prosecution: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a competent court; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. The court then discusses a long history of jurisprudence and somewhat seemingly conflicting rulings that is too long to put in the digest. In the end through the accused can be estopped or can waive double jeopardy. The application of the sister doctrines of waiver and estoppel requires two sine qua non conditions: first, the dismissal must be sought or induced by the defendant personally or through his counsel;

and second, such dismissal must not be on the merits and must not necessarily amount to an acquittal. Indubitably, the case at bar falls squarely within the periphery of the said doctrines which have been preserved unimpaired in the corpus of our jurisprudence. Petition granted, order set aside.

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien

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Ada v. Virola 172 SCRA 336

Ada was initially charged under BP 22 for issuing 3 checks that bounced Before prosecution rested its case, he was also charged with estafa, which Ada tried to object to but was arraigned nevertheless. After prosecution rested its case, he filed a motion to dismiss the later cases saying it was violation is Double jeopardy right.

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It is a settled rule that to raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or a frustration thereof. These requisites do not exist in the case at bar. The prohibition is against a second jeopardy for the same offense. The plea of double jeopardy applies where the offenses in the two informations are the same in law and in fact. It is not necessarily decisive that the two offenses may have material facts in common, or that they are similar, where they are not in fact the same. The test is not whether the defendant has already been tried for the same act, but whether he has been put in jeopardy for the same offense. A single act may offend against two (or more) entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision of law requires proof of an additional fact or element while the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does not bar prosecution under the other. In other words, where two different laws (or articles of the same Code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other. The 2 laws are distinct from each other. There is no identity of offenses charged.

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien People v. Relova 148 SCRA 304     

The Police, armed with a search warrant, conducted a search on private respondents properties and found out he was using devices to lower his electric bill. He was charged in violation of ordinance 1 and pleaded not guilty. He filed a motion to dismiss saying the offense has already prescribed which was granted. After 14 days, he was charged now under the RPC 309, theft of electrical power. He filed a motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy. This was granted by the trial court.

W/N Doulbe Jeopardy bars the RPC information? YES  The basic difficulty with the petitioner's position is that it must be examined, not under the of the first sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution, but rather under the second sentence of the same section. The first sentence of Article IV (22) sets forth the general rule: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not available where the second prosecution is for an offense that is different from the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both the first and second offenses may be based upon the same act or set of acts. The second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception to the general proposition: the constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts.  Put a little differently, where the offenses charged are penalized either by different sections of the same statute or by different statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of offenses charge: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available only where an Identity is shown to exist between the earlier and the subsequent offenses charged. In contrast, where one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance while the other is penalized by a statute, the critical inquiry is to the identity of the acts which the accused is said to have committed and which are alleged to have given rise to the two offenses: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available so long as the acts which constitute or have given rise to the first offense under a municipal ordinance are the same acts which constitute or have given rise to the offense charged under a statute.  It is perhaps important to note that the rule limiting the constitutional protection against double jeopardy to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense is not to be understood with absolute literalness. The Identity of offenses that must be shown need not be absolute Identity: the first and second offenses may be regarded as the "same offense" where the second offense necessarily includes the first offense or is necessarily included in such first offense or where the second

offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof. 14 Thus, for the constitutional plea of double jeopardy to be available, not all the technical elements constituting the first offense need be present in the technical definition of the second offense. The law here seeks to prevent harrassment of an accused person by multiple prosecutions for offenses which though different from one another are nonetheless each constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of technical elements.

Petition denied.

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien THE PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES v. MARIA DEL CARMEN et al. PARAS J.  

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The defendants were prosecuted in the municipal court of Manila for the crime of malicious mischief. After presentation of evidence for the prosecution, the municipal court dismissed the case on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove that the removal or destruction of the property in question had been inspired by resentment, rancor, or desires for revenge. Subsequently, the same fiscal who filed the information in the municipal court, filed the following information of coercion in the court of First Instance of Manila against the defendants.

Issue: Whether or not there is double jeopardy? Yes, the rule against double jeopardy prohibits prosecution for the same offense it seems basic that an accused should be shielded against being prosecuted for several offenses made out from a single act.  

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Counsel for defendants filed a motion to nullify the second information on the grounds of double jeopardy. Contented for the appellant there is no double jeopardy since the second information charges an offense different from that included in the information filed in the municipal court. The rule against double jeopardy protecting the accused not against the second punishment for the same act but against being tried for the same offense. A brief comparison of the two informations, the act complained of in the case for coercion is the same act which formed the basis of the information for malicious mischief. The rule against double jeopardy prohibits prosecution for the same offense it seems basic that an accused should be shielded against being prosecuted for several offenses made out from a single act. Otherwise, an unlawful act or omission, may give rise to several prosecutions depending upon the ability of prosecuting officer to imagine as many offenses as can be justified by said act or omission, by simply adding or subtracting essential elements. The case at bar is an occasion for reminding prosecuting officers to be careful and comprehensive in criminal investigations with the view to determining definitely, before filing the necessary information, the offenses in fact and in law committed, in order to avoid situations smacking of persecutions.

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien CONRADO MELO v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF THE FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL MORAN, C. J. 

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Petitioner Conrado Melo was charged on December 27, 1949, with frustrated homicide, for having allegedly inflicted upon Benjamin Obillo, with a kitchen knife and with intent to kill at the Court of First Instance of Rizal. On December 29, 1949, at 8 a.m., the accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged and at 10:15 p.m. of the same day, Benjamin Obillo died from his wounds. Evidence of death was available to the prosecution only on January 3, 1950 and January 4, 1950 and amended information was filed charging the accused with consummated homicide. The accused then filed a motion to nullify the amended information claiming double jeopardy. Motion was denied by the respondent court; hence, instant petition for prohibition to en the respondent court from further entertaining the amended information

Issue: Whether or not an accused who pleaded guilty to the offense of frustrated homicide, upon death of the offended party, could not rely on a plea of double jeopardy, if the information amended is to charge him with homicide? No, because the petition is denied, and the respondent court may proceed to the trial of the criminal case under the amended information. 

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Rule 106, section 13, 2d paragraph, under this provision, it was proper for the court to dismiss the information and order the filing of a new one for the reason that the proper offense was not charged in the former and it did not place the accused in a second jeopardy for the same or identical offense. “No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense”. Meaning when a person is charged with an offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any manner without the consent of the accused, the latter cannot be charged with the same or identical offense. It is noticed that the protection of the constitutional inhibition is against a second jeopardy for the “same offense”, the only exception, that if an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. “Same offense”, under the general rule, has always been interpreted to mean not only that the second offense charged is exactly the same as the one alleged in the first information, but also the two offenses are identical. There is identity between two offenses when the evidence to a conviction for one offense would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other. On the other hand, the rule of identity does not apply, when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was in existent.

The rule is that where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is responsible, which changes the character of the offense and, together with the facts existing at the time constitutes a new and distinct offense. The accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense.

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien THE PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES v. RODRIGO YORAC FERNANDO, J.  

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A constitutional right not to be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense was the basis for a motion to nullify by the accused, now appellee, Rodrigo Yorac. He was prosecuted for frustrated murder arising allegedly from having assaulted, attacked, and hit with a piece of wood the offended party, for which he was previously tried and sentenced for slight physical injuries, his plea being one of guilt. The information for frustrated murder was based on the second medical certificate given by the same physician which was much more thorough the second time, to the effect that the victim did suffer a greater injury than was at first ascertained. The lower court, presided by Honorable Judge Nestor B. Alampay, considering that there was no supervening fact that would negate the defense double jeopardy, sustained the motion to quash in an order of June 21, 1968. The people appealed. The accused Yorac was charged with slight physical injuries before the City Court of Bacolod. The accused plead guilty on April 16, 1968 resulting in his being penalized to suffer ten days of arresto menor. On April 18, 1968, the provincial fiscal filed information at the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, charging the same defendant with frustrated murder arising from the act upon another medical certificate dated April 17, 1968. A motion to nullify was filed by the accused on June 10, 1968 on the ground that, having been previously convicted of slight physical injuries and having already served the penalty imposed on him for the same offense, the prosecution for frustrated murder arising out of the same act committed against the same offended party, he would be placed in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense.

Issue: Whether or not the defendant, who had already been convicted of slight physical injuries and had served sentence therefore, may be prosecuted anew for frustrated murder for the same act committed against the same person? No, because there is no supervening fact that had occurred which justifies the application, for which reason we are constrained to apply the general rule of double jeopardy. By this, the motion to quash was granted and ordered the dismissal of the case and immediate release of the appellee. 

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For double jeopardy not to exist, there is then the indispensable requirement of the existence of a new fact which supervenes for which the defendant is responsible changing the character of the crime imputed to him and together with the facts existing previously constituting a new and distinct offense. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. A defendant in a criminal case should therefore, be judged either guilty or not guilty and thereafter left alone in peace, in the latter case the State being precluded from taking an appeal. “The Same offense”, means another prosecution for the offense charged after a defendant shall have been convicted

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or acquitted or the case against him terminated without his express consent, or any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof or for; any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. It follows that after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes on which defendant may be held liable, resulting in altering the character of the crime and giving rise to a new and distinct offense, the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense. Although there is the indispensable requirement of the existence of a new fact which supervenes for which the defendant is responsible changing the character of the crime imputed to him and together with the existing facts previously constituting a new and distinct offense.

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien THE PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES, v. CITY COURT of MANILA, BRANCH XI and FRANCISCO GAPAY y MALLARES, RELOVA J. 

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This is a petition to review the order, dated November 17, 1972, of the City Court of Manila, Branch XI, dismissing the information for homicide thru reckless imprudence filed against respondent Francisco Gapa y Mallares on the ground of double jeopardy. Respondent court held that the private respondent having been previously tried and convicted of serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence for the death of the victim would place the accused in double jeopardy. The case at bar, the incident occurred on October 17, 1972. On the following day, October 18, information was filed against respondent for serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence. On the same day, the victim Diolito de la Cruz died. On October 20, 1972, private respondent was arraigned on the charge of serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to one month and one day of arresto mayor, and commenced serving sentence. On October 24, 1972, information for homicide thru reckless imprudence was filed against respondent. On November 17, 1972, the City Court of Manila, upon motion of respondent, issued and order dismissing the homicide thru reckless imprudence case on the ground of double jeopardy.

Issue: Whether or not a person who has been prosecuted for serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence and convicted thereof may be prosecuted subsequently for homicide thru reckless imprudence if the offended party dies as a result of the same injuries he had suffered? No, the fact remains that the victim Diolito de la Cruz died on October 18 one day after the accident and arrest of the respondent Gapay and that on October 20 the accused was arraigned, pleaded guilty and sentenced accordingly. Thus, jeopardy had attached and no new fact supervened after the arraignment and conviction of the accused. 

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It follows that after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes on which defendant may be held liable, resulting in altering the character of the crime and giving rise to a new and distinct offense, the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense. However, article 365 of the Penal Code punishes the negligent state of mind and not the resulting injury. The trial court concluded that once prosecuted for and convicted of negligence, the accused cannot again be prosecuted for the same negligence although for a different resulting injury. Well-settled is the rule that one who has been charged with an offense cannot be charge again with the same or identical offense though the latter be lesser or greater than the former. However, it must be pointed that, the rule of identity does not apply when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused, during the first

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prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then in existent. Accordingly, where the accused was charged with physical injuries and after conviction, the injured person dies, the charge for homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in jeopardy. As stated, the victim Diolito de la Cruz died on the day the information was filed, and the accused was arraigned two days after, or on October 20, 1972. When the information for homicide thru reckless imprudence was filed on October 24, 1972, the accused- private respondent was already in jeopardy.

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien GEORGE MANANTAN, v. THE COURT of APPEALS, SPOUSES MARCELINO NICOLAS and MARIA NICOLAS QUISIMBING J. 

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June 1, 1983, thee Provincial Fiscal of Isabela filed information charging petitioner Manantan with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Petitioner was acquitted by the trial court of homicide through reckless imprudence without ruling on his civil liability. On appeal from the civil aspect of the judgement in Criminal Case no. 066, the appellate court found the petitioner Manantan civilly liable and ordered him to indemnify private respondents Marcelino Nicolas and Maria Nicolas for a total of 174,400.00 for the death of their son, Ruben Nicolas. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the appellate court in its resolution of August 24, 1992 denied the motion.

Issues: Did the acquittal of petitioner foreclose any further inquiry by the Court of Appeals as to his negligence or reckless imprudence? Did the court a quo err in finding that petitioner’s acquittal did not extinguish his civil liability? Did the appellate court commit a reversible error in failing to apply the Manchester Doctrine to CA-G.R. CV No. 19240?

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Petitioner argues that the trial court’s finding that he was neither imprudent nor negligent was the basis of his acquittal and not reasonable doubt. Hence, upon finding him liable for indemnity and damages, the appellate court not only placed his acquittal in suspicion, but also put him in double jeopardy. Preliminary, petitioner’s claim that the decision of the appellate court awarding indemnity placed him in double jeopardy is misplaced. The constitution provides that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. For double jeopardy to exist elements are established. First is a jeopardy must have attached prior to the second. The first jeopardy must have been terminated. Lastly, the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as the first. In the instant case, petitioner had once been placed in jeopardy by the filing of Criminal Case No. 066 and the jeopardy was terminated by his discharge. However, petitioner was not charged anew in CA-G.R. No. 19240 with a second criminal offense identical to the first offense. Records clearly show that no second criminal offense was being imputed to petitioner on appeal therefore there was no second jeopardy to speak of. Petitioner’s claim of having been placed in double jeopardy is incorrect. Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act of omission complained of. This closes the door to civil liability. Second is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused, in this case if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempted from civil liability which may be proved by the preponderance of evidence only.

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Hence, petitioner’s acquittal was not precluded from looking into the question of petitioner’s negligence. In line with this, the petitioner insists that he was acquitted on a finding that he was neither criminally negligent nor recklessly imprudent. He argues that when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded and concludes that his acquittal bars any civil action. Respondents counter that the trial court’s judgement shows the judgement of acquittal did not clearly declare the nonexistence of petitioner’s negligence or imprudence. They argue that his acquittal must be deemed based on reasonable doubt. Inquiry by the lower court’s decision in Criminal Case No. 066 s the conclusion of the appellate court that the acquittal was based on reasonable doubt hence petitioner’s civil liability was not extinguished by his discharge. However, it found that a hypothesis inconsistent with the negligence of the accused presented itself before the court. The foregoing clearly shows that petitioner’s acquittal based on reasonable doubt and a suit to enforce civil liability for the same act or omission lies. Furthermore, petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals made a mistake in awarding damages and indemnity, since private respondents did not pay the corresponding filing fees for their claims for damages when civil case was instituted with the criminal action. Private respondents argue that under the rules of court, the filing fees for the damages awarded are a first lien on the judgement. At the time of the filing of information, the implied institution of civil actions with criminal actions was governed by Rule 111, section 1 of the 1964, Rules of Court. As pointed out by the respondents, under the said rule, it was not required that the damages sought by the offended party be stated in the complaint or information. Thus, the civil action is impliedly instituted together with the criminal action, the actual damages claimed by the offended parties, as in this case, are not included in the computation of the filing fees. Filing fees are to be paid only if other items of damages such as moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages are alleged in the complaint or information, or if they are not so alleged, shall constitute a first lien on the judgement. The rules of criminal procedure guarantee that filing fees for the award of damages are first lien on the judgement, the effect of the enforcement of said lien must retro act to the institution of the criminal action. Therefore, we find no basis for petitioner’s allegations that the filing fees were not paid or improperly paid and that the appellate court acquired no jurisdiction. The instant petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

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SAMSON V. CA BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Rufino T. Samson was tly charged with Amado L. Cruz and Bonifacio Vergara and two others whose names are unknown in two separate informations with the complex crime of estafa through falsification of two checks of the Philippine National Bank The trio appealed from the decision and the Court of Appeals affirmed the same but with a reduced penalty with regard to appellants Cruz and Vergara. Appellant Samson was only found guilty of committing the crime through gross imprudence and was accordingly sentenced to 4 months of arresto mayor in each of the two cases. Dissatisfied with his conviction, Samson sued out the present petition for review contending (1) that the acts done by him, as found by the Court of Appeals, do not constitute gross imprudence; (2) that there is no such offense as estafa through (falsification by) negligence; and (3) that the Court of Appeals erred in denying his motion for new trial. Espiridion Lascaño, father of the late Felipe Lascaño, a lieutenant of the USAFFE, who died during the last World War, and his widow Rosanna Paras, are Felipe Lascano's only legitimate surviving heirs, They filed their claim papers with the Red Cross Chapter in the Province of Sorsogon in the early part of 1946. On October 2, 1948 Amado L. Cruz asked the help of his former classmate Rufino T. Samson in getting the checks of the two claimants who were with him at Camp Murphy . They were successful in having the checks of the two claimants. They went to Aristocrat restaurant and Samson went on to watch a movie that night ( I know. Weird.). Just two days after cashing the checks, while at Camp Murphy Samson was informed by Severino Anda, one of those who were with the party which cashed the checks, thus said cheeks were delivered to the wrong parties. Worried by such news he left for Sorsogon the following day to locate the real claimants. He found Espiridion too weak and too old to get out of the house and saw Rosalina (I think this should be Rosanna) in the school where she was teaching and confirmed that the old man’s check was never claimed by them. ISSUE (CRIMPRO): WON Samson can be convicted of the crime of estafa through falsification by imprudence despite the fact that the information filed against him charges only a willful act of falsification and contains no reference to any act of imprudence on his part- YES

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Appellant was, or must have been aware that the claim was for a sizeable amount, totalling over twelve thousand pesos, and ordinary prudence required that he should satisfy himself by all proper and adequate means of the identity of the persons claiming said amounts, since they we personally unknown to him. The mere assurance of a former class, mate would certainly not be a satisfactory identification to justify disbursement of such a large amount if the funds belonged to appellant. Under the facts found by the Court of Appeals, the acts of appellant constitute in each case the crime of estafa through falsification of a mercantile document by reckless imprudence, because in so far as the falsification is concerned, his acts of endorsing the respective checks by way of identification of the signatures of the payees entitled to said checks and their

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proceeds, constituted a written representation that the true payees participated in the indorsement and cashing of the checks aforesaid, when in truth and in fact the true payees had no direct intervention in the proceedings (Art. 171, Revised Penal Code). Even if such indorsement and identification were extraneous to the official duties of appellant, he would be nevertheless liable as a private person under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code. Decisions of this Court and of the Supreme Court of Spain assert the juridical standing of the crime of falsification by imprudence since in falsifying public or mercantile document, of intent to cause damage is not required because what the law, seeks to repress is the prejudice to the public confidence in these documents. The rule regarding variance between allegation and proof in a criminal case, is: "When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as charged, is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the defendant shall be convicted of the offense proved included in that which is charged, or of the offense charged included in that which is proved" (Section 4, Rule 116. Rules of Court). As a complement we have also the following rule: "An offense charged necessarily includes that which is proved, when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And the offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proves, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter" (Section 5, Rule 116, Idem.). While a criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a willful crime, as we held in Quizon vs. Justice of the Peace of Bacolor,* G.R. No. L-6641, July 28, 1955, but a distinct crime in itself, designated as a quasi offense in our Penal Code, it may however be said that conviction for the former can be had under an information exclusively charging the commission of a willful offense, upon the theory that the greater includes the lesser offense. This is the situation that obtains in the present case. The fact that the information does not allege that the falsification was committed with imprudence is of no moment for here this deficiency appears supplied by the evidence submitted by appellant himself and the result has proven beneficial to him. Certainly, having alleged that the falsification has been willful, it would be incongrous to allege at the same time that it was committed with imprudence for a charge of criminal intent is incompatible with the concept of negligence.

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STA. RITA V. CA FELICIANO, J.:

Petitioner Sta. Rita was charged in the RTC with violating Section 2(a) in relation to Sections 22(d) and 28(e) of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended, otherwise known as the Social Security Law. The Information alleged that petitioner, "as President/General Manager of B. Sta. Rita Co., Inc. a compulsorily (sic) covered employer under the Social Security Law, as amended, did then and there willfully and unlawfully fail, neglect and refuse and still fails, neglects and refuses to remit to the Social Security System contributions for SSS, Medicare and Employees Compensation for its covered employees." Petitioner Sta. Rita moved to dismiss said criminal case The RTC sustained petitioner's motion and dismissed the criminal case filed against him. It ruled that the Memorandum of Agreement entered into between the Department of Labor and Employment ("DOLE") and the Social Security System ("SSS") extending the coverage of Social Security, Medical Care and Employment Compensation laws to Filipino seafarers on board foreign vessels was null and void as it was entered into by the of the SSS without the sanction of the Commission and approval of the President of the Philippines, in contravention of Section 4 (a) of R.A. No. 1161, as amended. The People, through the Solicitor General, filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus assailing the order of dismissal issued by the trial court. Respondent appellate court granted the petition. Thereafter, petitioner filed in this Court a motion for extension of thirty (30) days from the expiration of reglementary period within which to file a petition for review on certiorari. The Court granted the motion and gave petitioner until 9 June 1995 to file the petition with warning that no further extension will be given. Despite the warning, the petition was filed only on 13 June 1995 or four (4) days after the due date. Moreover, it failed to comply with requirement no. 2 of Circular No. 1-88, as amended and Circular No. 19-91 of the Court as it did not contain an affidavit of service of copies thereof to respondents. It was only on 14 July 1995, through an ex-parte manifestation, that the affidavit of service was belatedly submitted to this Court. In the Petition for Review, petitioner Sta. Rita contends that the Filipino seafarers recruited by B. Sta. Rita Co. and deployed on board foreign vessels outside the Philippines are exempt from the coverage of R.A. No. 1161 under Section 8 (j) (5) thereof WON THE PETITION MUST FAIL DUE TO NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROCEDURAL RULES – YES It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that the right to appeal is a statutory right and a party who seeks to avail of the right must comply with the rules. 4 These rules, particularly the statutory requirement for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period laid down by law, must be strictly followed as they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for orderly discharge of judicial business. 5 Petitioner's failure to seasonably file the Petition and its failure to comply with the aforequoted Circulars of the Court necessitate the denial of the Petition. Besides, even if the Petition had been filed on time and had complied with the Circulars, it would still have to be denied as petitioner has failed to show that respondent appellate court committed any reversible error in rendering the assailed decision.

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WON THE INFORMATION AGAINST PETITIONER IS SUFFICIENT- YES The Court agrees with the CA that the Information filed against petitioner was sufficient as it clearly stated the designation of the offense by the statute, i.e. violation of the Social Security Law, and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense, i.e., petitioner's failure to remit his contributions to the SSS. The CA found that there is prima facie evidence to the allegations in the Information and to warrant the prosecution of petitioner. WON THE QUESTIONED MEMORANDUM AGREEMENT (DOLESSS) IS VALID- YES Contrary to the trial court's finding, the Memorandum of Agreement was approved by the Social Security Commission per the Commission's Resolution No. 437, dated 14 July 1988. Upon the other hand, the Memorandum of Agreement is not a rule or regulation enacted by the Commission in the exercise of the latter's quasi-legislative authority Under Section 4 (a) of R.A. No. 1161, as amended, which reads as follows: Sec. 4. Powers and Duties of the Commission. — For the attainment of its main objectives as set forth in section two hereof, the Commission shall have the following powers and duties: To adopt, amend and rescind, subject to the approval of the President, such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of this Act. What the Memorandum of Agreement did was to record the understanding between the SSS on the one hand and the DOLE on the other hand that the latter would include among the provisions of the Standard Contract of Employment required in case of overseas employment, a stipulation providing for coverage of the Filipino seafarer by the SSS. The Memorandum of Agreement is not an implementing rule or regulation of the Social Security Commission which, under Section 4 (a) abovequoted, is subject to the approval of the President. Indeed, as a matter of strict law, the participation of the SSS in the establishment by the DOLE of a uniform stipulation in the Standard Contract of Employment for Filipino seafarers was not necessary; the Memorandum of Agreement related simply to the istrative convenience of the two (2) agencies of government. The Standard Contract of Employment to be entered into between foreign shipowners and Filipino seafarers is the instrument by which the former express their assent to the inclusion of the latter in the coverage of the Social Security Act. In other words, the extension of the coverage of the Social Security System to Filipino seafarers arises by virtue of the assent given in the contract of employment signed by employer and seafarer; that same contract binds petitioner Sta. Rita or B. Sta. Rita Company, who is solidarily liable with the foreign shipowners/employers. It may be noted that foreign shipowners and manning agencies had generally expressed their conformity to the inclusion of Filipino seafarers within the coverage of the Social Security Act even prior to the g of the DOLE-SSS Memorandum of Agreement. It is, finally, worthy of special note that by extending the benefits of the Social Security Act to Filipino seafarers on board foreign vessels, the individual employment agreements entered into with the stipulation for such coverage contemplated in the DOLE-SSS

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Memorandum of Agreement, merely give effect to the constitutional mandate to the State to afford protection to labor whether "local or overseas." (CRIMPRO) WON THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE CRIMINAL CASE AGAINST STA. RITA CONSTITUTES DOUBLE JEOPARDYNO The Court of Appeals properly held that the reinstatement of the criminal case against petitioner did not violate his right against double jeopardy since the dismissal of the information by the trial court had been effected at his own instance. 10 There are only two (2) instances where double jeopardy will attach notwithstanding the fact that the case was dismissed with the express consent of the accused. The first is where the ground for dismissal is insufficiency of evidence for the prosecution; and the second is where the criminal proceedings have been unreasonably prolonged in violation of the accused's right to speedy trial. 11 Neither situation exists in the case at bar. There is no legal impediment to the reinstatement of Criminal Case No. Q92-35426 against petitioner Sta. Rita. (AS IN ITO LANG ANG DISCUSSION ABOUT THAT, ARGH.)

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ANAMER SALAZAR V. PEOPLE CALLEJO, SR., J.:

On June 11, 1997, an Information for estafa was filed against herein petitioner Anamer D. Salazar and co-accused Nena Jaucian Timario with the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City. petitioner Anamer Salazar purchased 300 cavans of rice from J.Y. Brothers Marketing Corporation, through Mr. Jerson Yao. As payment for these cavans of rice, the petitioner gave the private complainant Check No. 067481 drawn against the Prudential Bank, Legazpi City Branch, dated October 15, 1996, by one Nena Jaucian Timario in the amount of P214,000. Jerson Yao accepted the check upon the petitioner’s assurance that it was a good check. The cavans of rice were picked up the next day by the petitioner. Upon presentment, the check was dishonored because it was drawn under a closed (“ Closed”). The petitioner was informed of such dishonor. She replaced the Prudential Bank check with Check No. 365704 drawn against the Solid Bank, Legazpi Branch, which, however, was returned with the word “DAUD” (Drawn Against Uncollected Deposit). After the prosecution rested its case, the petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence with Leave of Court alleging that she could not be guilty of the crime as charged. The prosecution filed its comment/opposition to the petitioner’s demurrer to evidence. TC: rendered judgment acquitting the petitioner of the crime charged but ordering her to remit to the private complainant the amount of the check as payment for her purchase. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused Anamer D. Salazar is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged but is hereby held liable for the value of the 300 bags of rice. Accused Anamer D. Salazar is therefore ordered to pay J.Y. Brothers Marketing Corporation the sum of P214,000.00. Costs against the accused. In her petition at bar, the petitioner assails the orders of the trial court claiming that after her demurrer to evidence was granted by the trial court, she was denied due process as she was not given the opportunity to adduce evidence to prove that she was not civilly liable to the private respondent. The petitioner invokes the applicability of Rule 33 of the Rules of Civil Procedure in this case, contending that before being adjudged liable to the private offended party, she should have been first accorded the procedural relief granted in Rule 33. ISSUE: WON SALAZAR SHOULD BE GRANTED THE PROCEDURAL RELIEF IN RULE 33- YES The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation. “ (b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.” The criminal action has a dual purpose, namely, the punishment of the offender and indemnity to the offended party. The dominant and primordial objective of the criminal action is the punishment of the offender. The civil action is merely incidental to and consequent to the conviction of the accused. The reason for this is that criminal actions are primarily intended to vindicate an outrage against the sovereignty of the state and to impose the appropriate penalty for the vindication of the disturbance to the social order caused by the offender. On the

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other hand, the action between the private complainant and the accused is intended solely to indemnify the former. Unless the offended party waives the civil action or reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action, there are two actions involved in a criminal case. The first is the criminal action for the punishment of the offender. The parties are the People of the Philippines as the plaintiff and the accused. In a criminal action, the private complainant is merely a witness for the State on the criminal aspect of the action. The second is the civil action arising from the delict. The private complainant is the plaintiff and the accused is the defendant. There is a merger of the trial of the two cases to avoid multiplicity of suits. The quantum of evidence on the criminal aspect of the case is proof beyond reasonable doubt, while in the civil aspect of the action, the quantum of evidence is preponderance of evidence. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the said rules shall govern the procedure to be observed in action, civil or criminal. The prosecution presents its evidence not only to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt but also to prove the civil liability of the accused to the offended party. After the prosecution has rested its case, the accused shall adduce its evidence not only on the criminal but also on the civil aspect of the case. At the conclusion of the trial, the court should render judgment not only on the criminal aspect of the case but also on the civil aspect thereof. In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case where (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) where the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; (c) where the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted. . If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of acquittal as it would place the accused in double jeopardy. However, the aggrieved party, the offended party or the accused or both may appeal from the judgment on the civil aspect of the case within the period therefor. After the prosecution has rested its case, the accused has the option either to (a) file a demurrer to evidence with or without leave of court under Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, or to (b) adduce his evidence unless he waives the same If the court denies the demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When the demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the accused waives his right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act or omission

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from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. If the trial court issues an order or renders judgment not only granting the demurrer to evidence of the accused and acquitting him but also on the civil liability of the accused to the private offended party, said judgment on the civil aspect of the case would be a nullity for the reason that the constitutional right of the accused to due process is thereby violated The principles find universal acceptance and are tersely expressed in the oft-quoted statement that procedural due process cannot possibly be met without a “law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial.” This is so because when the accused files a demurrer to evidence, the accused has not yet adduced evidence both on the criminal and civil aspects of the case. The only evidence on record is the evidence for the prosecution.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al., vs. PANFILO M. LACSON. MAY 28, 2002

On May 18, 1995, then PNP Director-General Recaredo Sarmiento II announced, in a press conference, the killing of eleven (11) of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang (KBG) in a shootout with police elements near the fly-over along Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City at about 4:00 A.M. that day. On May 22, 1995, morning papers carried the news that SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes had claimed that the killing of the eleven (11) gang was a “rub-out” or summary execution and not a shootout. On May 26, 1995, SPO2 Corazon dela Cruz, another CIC investigator, executed an affidavit corroborating the material allegations of delos Reyes. Dela Cruz claimed that she was with delos Reyes from the time the eleven (11) KBG were arrested up to the time they were killed in Commonwealth Avenue. On May 31, 1995, Armando Capili, a reporter of Remate, executed an affidavit stating that he was present when the KBG were arrested in Superville Subdivision. On June 1, 1995, Chief Superintendent Job A. Mayo, PNP Director for Investigation, filed murder charges with the Office of the Ombudsman against ninety-seven (97) officers and personnel of ABRITFG. The next-of-kin of the slain KBG also filed murder charges against the same officers and personnel. On November 2, 1995, the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eleven (11) Informations for MURDER, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057, against respondent Panfilo M. Lacson and twenty-five (25) other accused. Upon motion of the respondent, the criminal cases were remanded to the Ombudsman for reinvestigation. On March 1, 1996, Amended Informations were filed against the same twentysix (26) suspects but the participation of respondent Lacson was downgraded from principal to accessory (TACKLED IN LACSON V. EXEC. SEC.) Before the accused could be arraigned, prosecution witnesses Eduardo de los Reyes, Corazon de la Cruz, Armando Capili and Jane Gomez recanted their affidavits which implicated respondent Lacson in the murder of the KBG . On the other hand, private complainants Myrna Abalora, Leonora Amora, Nenita Alap-ap, Imelda Montero, Margarita Redillas, Carmelita Elcamel and Rolando Siplon also executed their respective affidavits of desistance declaring that they were no longer interested to prosecute these cases. Due to these developments, the twenty-six (26) accused, including respondent Lacson, filed five separate but identical motions to (1) make a judicial determination of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest; (2) hold in abeyance the issuance of the warrants, and (3) dismiss the cases should the trial court find lack of probable cause. The records of the case before us are not clear whether the private offended parties were notified of the hearing on March 22, 1999 held by Judge Agnir to resolve the motions filed by respondent Lacson and the other accused. On March 27, 2001, PNP Director Leandro R. Mendoza indorsed to the Department of Justice the new affidavits of P/Insp. Ysmael S. Yu and P/S Insp. Abelardo Ramos regarding the Kuratong Baleleng incident for preliminary investigation. On the strength of this indorsement, Secretary of Justice Hernando B. Perez formed a to investigate the matter..

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On May 28, 2001, respondent Lacson, et al., invoking, among others, their constitutional right against double jeopardy, filed a petition for prohibition with application for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, primarily to en the State prosecutors from conducting the preliminary investigation. On June 6, 2001, eleven (11) Informations for murder involving the killing of the same of the Kuratong Baleleng gang were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon. The new Informations charged as principals thirty-four (34) people, including respondent Lacson and his twenty-five (25) other coaccused. The criminal cases were assigned to Judge Ma. Theresa L. Yadao. The Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order ening Judge Yadao from issuing a warrant of arrest or conducting any proceeding or hearing in Criminal Cases Nos. 01101102 to 01-101112. On August 24, 2001, the Court of Appeals (Special Third Division), rendered the now assailed Decision. It characterized the termination of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-9981689 as “provisional dismissal,” and considered Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 as mere revivals of the same. Applying Section 8, Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, it dismissed the criminal cases against the respondent ISSUE: whether Section 8, Rule 117 bars the filing of the eleven (11) informations against the respondent Lacson involving the killing of some of the Kuratong Baleleng gangNO (AT LEAST NOT YET) Like any other favorable procedural rule, this new rule can be given retroactive effect. However, this Court cannot rule on this jugular issue due to the lack of sufficient factual bases. Thus, there is need of proof of the following facts, viz: (1) whether the provisional dismissal of the cases had the express consent of the accused; (2) whether it was ordered by the court after notice to the offended party, (3) whether the 2-year period to revive has already lapsed, and (4) whether there is any justification for the filing of the cases beyond the 2-year period. There is no uncertainty with respect to the fact that the provisional dismissal of the cases against respondent Lacson bears his express consent. It was respondent Lacson himself who moved to dismiss the subject cases for lack of probable cause before then Judge Agnir, hence, it is beyond argument that their dismissal bears his express consent. The records of the case, however, do not reveal with equal clarity and conclusiveness whether notices to the offended parties were given before the cases against the respondent Lacson were dismissed by then Judge Agnir. The issue of whether or not the reinvestigation is barred by Section 8, Rule 117 was not tackled by the litigants at the RTC level. Nor was the fact of notice to the offended parties the subject of proof after the eleven (11) informations for murder against respondent Lacson and company were revived in the RTC of Quezon City presided by Judge Yadao. There was hardly any proceeding conducted in the case for respondent Lacson immediately filed a petition for certiorari in the appellate court challenging, among others, the authority of Judge Yadao to

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entertain the revived informations for multiple murder against him. This is not to be wondered at. The applicability of Section 8, Rule 117 was never considered in the trial court. It was in the Court of Appeals where respondent Lacson raised for the first time the argument that Section 8, Rule 117 bars the revival of the multiple murder cases against him. Indeed, the records of this case are inconclusive on the factual issue of whether the multiple murder cases against respondent Lacson are being revived within or beyond the 2-year bar. The reckoning date of the 2-year bar has to be first determined - - whether it is from the date of the Order of then Judge Agnir dismissing the cases or from the dates the Order were received by the various offended parties or from the date of the effectivity of the new rule. If the cases were revived only after the 2-year bar, the State must be given the opportunity to justify its failure to comply with said timeline. The new rule fixes a timeline to penalize the State for its inexcusable delay in prosecuting cases already filed in courts. It can therefore present compelling reasons to justify the revival of cases beyond the 2-year bar. In light of the lack of or the conflicting evidence on the various requirements to determine the applicability of Section 8, Rule 117, this Court is not in a position to rule whether or not the refiling of the cases for multiple murder against respondent Lacson should be ened. Fundamental fairness requires that both the prosecution and the respondent Lacson should be afforded the opportunity to be heard and to adduce evidence on the presence or absence of the predicate facts upon which the application of the new rule depends. DISPOSITIVE: case at bar is remanded to the RTC - Quezon City, Branch 81 so that the State prosecutors and the respondent Lacson can adduce evidence and be heard on whether the requirements of Section 8, Rule 117 have been complied with on the basis of the evidence of which the trial court should make a ruling on whether the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01101102 to 01-101112 should be dismissed or not. Pending the ruling, the trial court is restrained from issuing any warrant of arrest against the respondent

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PEOPLE V LACSON APRIL 1, 2003

Before the Court is the petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 28, 2002 ISSUE: WON SECTION 8, RULE 117 OF THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IS APPLICABLE TO CRIMINAL CASES NOS. Q-99-81679 TO Q-99-81689- NO Having invoked Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure before the petitioners- of prosecutors and before the Court of Appeals, the respondent is burdened to establish the essential requisites of the first paragraph thereof, namely: 1. the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case; 2. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case; 3. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; 4. the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case. The foregoing requirements are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the second paragraph of the new rule. The raison d’ etre for the requirement of the express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of a criminal case is to bar him from subsequently asserting that the revival of the criminal case will place him in double jeopardy for the same offense or for an offense necessarily included therein. Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after the issuance thereof without the case having been revived, the provision should be construed to mean that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after service of the order of dismissal on the public prosecutor who has control of the prosecution without the criminal case having been revived. The public prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with the timeline unless he is served with a copy of the order of dismissal. Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or in writing. It is a positive, direct, unequivocal consent requiring no inference or implication to supply its meaning. Where the accused writes on the motion of a prosecutor for a provisional dismissal of the case No objection or With my conformity, the writing amounts to express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of the case. The mere inaction or silence of the accused to a motion for a provisional dismissal of the case or his failure to object to a provisional dismissal does not amount to express consent. A motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal of a case is an express consent to such provisional dismissal. If a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused, the case may be revived only within the periods provided in the new rule. On the other hand, if a criminal case is provisionally dismissed without the express consent of the accused or over his objection, the new rule would not apply. The case may be revived or refiled even beyond the prescribed periods subject to the right of the accused to oppose the same on the ground of double jeopardy or that such revival or refiling is barred by the statute of limitations. The case may be revived by the State within the time-bar either by the refiling of the Information or by the filing of a new

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Information for the same offense or an offense necessarily included therein. There would be no need of a new preliminary investigation. However, in a case wherein after the provisional dismissal of a criminal case, the original witnesses of the prosecution or some of them may have recanted their testimonies or may have died or may no longer be available and new witnesses for the State have emerged, a new preliminary investigation must be conducted before an Information is refiled or a new Information is filed. A new preliminary investigation is also required if aside from the original accused, other persons are charged under a new criminal complaint for the same offense or necessarily included therein; or if under a new criminal complaint, the original charge has been upgraded; or if under a new criminal complaint, the criminal liability of the accused is upgraded from that as an accessory to that as a principal. The accused must be accorded the right to submit counter-affidavits and evidence. After all, “the fiscal is not called by the Rules of Court to wait in ambush; the role of a fiscal is not mainly to prosecute but essentially to do justice to every man and to assist the court in dispensing that justice.” In this case, the respondent has failed to prove that the first and second requisites of the first paragraph of the new rule were present when Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q99-81679 to Q-99-81689. Irrefragably, the prosecution did not file any motion for the provisional dismissal of the said criminal cases. For his part, the respondent merely filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause and for examination of prosecution witnesses. The respondent did not pray for the dismissal, provisional or otherwise, of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. Neither did he ever agree, impliedly or expressly, to a mere provisional dismissal of the cases. The respondent’s issions made in the course of the proceedings in the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive on him. The respondent is barred from repudiating his issions absent evidence of palpable mistake in making such issions. To apply the new rule in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q99-81689 would be to add to or make exceptions from the new rule which are not expressly or impliedly included therein. This the Court cannot and should not do. The Court also agrees with the petitioners’ contention that no notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 or of the hearing thereon was served on the heirs of the victims at least three days before said hearing as mandated by Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. It must be borne in mind that in crimes involving private interests, the new rule requires that the offended party or parties or the heirs of the victims must be given adequate a priori notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal of the criminal case. Such notice may be served on the offended party or the heirs of the victim through the private prosecutor, if there is one, or through the public prosecutor who in turn must relay the notice to the offended party or the heirs of the victim to enable them to confer with him before the hearing or appear in court during the hearing. The proof of such service must be shown during the hearing on the motion, otherwise, the requirement of the new rule will become illusory

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien 

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Since the conditions sine qua non for the application of the new rule were not present when Judge Agnir, Jr. issued his resolution, the State is not barred by the time limit set forth in the second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The State can thus revive or refile Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 or file new Informations for multiple murder against the respondent. WON THE TIME-BAR IN SECTION 8, RULE 117 OF THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SHOULD BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY- NO The new rule is not a statute of limitations. Statutes of limitations are construed as acts of grace, and a surrender by the sovereign of its right to prosecute or of its right to prosecute at its discretion On the other hand, the time-bar under Section 8 of Rule 117 is akin to a special procedural limitation qualifying the right of the State to prosecute making the time-bar an essence of the given right or as an inherent part thereof, so that the lapse of the timebar operates to extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the accused. The time-bar under the new rule does not reduce the periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, a substantive law. It is but a limitation of the right of the State to revive a criminal case against the accused after the Information had been filed but subsequently provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused. Upon the lapse of the timeline under the new rule, the State is presumed, albeit disputably, to have abandoned or waived its right to revive the case and prosecute the accused. The Court agrees with the respondent that procedural laws may be applied retroactively. In Tan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that:”Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their age. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants’ rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. Nor is the retroactive application of procedural statutes constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. It has been held that “a person has no vested right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case, whether civil or criminal, of any other than the existing rules of procedure.” DISPOSITIVE: M.R. GRANTED; RTC DIRECTED TO FORTHWITH PROCEED WITH THE CRIMINAL CASES

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PEOPLE V. LACSON OCTOBER 7, 2003

Before the Court are the following motions of the respondent, to wit: (a) Omnibus Motion; (b) Motion for Reconsideration; (c) Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration; (d) Motion To Set for Oral Arguments RESPONDENT asserts that pursuant to a long line of jurisprudence and a long-standing judicial practice in applying penal law, Section 8, Rule 117 of the RR should be applied prospectively and retroactively without reservations, only and solely on the basis of its being favorable to the accused. He asserts that case law on the retroactive application of penal laws should likewise apply to criminal procedure, it being a branch of criminal law. The respondent insists that Section 8 was purposely crafted and included as a new provision to reinforce the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy disposition of his case. Accordingly, prospective application thereof would in effect give the petitioners more than two years from March 29, 1999 within which to revive the criminal cases, thus violating the respondent’s right to due process and equal protection of the law.

ISSUE: APPLICATION OF THE TIME-BAR RULE- PROSPECTIVE OR RETROACTIVE?- ONLY PROSPECTIVE. RAAR. The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that plagued the istration of the criminal justice system for the benefit of the State and the accused; not for the accused only. The Court emphasized in its assailed resolution that: In the new rule in question, it has fixed a time-bar of one year or two years for the revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused and with a priori notice to the offended party. In fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and those of the accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the State and the accused. It took into the substantial rights of both the State and of the accused to due process. The Court believed that the time limit is a reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with the consent of the accused and notice to the offended parties. The Court approved Section 8 pursuant to its power under Article VIII, Section 5, paragraph 5 of the Constitution. This constitutional grant to promulgate rules carries with it the power, inter alia, to determine whether to give the said rules prospective or retroactive effect. Moreover, under Rule 144 of the Rules of Court, the Court may not apply the rules to actions pending before it if in its opinion their application would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event, the former procedure shall apply. The absence of a provision in Section 8 giving it prospective application only does not proscribe the prospective application thereof; nor does it imply that the Court intended the new rule to be given retroactive and prospective effect. If the statutory purpose is clear, the provisions of the law should be construed as is conducive to fairness and justice, and in harmony with the general spirit and policy of the rule. It should be construed so as

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not to defeat but to carry out such end or purpose. A statute derives its vitality from the purpose for which it is approved. To construe it in a manner that disregards or defeats such purpose is to nullify or destroy the law. In Cometa v. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that "the spirit rather than the letter of the statute determines its construction; hence, a statute must be read according to its spirit or intent." While we may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, we nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, we defer not to the "letter that killeth" but to the "spirit that vivifieth, to give effect to the lawmaker’s will." The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar retroactively so that the two-year period commenced to run on March 31, 1999 when the public prosecutor received his copy of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the criminal cases is inconsistent with the intendment of the new rule. Instead of giving the State two years to revive provisionally dismissed cases, the State had considerably less than two years to do so. In this case, when the Court approved Section 8, it intended the new rule to be applied prospectively and not retroactively, for if the intention of the Court were otherwise, it would defeat the very purpose for which it was intended, namely, to give the State a period of two years from notice of the provisional dismissal of criminal cases with the express consent of the accused. It would be a denial of the State’s right to due process and a travesty of justice for the Court to apply the new rule retroactively in the present case as the respondent insists, considering that the criminal cases were provisionally dismissed by Judge Agnir, Jr. on March 29, 1999 before the new rule took effect on December 1, 2000. A retroactive application of the time-bar will result in absurd, unjust and oppressive consequences to the State and to the victims of crimes and their heirs. DISPOSITIVE: respondent Panfilo M. Lacson’s Omnibus Motion and Motion to Set for Oral Arguments are DENIED. The respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration and its Supplement are DENIED WITH FINALITY. The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is hereby DIRECTED to CONSOLIDATE Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 and to RE-RAFFLE the same with dispatch to one of the branches of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City designated as a special court, exclusively to try and decide heinous crimes.

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CONDRADA V. PEOPLE CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Petitioner was charged with rape. When he was arraigned on February 26, 1999, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge against him. On March 31, 1999, the date set by the trial court for the initial hearing, the prosecution moved that the same be postponed due to the absence of the complainant and her witnesses. The hearing was reset on April 29, 1999. On April 29, 1999, the prosecution again moved to postpone the hearing due to the absence of the complainant and her witnesses. Petitioner objected to the motion on the ground that his right to speedy trial was being violated by such postponements. The trial court granted the prosecution’s motion and reset the hearing on May 31, 1999. It also directed that the subpoenae to the complainant and her witnesses be coursed through the National Bureau of Investigation which handled the investigation of the case. During the hearing on May 31, 1999, the prosecution requested for another postponement. Petitioner moved for at least a temporary dismissal of the case. The prosecution manifested that it would not object to a temporary dismissal. Thus, on the same date, the trial court issued an order temporarily dismissing the case. On June 22, 1999, the prosecution filed a Motion for Reinstatement and/or Revival of Criminal Case No. 10770. Appended to said motion was the affidavit of private complainant that the subpoenae sent to her for the trial of the case did not reach her because in the meantime she had transferred her residence. The trial court set the hearing on the motion for reinstatement on June 25, 1999. Petitioner opposed the motion contending that the revival or reinstatement of the case will place him in double jeopardy. On September 29, 1999, the Court issued a resolution reinstating the said case and reiterating the issuance of a warrant of arrest for petitioner. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said resolution insisting that the reinstatement of the case will place him in double jeopardy. On January 14, 2000, the court issued a resolution denying the motion for reconsideration of petitioner. Consequently, Criminal Case No. 10770 is still pending before the trial court. Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition on February 1, 2000. He claims that Criminal Case No. 10770 cannot be revived because the dismissal of the case on May 31, 1999 is permanent in character, having been made in consideration of his right to speedy trial. The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that the case was dismissed not because petitioner’s right to speedy trial has been violated by the postponements of the trial on several instances, but because petitioner through counsel moved that the case be dismissed at least even temporarily to which the public prosecutor interposed no objection. The Solicitor General points out that the prosecution moved for the postponement of the trial several times in good faith and for valid reasons. He likewise argues that the revival of the case does not place the petitioner twice in jeopardy for the same offense because the dismissal of the case on May 31, 1999 was made at petitioner’s instance. ISSUES:

A.Whether or not the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 10770 by the trial court in its Order of June 25, 1999 is permanent in character so as to operate as an acquittal of the petitioner for the crime charged- NO B.Whether or not the reinstatement of Criminal Case No. 10770 places the petitioner in double jeopardy.- NO

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A permanent dismissal of a criminal case may refer to the termination of the case on the merits, resulting in either the conviction or acquittal of the accused; to the dismissal of the case due to the prosecution’s failure to prosecute; or to the dismissal thereof on the ground of unreasonable delay in the proceedings, in violation of the accused’s right to speedy disposition or trial of the case against him. In contrast, a provisional dismissal of a criminal case is a dismissal without prejudice to the reinstatement thereof before the order of dismissal becomes final or to the subsequent filing of a new information for the offense within the periods allowed under the Revised Penal Code or the Revised Rules of Court. In the present case, it is clear from the records that the dismissal ordered by the trial court on May 31, 1999 was a temporary dismissal of the case, and not a permanent dismissal on the ground that the right of the accused to speedy trial had been violated by the delay in the prosecution of the said case. The trial court apparently denied petitioner’s motion to have Criminal Case No. 10770 dismissed on the ground of his right to speedy trial when despite said motion made in open court on April 29, 1999, it ordered the resetting of the hearing of the case on May 31, 1999. In subsequently granting petitioner’s request for the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 10770 on May 31, 1999, the trial court expressly stated that the same was subject to reinstatement within thirty days from the date of the temporary dismissal. Therefore, it cannot be gainsaid that the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 10770 on May 31, 1999 was provisional or temporary, without prejudice to the revival thereof within thirty days from the date of dismissal. Thus, the Court finds that the reinstatement thereof on June 25, 1999 did not place petitioner in double jeopardy. The proscription against double jeopardy presupposes that an accused has been previously charged with an offense, and the case against him is terminated either by his acquittal or conviction, or dismissed in any other manner without his consent. As a general rule, the following requisites must be present for double jeopardy to attach: (1) a valid indictment, (2) before a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) the arraignment of the accused, (4) a valid plea entered by him, and (5) the acquittal or conviction of the accused, or the dismissal or termination of the case against him without his express consent. However, there are two exceptions to the foregoing rule, and double jeopardy may attach even if the dismissal of the case was with the consent of the accused: first, when there is insufficiency of evidence to the charge against him; and second, where there has been an unreasonable delay in the proceedings, in violation of the accused’s right to speedy trial. Petitioner is not in danger of being twice put in jeopardy with the reinstatement of Criminal Case No. 10770 because as earlier stated, said case was provisionally dismissed by the trial court upon his motion. Thus, the requirement that the dismissal of the case must be without the consent of the accused is not present in

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien this case. Neither does the case fall under any of the aforecited exceptions. The prosecution had not yet presented evidence at the time the case was dismissed on May 31, 1999. Moreover, as previously explained, said dismissal was temporary in nature, as the case was subject to reinstatement within thirty days from the date of dismissal

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